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Abstract 
This study investigates the characteristics of project finance transactions and establishes 
the cost determinants for non-recourse project finance in Africa within the energy, oil and 
gas, mining and infrastructure sectors. Essentially, this thesis will be investigating what 
the main cost determinants are which lenders use to price the risk in project finance 
transactions. 
Project finance risks such as market, operational, sponsor, political / regulatory and 
environmental risks are investigated. A loan transaction database is used to fit these risks 
to determine the relevant loan parameters available in the database, employing a 
regression model is used to obtain which loan parameters, and, in turn, risks, lenders 
price into the cost of the loans. The database represents non-recourse project finance 
transactions throughout Africa from 1995 to 2015 and was filtered down 89 loan entries 
that contained the most important loan parameters.  
Empirical results suggest that secured loans are priced in a different category to 
unsecured loans, increasing the All-In credit-spread by 196.94 bps (P-value < 0.1%) if the 
loan parameter is moved from an unsecured to a secured loan. Political / regulatory risk, 
which had a 27.697 bps increase in the All-in Credit-spread (P-value < 2.3%). This can be 
attributed to being a result of a country’s risk ranking, which was found to be the most 
significant pricing determinant for non-recourse loans on the African continent. 
Key words: project finance, non-recourse debt, special purpose vehicle (SPV), credit 
spread, finance, project-risk, credit spread, political risk. 
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1 Introduction 
Infrastructure development plays a key role in alleviating unemployment and improving 
the standard of living for citizens in the economies of developing countries.  African 
governments already at their public sector borrowing limits with constrained tax pools 
limits their opportunities to raise taxes and with the increased need to invest in social 
spending, are starting to look at alternative means of funding power and infrastructure 
projects.  Non-recourse Project Finance funding provides these governments the means 
to develop such projects without taking on additional direct debt on their balance sheets 
(Davis, 1996: P5). 
As stated in the Financial Times Online Blog: 
“A new report from the Centre for Global Development reveals the high importance 
placed on infrastructure by Africans across the continent relative to jobs and income 
related issues. In order to increase the pace of critical infrastructure investment, 
innovative financing mechanisms must be studied and scaled up.” 1 
A means of funding these capital intensive projects is to use Project Finance (PF),  defined 
as financing  with no recourse to the equity sponsors, who typically contribute 20-35% 
of the project’s capital with the remainder sourced using debt financing (Davis, 1996: 
P11).  The loans are only repaid through the cash flow revenue derived from the project 
itself, with limited resale value of the underlying project asset, and no financing recourse 
to the equity sponsor during the normal operation of the project.  The projects require 
creating a stand-alone special purpose vehicle (SPV) company for control of ownership 
and operation lifecycle for a given operational period, after which the project is either 
1 Hruby, A., Jawara III, D., 2015, “Guest post: closing the infrastructure investment gap in Africa”, Financial 
Times Website, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/03/06/guest-post-closing-the-
infrastructure-investment-gap-in-africa/ (accessed January 2016) 
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decommissioned, handed over to the government, or the off-taker agreement2 is renewed 
with the off-taker.  
These independent SPV companies are legally ring-fenced from the equity providers 
(sponsors) in terms of permitting, funding recourse and project risks. Debt providers, 
however, have recourse to the SPV and its underlying assets, but not to equity providers.  
While project financing has increased in use in recent years, limited research is available 
in terms of what the drivers are for lenders in determining how the borrowing costs are 
priced, and how the lenders perceive the risks of the projects.  As project finance is 
relatively new to Africa, local banks appear to take a conservative approach on pricing 
the project-risks, with higher interest spreads, longer loan maturities and the use of debt 
service covenants up to the maturity of the loan. This has resulted in more expensive cost 
of debt when compared to international (American and European) financing, which is 
based on a lower interest base-rate (e.g. LIBOR) and fewer debt service covenants 
(Kleimeier & Megginson, 2000).  If, however, international lenders might also price in 
foreign market risks, such as currency exchange risks and sovereign risks, which the local 
lenders do not price into their credit spreads.  The question is how does this compare to 
the all-in cost of non-recourse project finance loans in Africa and what are the most 
important cost determinants when lenders price these loans? 
Previous research (Kleimeier & Megginson, 2001) has found that project finance costing 
is dependent on various factors of which loan characteristics (Size, Maturity, Third Party 
Guarantees) and project characteristics (Currency Risk, Sovereign Risk) have an effect on 
the pricing. Further research (Kleimeier & Megginson, 1997) has been conducted into 
comparing the pricing cost of project finance in Asia and developed western countries 
and (Europe and USA) what factors dominate lender-pricing decisions.  
                                                        
2 Off-taker Agreement: The agreement between a resource’s purchaser and producer, for the purchaser to 
purchase project’s future production, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/offtake-agreement.asp  
(accessed on 30 June 2016). 
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According to Sorge & Gadanecz (2008: P2) “project finance grants emerging market 
borrowers access to long-term funds at affordable rates”.  As long as the new regulatory 
framework (Basel Accords) takes into account the adequate project-risk priced in longer-
term project finance loans, it can be ascertained that international trading banks will not 
be discouraged from investing in project finance in developing countries (Sorge & 
Gadanecz, 2008). 
As such, how do these project characteristics affect the price of non-recourse debt, taking 
into account that project finance is seen as a higher-risk financial product and how do 
commercial banks, development banks and export credit agencies (ECAs) who typically 
finance these projects have different cost determinants to address their risk perceptions? 
This thesis will investigate the cost determinants for project-financed transactions in the 
energy, oil and gas, mining and infrastructure sectors.  The principles, however, will apply 
to most other general infrastructure projects, where there is a fixed off-take agreement 
over the course of the operational lifespan.  
As most of the existing academic research has focused on global project financed 
transactions, there is a need to investigate what the borrowing cost determinants are for 
African project finance transactions including the determining loan characteristics, such 
as loan size, loan maturity period, third party guarantees, loan covenants, etc., which 
lenders use to price the relevant project risks.  
This thesis will compare loan-pricing determinants of lenders in Africa, using loan 
information from the Thomas Reuters Dealscan loan database.  Detailed research will be 
undertaken to understand what project risks are present for non-recourse loans, 
followed by a regression analysis to compare all loan characteristics, in order better to 
understand the determinants of loan pricing and the main cost drivers for financial 
institutions in pricing the project risk. The thesis will also consider various pricing effects 
of including additional project characteristics such as currency risk with regard to 
international debt providers. 
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This investigation is currently both highly relevant and worthwhile as African 
governments and investors need to consider innovative solutions in facing the challenges 
of infrastructure financing. There also is a need to understand the credit spread 
determinants on existing project finance loans better. Greater understanding of loan 
characteristics, such as loan size, maturity periods, third party guarantees, loan 
securisation and covenants, as well as what external loan characteristics such as country 
risk rank and off-taker guarantees, allows project developers and investors to  
understand better how lenders price non-recourse loans in developing countries. This 
allows investors at a project pre-feasibility stage to consider the economic viability of 
investments in specific countries that have higher political risks, and in sectors with loans 
which require certain characteristics, and how these investments can compare to other 
countries and industry sectors, through understanding the cost determinants of project 
financing funding. 
The Thomas Reuters PLC Dealscan database used in this thesis represents the most 
detailed information on financing deals in Africa, which shows project finance as 
becoming an increasingly popular means of debt financing. This ranged from capital 
intensive projects over the last 20 years, ranging from construction (in Algeria, South 
Africa), mining (Zambia, Liberia, Mali, Tanzania, Botswana, Ghana, South Africa), utilities 
(Cameroon, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, Morocco, Mozambique, Egypt), to less capital 
intensive industries such as financial services (Ivory Coast, Seychelles) and business 
services (Gabon,  South Africa). 
An investigation of the most recent theoretical research and empirical findings on project 
finance follows in the Literature Review chapter.  This is followed by a review of previous 
regression techniques that have been used on project finance, as well as the compilation 
of the multiple regression model used is discussed in the Data and Methodology chapter. 
The empirical findings and the testing of sensitivities of the regression analysis are 
contained in the Findings chapter.  The empirical findings are reviewed in context with 
previous research in the Discussion chapter. The Conclusions chapter wraps up the 
findings and provides suggestions for any further studies.   
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter will focus on researching the characteristics and properties of non-recourse 
project finance, how it is project finance is applied and what inherent risks are presents 
in this source of debt financing. An investigation is undertaken into how lenders price 
and mitigate these risks, and what previous research has been done on risk pricing, and 
how this can be used to better understand how lenders price in the risks for project 
finance debt. 
2.1 What is Project Finance? 
Project Finance (PF), a relatively new financing technique used in Africa, has become 
increasingly popular in financing projects which are long-term and capital intensive in 
nature within the natural resources, telecommunications, oil and gas, energy and 
infrastructure sectors.  Throughout the mid 1990’s lenders were financing projects using 
PF with the relevant terms and structures which would have been unimaginable a few 
decades ago.  The worldwide number of project financed deals increased in the mid-
1990s up until the Brazilian Real devaluation, Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 1998 
Russian default (Davis, 1996: P9). Thereafter, PF deals reached new highs globally in the 
2000s before declining again along with the collapse of the US equity markets notably in 
the technology, telecommunications and power generation sectors.  In particular, the fall 
in the US west coast energy sector with the Enron and PG&E bankruptcies renewed the 
scrutiny of trading and off-balance sheet financing. (Davis, 1996: P13-15) 
In a global context, there is not much difference in the projects as these economic woes 
had medium term effects on lenders’ appetite and their abilities to finance projects, which 
reflected on the financing terms offered to borrowers (Davis, 1996).  
Davis (1996) concludes that there are significant differences to financing projects 
through PF in member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the developing world, in which Africa is categorised. Even 
though African PF has had limited exposure to the lending market, it has become a 
significant avenue of financing projects from the 1990s.  This is mainly due to 
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improvement of legislative and regulatory frameworks, lawyers and bankers accustomed 
themselves to PF financial and legal concepts, and the opening of infrastructure markets 
to private companies.  
Project finance is primarily used in developing countries for energy and infrastructure 
projects, due to it allowing governments not to take on additional debt onto the countries’ 
balance sheets due to PF being limited- or non-recourse to the equity provides. This in 
turn has a limited influence on a country’s sovereign credit rating, as the projects’ debt 
are not recorded as long-term liabilities. Project finance can be more leveraged (higher 
proportion of debt) than traditional on-balance-sheet collateralised financing resulting 
in a lower project financing cost.  It is most suitable for projects which: 
 are highly capital intensive; 
 are contractually ring-fenced away from the borrowers and their parent 
companies; 
 are able to consist out of a consortium of different debt and equity providers; 
 have limited resource, equipment and cash flow lifespans; 
 have predictable revenue and expenses contained within a special project vehicle 
company with no requirements for additional investment during operation; 
 Has limited or non-recourse towards the borrower, where only cash flows from 
the project itself supports loan repayments; 
 Binds parties to the project company and transfers the risk accordingly through 
the extensive use of Non-financial contractual (NFC) agreements. 
Project finance has been a successful means of financing stand-alone projects in Europe 
since the 1970s, such as the English Tunnel, Euro Disney, and the exploration of oil and 
gas in the North Sea (Esty, 2003).  It has since penetrated new geographical regions in 
Asia, Australia, South America and Africa.  As PF progressed and moved into new 
industries, lenders have become more confident with this loan type.  They have 
subsequently reduced the credit costs, loosened loan covenants, extended the maturities 
of the loans and decreased lending spreads (Esty, 2003), making it even more available 
to a larger network of projects.  PF has further seen a tremendous growth in countries 
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that are beginning to privatise their public services, such as electricity generation and 
distribution, water provision, toll roads, pipelines and telecommunication.  Before the 
1970s, the majority of global project finance was concentrated in the mining and oil 
exploration industries (Davis, 1996).   
PF was originally used in the energy sector, and subsequently has been successfully 
implemented in the oil and gas, infrastructure and telecom sectors (Borgonovo, Gatti & 
Pecatti, 2010).  The attractiveness of PF funding is that it limits and removes risk 
exposure of the borrowing firm’s balance sheets, which is important when entering risky 
markets such as developing countries. 
The structure of PF allows for the project and risks to be ring-fenced and isolated, 
removing any misalignment of lender and borrower conflicts i.e. agency conflict, and 
creating a ‘community of interests’ between lenders and borrowers (Shen-fa & Xiao-ping, 
2009: P6) to decrease possibilities of any project failures.  From the equity sponsor’s 
perspective, PF also reduces the potential of ‘risk contamination’ to sponsors. If a project 
fails, it would not jeopardise the financial integrity of the sponsors’ core business (Sorge, 
2011: P96).  
According to Esty (2003), the analysis of future trends in PF can be split into the nature 
of the project assets and the financing of project assets. This thesis focuses on the latter, 
establishing which determinants are used in pricing the project risk of PF loans used in 
the African market, and considering the effect these cost determinants have on the pricing 
of non-recourse PF loans. 
Project finance is structured around a centre of contracts, focused around a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) entity, which becomes the counterparty to all operating, financing 
and revenue agreements.  The SPV is comprised of representatives from the sponsoring 
firms/equity-providers.  They are in turn the SPV’s shareholders who arrange financing 
with a syndication of banks, headed by a principal Lead Arranger who provides all funds 
to financially close, design, procure and construct the project. Various agreements 
transfer the risk away from the SPV and lenders such as: 
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 sales off-take agreements with the off-taker/purchaser (and sales take-or-pay 
guarantees towards the SPV); 
 concession/environmental/permitting authorisations from the local and national 
authorities; 
 input supply agreements with local suppliers;  
 shareholder agreements with the various project sponsors; and  
 loan-facility agreements with lenders who are providing the debt.  
Lenders further reduce the risk of loan repayments by requiring loan covenants to be in 
place for the duration of the loan repayments. The typical loan covenant used would be a 
debt service reserve account, ensuring that there is reverse revenue available that can be 
used to service the loan repayments in the event that revenue is unavailable for a short 
period.  The covenants are also designed to protect Lenders from asset substitution and 
project value expropriation by the borrower (Kleimeier & Meggison, 2001). 
Dailami & Hauswald (2001: P6) reasserted that ‘a firm is a nexus of contracts allocating 
contracted and non-contracted risks between different stakeholders’, and that ‘the markets 
assess the latter in the pricing of financial claims.’  Their study shows that, in the event of 
the lack of contractual agreements, the project risks are shared between the lenders and 
shareholders over time, despite loan covenants being in place which would have 
prevented risk shifting.   Contractual completeness is essential for the non-recourse 
feature of PF. This does not essentially provide project sponsors with the reasoning to 
‘engage high risk, low value activities in order to increase shareholder value at the expense 
of debtholders (debt agency)’.  ‘Informational advantage’ can still be exploited through 
equity-holders and project managers, leaving off-take agreements incomplete to lenders, 
in a way which will benefit equity-holders’ interests.  The Dailami & Hauswald (2001: P6) 
study observed that ‘market risk perceptions are a function of a project’s contractual 
structure.’ As projects are defined in terms of the nexus of individual contracts, the type 
and interface of these contracts motivate the use of PF, and provide a basis on project risk 
determination. 
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As PF projects only have a finite resource- and operational lifespan, both borrowers and 
lenders must ensure that the project’s expected performance figures will be met, by using 
realistic production and revenue models during the planning process.  The construction 
of the project is usually contracted out to a third party independent Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractor, who undertakes all the risk in 
designing, procuring and constructing the project facility.  After construction, the SPV 
enters into Operations and Maintenance (O&M) agreements with an independent 
operator to undertake all operational and maintenance obligations for the specific 
duration of the project’s lifespan.  An optimal combination of PF agreements, as 
mentioned above, is most effective in allocating risks to the most suitable counterparties 
who are able to deal with them (Bonetti, Caselli, & Gatti, 2010).  In the event that the 
project’s equity sponsors are also undertaking the construction and operation functions, 
the independent project company SPV will still enter into NFC agreements with the 
sponsor company’s EPC and O&M companies to ring-fence and transfer the 
constructional and operations risks onto these companies.  The lenders further transfer 
constructional and operational risk from the SPV to the EPC and O&M contractors by 
requiring them to provide performance guarantees to cover performance or delayed 
liquidated damages to the SPV.  Esty (2003) refers to NFC as ‘institutional risk 
management’ tools. 
These extensive contractual structures allow the projects to achieve a higher leverage of 
debt compared to commercial syndicated loans, as they are able to address agency 
conflict, and in turn reduce total agency costs related to such risky debt in-light of 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Shen-fa & Xiao-ping, 2009).  
Corielli, Gatti & Steffanoni (2010; P1298) conclude that lenders rely upon these NFC 
contracts to regulate project risks and costs. Lenders are, however, unwilling to lower 
their credit spreads if equity sponsors act as counterparties in the relevant project 
agreements (e.g. EPC or O&M contractors). 
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The Corielli, Gatti & Steffanoni (2006) study obtained and used data from the Dealogic 
ProjectWare database between January 1994 – 2003. The database was filtered to 
completely focused on loans awarded to project finance deals. 
The number of usable loans for the study was 1,093 deals to the value of US$195 Billion, 
and the study indicated that the largest share of loans were awarded to electricity, power 
and other utility industries, representing 52% of the total database value. 
Telecommunications where next in line with 28% and transportation with 14%. 
The study reveals the geographical breakdown of project finance loans, with four 
significant area are identified: Western Europe 30%, North America 16%, Eastern Europe 
15% and Southeast Asia 11% representing the respective breakdowns of the total of 
project finance loans.  
The study also categorised the distribution of project finance loans according to the rating 
of the borrowers’ country, and reclassified the Standard & Poor's country rating into five 
key categories.  This showed a bias towards projects in the first (and highest) rating class, 
and accounted for 66% of the value of project finance loans. Poor & speculative countries, 
developing countries received a lower proportion of project finance loans.  
Project size is available for 518 operations with an average of US$513 million (median 
value US$200 million) and the average value of spread is 172 basis points (137.5 median) 
and the average loan majority is 10.5 years (median 9.0). 
The study established that a number of variables, such as the level of NFC agreements 
entered into, micro-economical loan variables, geographical location (country) and the 
sector of transaction and industry all influence the loan interest rate and capital structure 
(debt leverage) of a project financed (PF) deal.  The study concluded that the country 
credit ratings and project industry are determinants in defining the level of debt structure 
and interest rates, and that NFC agreements help reduce agency risk.  The study could not 
confirm whether the agreements assist the projects in obtaining lower interest rates / 
loan spreads, or they increase the level of debt leverage for the project.  In addition, low 
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levels of revenue volatility result in the project being able to negotiate higher debt 
leverage levels. This is supported by Dailami & Hauswald (2001), who found that the 
Qatar Ras Gas project’s cash flow revenue was more important than the physical 
underlining assets, as a project’s real collateral in being able to negotiate lower interest 
rates.  This idea is further supported by Hainz & Kleimeier (2012; P6), citing Rajan & 
Winston (1995) who found that lender’s incentives to provide financing for the project 
improved in the case of banks who had a right to claim pre-specified collateral assets. 
Furthermore, Dailami & Hauswald (2001) determined that the lender’s risk perception is 
a function of the project’s contractual structure.  Projects where the risks are covered 
through NFC contracts result in lower credit spreads and longer debt tenors.  Corielli, 
Gatti & Steffanoni (2010) supported this finding, but also found that lenders are unwilling 
to reduce borrowing costs or increase the project leverage if the borrowers are involved 
as counter parties to the project’s NFC agreements.  Esty (2002) as cited by Gatti et al. 
(2007) finds that PF loans have higher leverage ratios (debt to equity) compared to 
regular corporate loans, with PF loans having 70% debt to equity ratio, versus 33.1% for 
corporate loans. A structural diagram of the various agreements and counterparties is 
shown below.  
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Figure 1: Project Finance Counter Party Agreements Structure
                     
Source: http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements/concessions-bots-dbos 
2.2 Why Project Finance? 
With Africa’s growth in economic development, increasingly more financing is required 
for long-term infrastructure projects within the natural resources, energy, 
telecommunications and infrastructure sectors.  
Governments are faced with new challenges resulting from high economic growth rates, 
which in turn yields immense economic benefits for the country, as there is more 
pressure on governments to provide education, social, health and environmental 
upliftment within their countries.  This in turn has led to the governments increasingly 
allocating a majority of their national budgets to address these concerns. Furthermore, 
as governments get closer to their public sector borrowing limits, and due to their limited 
tax base, they are unable to increase tax revenue to finance additional infrastructure 
projects. 
There is growing public opinion that infrastructure projects would be best suited for the 
private sector, with less intervention from the national government. In essence, due to 
governmental balance sheets being too small to finance these projects on their own, 
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partnering with private companies would be required to implement and finance such 
infrastructure projects. 
Developing countries have increasingly accessed international financing from the 1990s 
with great success, and is believed to be due to their own domestic economic growth, 
international policies and the opening of markets to international lenders (Dailami & 
Leipziger, 1998). 
According to Sorge & Gadanecz (2008: P2) ‘Project finance grants emerging market 
borrowers’ access to long-term funds at affordable rates’.  They further concluded that as 
long as the newer regulatory framework (the Basel Accord which restricts longer term 
debts) takes into account the reduced project risk lenders price into longer-term PF loans, 
and that lenders who provide global debt funding, would not be discouraged from 
investing in PF in developing countries.  This is supported by Davis (1996) who states 
that the Basel Committee assigned its Models Task Force in 2002 with analysing the 
unique credit considerations of PF.  The Task Force found that even though non-recourse 
PF loans should have a higher capital weighting (and in turn reduced debt : equity 
leveraging), compared to unsecured corporate loans, these higher capital requirements 
could reduce the profitability of such loans for banks who in turn will raise the cost of 
providing such loans, and deter banks from participating in loan syndications.  Banks 
have responded by: 
 Requiring loan features such as early-warning mechanisms to alert them if there 
are project difficulties;  
 Encouraging equity-holders to remedy project defaults by providing additional 
equity or any other forms of  equity support; and  
 Being able to provide debt restructuring.   
Subsequently a four-bank study steered by S&P Risk Solutions indicated that non-
recourse loans had reduced losses subsequent to project defaults, compared to 
unsecured corporate loans.  This was due to banking requirements, such as ‘first-priority 
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lenders, revenue cash-flow sweeps, covenant triggers and limitations on indebtedness’, 
which act as credit enhancements that mitigate project risk. (Davis, 1996: P10) 
Another means of financing infrastructure projects are through construction bonds, 
however, as African capital markets are relatively underdeveloped, firms do not have the 
capabilities to issue bonds at competitive returns for a long maturity.  An & Cheung 
(2010) found a correlation that for projects which require a larger capital amounts, 
companies would be more likely to use PF, and that managers’ skills have a profound 
effect on the possibility of positive outcomes for a project, resulting in PF financing to be 
chosen. Interestingly the study also found that using PF increases the relative advantage 
of being able to relieve expensive capital market imperfections for projects with 
extremely large fixed capital requirements, due to their larger project risks, with no 
compensating benefits that they could offer. 
Edwards (1986) observed that loan credit spreads charged in the lenders does not reflect 
the true risk associated with lending in developing countries, yields in sovereign bonds 
do capture this risk better. There is, however, still uncertainty as to whether bank loans 
price the risks correctly. 
Further studies (Pollio, 1998) found that the common beliefs of choosing PF over other 
debt financing options are ‘unconvincing’, and that the benefits of PF are ancillary, not 
paramount.  The main feature of PF was found to be the risk management features, with 
additional benefits of increased level of leverage, longer debt tenures and risk mitigation 
features. 
Kleimeier & Versteeg (2010) hypothesized that PF provides the catalyst for growth 
stimulation in developing countries, in that foreign capital is beneficial to the 
development of domestic financial sectors.  Their study found that developing countries 
gained up to 0.67% in annual economic growth when the level of PF in their sample size 
is increased from the 25th to the 75th percentile.  This is due to 38% of PF funding is in 
infrastructure projects, and is viewed as the most significant economic driver in 
developing countries.  An interesting comment from the study is that public investment 
    
19 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
in infrastructure doesn’t lead to the same economic growth as investment from the 
private sector through project finance, with no clear conclusions as to why. 
Furthermore, Shen-fa & Xiao-ping (2009) also found that the PF lowers the opportunity 
cost of underinvestment in large and riskier projects. 
2.3 Characteristics of Project Finance  
Project financing is non-recourse, revenue-flow based, with important influences relating 
to project off-taker creditworthiness, and the ability to execute contracts over the 
duration of the project lifespan.  PF has increased in popularity due to lenders who have 
started to focus more on straight forward projects (in contrast to complex Enron-type 
deals which were of-balance-sheet and hidden away among the subsidiary companies) 
and borrowers who are against financing a new project against a basket of their existing 
projects (Davis, 1996). 
Project Finance loans entail higher structuring and debt costs compared to corporate 
syndicated loans, and are estimated at 5% of the loan capital for project finance loans 
(Esty, 2003).  Due to the advantages of NFC counterparty agreements, surplus expenses 
are more than counteracted through the advantages of the sponsors’ off-balance sheet 
financing structure, with the resulting appropriate risk allocation reduction (Bonetti, 
Caselli & Gatti, 2010). 
The Esty (2003) study used data from Thomson Financial SDC database. The database 
contains over 1,200 signed deals between 1997 and 2001. The data indicates that 
projects tend to be larger than $100 million in size, and often highly leveraged capital 
structures with long, but limited project lifespans. The study reveals that 27% of projects 
are under $100 million in size and 26% of projects are larger than $500 million in size, 
and account for 74% of total lending volume.  Majority of expenditure comes from 
projects greater than $1 billion in size, they account for 12% of projects by number and 
53% by total cost over 5 years. Petrochemical, telecom's, and oil & gas sectors is shown 
to have the greatest number of large projects (i.e. greater than $1 billion).  
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It was found that the loan term structure of PF loans has a bell-shaped costing curve 
(Sorge & Gadanecz, 2008), contradicting other types of financing loans, where the credit 
risk accordingly increases with the loan maturity levels.  Shen-fa & Xiao-ping (2009) 
concluded that PF loans carry a lower risk than short-term corporate loans, but there was 
no significant linear relationship between loan spreads and maturity.  All other 
commercial financing loans and bonds had an upward sloping regression line between 
maturity and spreads, implying that lenders expect higher spreads for longer exposure to 
risk.  
Sorge (2011) previously investigated the impact of credit risk, in particular political risk 
and the use of sovereign guarantees on credit spreads (interest rates) in emerging 
economies.  The findings showed that there appears to be a hump-shaped term structure 
for credit spreads when the credit spread is plotted against the loan maturity duration.  
The study found that the size of the ‘hump’ increases as the degree of leverage increases 
and that longer maturity (15 to 20 years) loans are priced cheaper than shorter term (10 
to 15 years) loans.  This would raise the question whether lenders perceive longer term 
loan maturities as less risky.   
To obtain clarity on this, the relationship between corporate loan credit spreads versus 
maturities were investigated, with the research done by Gottesman & Roberts (2004).  
They tested whether lenders prefer short term debt to riskier borrowers, in order to 
control agency problems, i.e. asset substitution and underinvestment, (credit-quality 
hypothesis) or whether lenders prefer longer loan maturities (trade-off hypothesis), and 
whether lenders price their credit spreads accordingly.  The study concluded that both 
hypotheses reflected reality, but the findings strongly show that lenders supported a 
trade-off hypothesis more between the two scenarios.  
Sorge’s study (2011: P97) cited Merton’s (1974) earlier work on pricing risky debt, 
whereby the firm was expected to observe hump-shaped credit spreads for loans with 
different loan tenors.  Merton’s hypothesis in that ‘default risk underlying credit spreads 
is primarily driven by two components: the degree of the firm’s borrowing or leverage, and 
the uncertainty about the value of the firm’s assets at maturity.’  Furthermore, assuming 
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that the firm’s debt-leverage ratios are decreasing over time, thereby delaying the debt 
maturity dates and reducing the probability that the project’s value will be below the debt 
default level when loan repayment is due.  Contrary to this, a longer loan tenor also 
increases the uncertainties about the future value of the project’s assets.  
The Sorge (2011) study concluded that firms which commence with reduced debt 
leverage, additional assumption dominates, such as an upward sloping loan term 
structure.  The study also found that for projects with higher levels of debt, ‘the increase 
in default risk due to higher asset volatility will be strongly felt by debt holders at short 
maturities.’  As loan maturities further increases, ‘the first component will rapidly take 
over, thanks to the greater margin for risk reduction due to declining leverage.  This leads 
to a hump-shaped term structure of credit spreads for highly leveraged obligors’. (Sorge, 
2011: P97) 
Previous research (Kleimeier & Megginson, 2001) has also found that global project 
finance costing is dependent on various factors, of which loan characteristics (Size, 
Maturity, Third Party Guarantees) and project characteristics (Currency Risk, Sovereign 
Risk) have the largest effect on the pricing. Further research (Kleimeier & Megginson, 
1998) was conducted into comparing the project finance deals in Asia and Western-
developed countries and what factors dominate lender-pricing decisions.   
The Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) study used data from the Loanware database 
provided by Capital DATA (London based Company). The study focuses on the historical 
data between January 1, 1980 and March 23 1999 on signed loans and includes cancelled 
loans. A total 90,784 loans, worth $13.2 trillion, were examined in this study.  
 
The study found that loans are highly concentrated in five key industry areas, 60.2% of 
all project lending (by value) and 46.3% of all PF loans are made to borrowers in the 
communications, mining and natural resources, oil and gas, electricity and energy utility, 
and transportation (excluding airlines and shipping) industries. These industries account 
for only 21.8% of all syndicated lending (value) and 17.1% of all syndicated loans. 
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Countries that attract bulk of general syndicated lending is concentrated in the United 
States (61.4% by value and 56.6% of all loans), only 16.8% of PF lending and only 14.7 
percent of PF loans go to U.S. borrowers.  The biggest recipient of PF lending was in south-
east Asia. This region accounts for 23.8% of the total value and no less than 30.3% of the 
total number of project finance loans, whereas it accounts for only a 5.2% of the value 
(and 10.8 percent of the number) of all syndicated lending. 
From the 25 largest PF loans arranged since 1980, the characteristics of the larger PF 
deals are that there were 46 loans associated with these 25 PF syndicated loans, 
averaging 1.84 loans per PF deal associated.  One of the key features in all these PF deals 
where that a newly created special project vehicle (SPV) company was setup to finance, 
build and operate the project. Another key feature the study found was that project 
sponsors are usually well known international companies, state-owned enterprises 
and/or governmental bodies that are joint through ownership and vehicle companies. 
Furthermore, loans are relatively long-term credits, and priced at a fixed spread above 
benchmark interest rates. These loans also included a feature of loan tranche that is fully 
or partially guaranteed by a creditworthy third party.                                                                      
 
PF loans have a longer average maturity and are more likely to have third party 
guarantees.  PF loans are far more likely to be requested from non-US borrowers and to 
riskier countries. PF loans often use fixed-rate rather than floating-rate loan pricing.   
 
According to the data, the features that consistently reduce the loan spreads were found 
to be whether a third party guarantee is present, and whether lending to a borrower in a 
collateralize asset-rich, such as oil and gas, real estate, and electric utilities industries 
increases loan spreads.  
It was found that the most important parameter which have an effect on the loan credit 
spreads is the level of country risk (positively correlating to credit spread and that where 
a countries risk rank was 30 versus one of 20 the loan spread increases between 11.7 and 
15.2 basis points). In addition, the year in which the loan is arranged (positively 
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correlating to credit spread), and whether there is a loan payment guarantee present 
from the government or a multilateral agency (negatively correlating to credit spread) 
also had an effect on the loan credit spreads.  
Due to the associated risks of non-recourse to equity providers, for PF projects which are 
at the development and construction stages, lenders are compensated with high upfront 
fee payments in order to entice them to participate in such long term, highly geared 
projects (Kleimeier & Meggison, 2001).  
Up until the late 1990’s there has been an increase in the risk tolerance for project finance 
deals, through increasing debt maturities, reduction in credit spreads, loosening of 
project covenants and extension of PF to emerging markets.  These trends, however, 
reversed as a result of the global consequences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 
Russian sovereign debt default and the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999.  
Lenders were unwilling to finance projects in emerging markets without support from 
sponsors, export credit agencies and insurance companies. (Davis, 1996). 
The bankruptcy of the Fiberoptic Link Around the Globe (FLAG) and Enron in the early 
2000s further compounded the risk perception of PF among lenders in the 
telecommunications and electricity sectors.  The immediate effect of the Enron 
bankruptcy was a loss on confidence among investors in the underlying project finance 
structure, and increased the risk perception towards borrowers.  This resulted in 
increased due diligences on the projects, increased counter-party guarantees and 
increased emphasis on the project’s free cash flows to service debt repayments, with an 
increase in debt service reserve loan covenants (Davis, 1996). 
Nguyen & Ross (2006) identified five risk-pricing factors as Operating, Environmental, 
Political/Regulatory, Market and Sponsor Risk. These are the key risk parameters 
affecting the project risk premium (usually expressed as a credit spread over a base rate).  
These risk-pricing factors could be analysed independently or combined given that they 
interact on each other.  Their study further suggests that the project risk premium can be 
adjusted for by non-risk pricing factors such as experience in the particular financing 
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instrument (e.g. project finance, collaterisable term loans etc.), expertise in the particular 
financing market, lenders financial capacity and competitive pressure within the 
financing market.  These non-risk pricing factors have indirect effects on the project risk 
premiums, for instance a lenders larger experience and their experience in PF might lead  
lenders being more assured of the market and thus provide lower project risk premiums.  
Lenders take these risk pricing factors and non-risk factors into consideration when 
deciding a project’s risk premium. These risk pricing and non-risk factors are further 
investigated below, as to which specific project risks they encompass.  
2.3.1 Operating risk 
Completion and operating risk is present when a project does not operate as planned 
within the project’s designed cost, performance, management and technical parameters. 
(Tinsley, 1999, as cited by Nguyen & Ross, 2006).  
Completion and operating cost overruns and plant underperformance exerts pressure on 
a project’s financial performance by reducing cash available to service debt and equity 
repayments. Operating costs overruns can be mitigated by entering into long term NFC 
agreements such as Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) and Operation 
and Maintenance (O&M) agreements, whereby the construction and maintenance 
companies are engaged with prior to the commencement of construction and operating 
phases of the plant.  Plant performance risk can also be mitigated through NFC 
agreements with the contractor responsible for constructing and operating the plant.  
These guarantee the performance, on the back of providing various guarantees, 
performance bonds and liquidated damages if the performance guarantees are not met. 
2.3.2 Management risk 
Management risk relates to the inability of the project company’s management to 
regulate and control the project’s output, operating cost and to the extent even run the 
project’s production facilities.   
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2.3.3 Technical risk 
The technical risk relates to new and untested equipment being used for a project 
whereby there is a risk of these technologies not being viable, nor being able to meet the 
plant’s projected output. As mentioned, these risks can be mitigated through NFC 
agreements with the respective third parties. 
2.3.4 Environmental Risk 
Environmental Risk relates to the possible environmental and social consequences the 
project could have on the surrounding environments and human inhabitants.  Lenders 
are increasingly requiring projects to use the IFC's Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability (Equator Principles).  Financial markets 
worldwide have accepted these Equator Principles as global best practice measures in 
managing environmental and social risks3. 
Even though environmental and social risk is present in projects, the study conducted by 
Nguyen & Ross (2006) concluded that environmental risk has the lowest perception 
among lenders and the least significant impact on affecting the project’s total risk 
premium. 
2.3.5 Political / Regulation Risk 
Political risk relates to the effect of a project’s host country’s political and regulatory 
environment on the viability of the project.  These political risks are political violence, 
war, nationalism and expropriation of property, changes in taxation, traffic, investment 
policies, foreign exchange control and currency convertibility.  It can also be noted that a 
specific project can be politically more sensitive in a country which is perceived to have 
a lower country political risk profile.   
                                                        
3 IFC website: 
www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Partnerships/
Equator+Principles+Financial+Institutions/ (accessed 20/06/16) 
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Political risk can be mitigated through lenders requiring the project company to purchase 
political risk insurance from government supported export credit agencies or third party 
insurance companies.   
The main attributors to Political / Regulation Risk is mainly attributed to Currency- and 
Sovereign risk, described in more detail below. 
2.3.5.1 Currency risk 
Currency risk exposure is present if the loan amount is in a currency that is different from 
the project revenue (and in turn loan repayments) and no currency hedge in the off-taker 
agreement is available for any movement in the different currencies. 
In some instances, the lender will usually require the borrower to hedge the exposure as 
a pre-condition of the loan (Pollio, 1998). 
Kleimeier & Meggison (2001) undertook an ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
analysis on the parameters that influence the pricing of loan spreads for project finance, 
with currency risk as a dummy.  They found there was a significant negative relationship 
with loan spread and the currency dummy, and that the mismatch between the currency 
of the lenders’ country and borrowers repayment significantly reduced the loan spread, 
on average by 42 basis points for project finance loans. 
Their understanding of this effect is that lenders might offer reduced credit spreads to 
projects who are willing to take on the currency exposure risks. It is not clear why this 
could result in increases in borrower default risk. The authors also provide an alternative 
explanation that the negative spread/currency risk relationship might be due to a yield 
premium charged to US borrowers, in that American borrowers pay higher spreads for 
loans than non-US borrowers.  Reasons given were that: 
 US corporations might have better access to syndicated loan markets than non-US 
corporations, and in turn the US corporations might have lower credit ratings; 
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 US lending might be used more for corporate take-over financing, which requires 
larger financing and larger spreads; and  
 There might be certain institutional features within the US loan market charging 
US borrowers relatively more than non-US borrowers. 
Hainz & Kleimeier (2003) in their earlier study found that international lending 
organizations (ILOs) are becoming increasingly present in using project finance in 
developing countries.  ILOs not only include Western (American and European 
commercial banks) but also international development agencies, such as the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (ERBD) or other national export-import banks.  The study’s hypothesises is 
that PF is a more preferred financing choice in developing countries, due to asymmetric 
information availability between borrowers, lenders and the respective governments 
causing a ‘moral hazard problem’ for the borrowers and lenders.  This is due to the ILOs 
being able to influence the outcome of a project’s success, through being able to influence 
the governments’ decisions. Their model’s results conclude that non-recourse financing 
offers the best incentives for lenders, and it is thus why PF is used in developing countries 
where there is a higher degree of political risk.  The model also reveals that the only ILO 
that has influence over such governments is the IFC.  This was observed that due to ILOs 
being able to use their leverage on the host governments to ‘prevent the governments from 
making decisions which could jeopardize the success of the projects funded by the ILOs’. 
(Hainz & Kleimeier, 2004: P290)  This explains the reason why projects with a perceived 
high degree of political risk utilise PF funding. 
Esty & Megginson (2003) support this statement, whereby their study concluded that   
countries with weak or un-enforceable legal rights, lenders syndications are relatively 
larger and distributed, in order to prevent any strategic defaults, and that even 
commercial banks can influence host governments and in turn reduce political and 
sovereign risk. 
The Hainz & Kleimeier (2003) study concludes that there is still a residual country risk 
unaccounted for by lenders in their loan-pricing, and that limited- or non-recourse loans 
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through a syndication of lenders is an efficient means of funding in countries with a high 
political risk. 
The Hainz & Kleimeier (2003) study’s finding is supported by previous studies, such as 
Esty & Megginson (2003) who concluded that in countries with higher political risk (i.e. 
weaker creditor rights and legal enforcement), ILO syndications were found to be more 
complex and integrated, in order to deter project risk default.  In contrast, it was found in 
countries with a lower political risk that syndications were structured to ensure 
monitoring of low-cost contracting.  The study concluded that a lender’s syndication 
structure is a direct result of country’s political risk levels and that political risk is 
reflected in the credit spread of the loan. 
Nguyen & Ross (2006) also confirmed that political risk is reflected in the credit spread 
of the loan, in their empirical study of non-recourse loan-pricing.  They also confirmed 
the importance of political risk in the context of PF.  In Australian project financed loans, 
there is a political risk premium, but it is of lower importance compared to other risk 
parameters in their study. They concluded that a higher level of importance might be 
attached to political risk by Australian lenders if the projects were in countries were there 
might be higher political risk. 
2.3.5.2 Sovereign risk 
Hainz & Kleimeier (2012) found that the loan term contract depends not only on political 
risk, but also on the legal and institutional environmental risk of the project country’s 
jurisdiction.  The study used indices sourced from Euromoney as inputs for the Coasian 
bargaining theory, and was used to clearly show that the higher the political risk of a 
country, the higher the probability is that PF loans will be used over other types of loans, 
and that development banks will participate in the loan syndication. 
Sovereign risk can be split into the ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ sovereign risks.  The harder risks 
include expropriation, currency restrictions, political violence (including war, sabotage 
or terrorism), failure to implement tariff adjustments as per the purchase agreement due 
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to political considerations, and quasi-commercial risks where state-owned 
suppliers/customers do not fulfil their contractual obligations. 
‘Softer’ sovereign risks are also present such as ‘bureaucracy quality, corruption, 
democratic accountable, ethnic tensions, government stability, investment profile, law and 
order, military politics, religious tensions and socio-economic tensions’, as defined by the 
International Country Risk Guide (Hainz & Kleimeier, 2012: P291). 
Further to the sources of risk in PF loans that the lenders take into consideration to price 
their perceived lending risk, Davis (1996) found that the following factors also influence 
the pricing of PF: 
2.3.5.3 Political Risk Insurance Coverage 
Insurance providers are assisting sponsors in covering various project risks  providing 
insurance products to the project covering construction-, operation-, off-taker- and 
residual value risks, and in turn reduces the project’s risks. (Davis, 1996: P8). The lenders 
view the insurance coverage as additional re-assurance against any possible project risks, 
and adjusts their risk margins and project covenants accordingly. 
2.3.6 Market risk 
Market Risk relates to the possibility that a ‘project’s product may not be able to be sold at 
a sufficient price to cover all the essential costs of the project and repay the debt in full’ 
(Mechnie, 1990: P313, as cited by Nguyen & Ross, 2006).  Market risk is caused by a 
decrease in commodity prices, or decrease in the demand for the project’s output. 
Commodity prices can be below the long-term forecast borrowers and lenders base their 
financial models on, and result in a reduction of the revenue available to service debt 
repayments (Davis, 1996).  This leads to a narrowing of market share, to the extreme 
situation of a total collapse in the international market of the project’s product. Market 
risk can also relate back to political/regulation risks, whereby changes in the project’s 
host government’s investment and economic policies could have an effect on the local 
market.  
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These market risks can be mitigated through detailed market forecasts and running 
market sensitivities in the project’s financial model.  Long-term NFC agreements, such as 
leases agreements with the property owners, supply agreements, off-take purchase 
agreements, wheeling agreements, and government guarantees provide natural 
mitigation to market risks, whereby the project’s off-take agreement can have take-or-
pay clauses and the project is assured a minimum price for the project.  Equity sponsors 
can further provide guarantees to mitigate risks in severe market circumstances. 
2.3.7 Sponsor risk 
Sponsor risk is best described as credit risk or equity risk, with reference to the financial 
strength, technical expertise and financial experience of both lenders and equity sponsors 
in the project.  Sponsor risk can be present in weak credit characteristics of the sponsors, 
internal conflicts between the project’s various equity sponsors and a weakness in the 
technical and financing expertise of the sponsors and their lenders.  
Sponsor risk can be mitigated by lenders doing a thorough due diligence on the sponsors 
and all the project’s internal and external NFC agreements.  Loan covenants and project 
cost contingencies provide additional support to the lenders.  
2.3.8 Non-risk Pricing Factors 
Non-risk pricing factors do play a significant, yet indirect effect on the project risk 
premium.  These pricing factors are worth mentioning, but are not explored in too great 
detail.  
The non-risk pricing parameters are experience and expertise in the particular financing 
instrument, expertise in the financing market, lenders financial capacity and the 
competitive pressure among lenders within the financing market (Nguyen & Ross, 2006).  
It should also be noted that additional non-risk pricing factors could be added, such as 
the Basel Banking Requirements, and the effect of ratings agencies on the indirect cost of 
debt premiums. 
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The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation has resulted in PF deals being perceived as 
riskier and having lower debt leverage compared to corporate loans, due to the unique 
risk profile of PF and their low level of recourse to borrowers (Esty & Christov, 2002).   
Furthermore, the effect of the Enron bankruptcy has resulted in rating agencies down 
rating PF deals, and resulting in ‘rating triggers’ being inserted in the loan agreements, 
which are seen as events of default when there is a rating downgrade. 
2.3.8.1 Financing expertise 
Financing expertise is a risk when the project’s sponsor does not adequately address 
interest rate and inflation volatility and thus changes in interest rates can affect a 
project’s capabilities to service its debt repayments.  Financial agreements, such as 
hedging agreements, can efficiently mitigate these risks. These hedging agreements can 
consist out of interest rate swaps, caps, collars or floors.  Off-taker and supply agreements 
can also incorporate price-adjustment features, in which a change in the interest rates or 
inflation can be passed through to the counterparty (Bonetti, Caselli & Gatti, 2010). 
 
2.4 Sources and Uses of Project Finance 
As PF lends itself better to support creditor rights, Hainz & Kleimeier (2012) found that 
PF funding was the least common source of financing projects in Western Europe, but the 
most important source of financing in developing countries such as Africa, Middle East 
and South East Asia. Even though these developing countries are politically riskier and 
have a higher degree of politically unstable governments, -banking markets and -
corporate governance, lenders in these markets are also more likely to partake in longer 
insolvency resolution processes.  
The Kleimeier & Meggison (2001) study concluded that due to PF loans having longer 
maturities, the credit spreads are based over a lower base benchmark interest rate, e.g. 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), Singapore Inter-Bank Offered Rate (SIBOR), 
etc., and that the PF loans were either fully or partially guaranteed by a third party. 
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Recent trends in PF have all assisted in the uptake of project finance by borrowers.  These 
trends include infrastructure requirements, industry privatisation, improvement of a 
country’s legislative and regulatory frameworks, development of financial innovation, 
local currency financing, broadened sources of funding and the role of insurance(Davis, 
1996).   
Insurance has played an increasingly important role in PF.  Insurers have taken on more 
of the construction, operating, off-taker and residual value risks as they have become 
more acquainted to the structures of project financing (Davis, 1996).  
Credit rating agencies have used the increased comfort of insurers to improve the credit 
ratings for infrastructure projects to ‘AAA’ levels through the projects guarantees 
provided by ‘AAA’ rated insurance companies. This has led to the uptake, securitisation 
and liquidity in PF deals (Davis, 1996). 
Hainz & Kleimeier (2012) also found that national development banks were active in loan 
club syndication, and that the most active multilateral financial institution was the 
European Investment Bank, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank being the most present multilateral 
development banks globally.  These development banks are also more likely to lend to 
borrowers in countries which have a French or German legal origin.  The development 
banks provide a ‘political umbrella’ and tend to focus more on projects with larger 
investments and longer lives, and less on mining and other industry (agriculture, trade, 
etc.) sectors. The syndication of international commercial lenders results in governments 
owing them substantial amounts of money over time, allowing these lenders to exert 
pressure on the government and allowing better bargaining power, which could allow 
banks to indirectly constrain adverse negative political actions (Hainz & Kleimeier, 2012; 
P17). 
PF is in essence a mechanism to deal with projects in high-risk countries and industries, 
whereby the project financing structure leads to a superior ability to facilitate 
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information sharing and provide good project management/governance, with 
independence from external sponsor governance (Kleimeier & Versteeg, 2010). 
 
2.5 Project Finance going forward: Effect of IFRS 16 
The fundamental nature of PF entails a long-term off-take purchase agreement for the 
project’s output.  This off-take agreement provides the required cash flow to enable the 
project to meet its debt and sponsors’ dividend obligations. 
Changes by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) through the newly 
promulgated International Financial Report Standards 16 (IFRS 16) will, however, 
change how lease agreements are accounted for.  A lessee is required to recognise the 
“right to use the leased item” as an asset and record the present value of all of the future 
lease payments as a liability.  The aim of the revised standard was to improve accounting 
transparency and assist with the calculation of a companies’ often substantial operating 
lease obligations whose long-term off-balance sheet lease financing is now better 
accounted for (IFRS, 2016).  IASB realised that a significant amount of long-term leases 
was recorded off-balance sheet, as presented by the percentage of understated leases 
from list companies as the heaviest users of off-balance sheet leases: 
Figure 2: Summary of long-term leases recorded off-balance sheet
   
Source : http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/138fe994-bdd5-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.html#axzz4CxzLXURH 
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Currently, International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee Standards 4 
(IFRIC 4) determines whether an arrangement can be classified as a lease and is 
determined through any arrangement that conveys the right to use an asset whereby the 
purchaser (lessee) has the right to control the use of the asset. (BDO, 2016)4 
The right to control the use of the underlying asset is conveyed if any of the following 
conditions are met: 
1.  The purchaser has the ability or right to operate the asset or direct others to operate 
the asset in a manner it determines while obtaining or controlling more than an 
insignificant amount of the output or other utility of the asset;  
2. The purchaser has the ability or right to control physical access to the underlying 
asset while obtaining or controlling more than an insignificant amount of the output 
or other utility of the asset. (BDO, 2016)5. 
The underlying principle of project finance is that long-term off-taker agreements are 
entered into, and form the basis of the project’s cash flow over the project’s lifespan. As 
per the definition mentioned in the paragraph above, these off-taker agreements can be 
classified as lease agreements, and once it has been decided that an arrangement contains 
a lease, that lease is accounted for under IAS17.  IFRS 16, issued in January 2016, will now 
replace earlier leasing standards IAS 17 and IRIC4 and will affect most companies that 
report under IFRS in 2019.   
                                                        
4 BDO publication, January 2016, “IFRS AT A GLANCE: IFRIC 4 Determining whether an Arrangement 
contains a Lease” 
http://www.bdointernational.com/Services/Audit/IFRS/IFRS%20at%20a%20Glance/Documents/IFRIC
%204.pdf  (accessed 29 June 2016) 
5 BDO publication, January 2016, “IFRS AT A GLANCE: IFRIC 4 Determining whether an Arrangement 
contains a Lease” 
http://www.bdointernational.com/Services/Audit/IFRS/IFRS%20at%20a%20Glance/Documents/IFRIC
%204.pdf  (accessed 29 June 2016) 
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Under the new IFRS 16, no distinction will be made between finance- and operating 
leases.  IFRS 16 will now bring to lessees to account a right-to-use asset and lease liability 
onto their balance sheets for all leases. This means the vast majority of operating leases 
as defined by the current leasing standard, IAS17, which currently do not impact the 
balance sheet, will be required to be capitalised on the balance sheet once IFRS 16 is 
adopted (IFRS2016).  
The IFRS 16 standard will have a profound consequence on lessees, and are 
counterparties to project finance.  The Lessees balance sheet will reflect a higher value of 
asset, but their liabilities will also increase.  The effect of IFRS 16 on the lessor (seller 
under the off-taker agreement) is minimal, as the Lessor will continue to account for 
leases based on the risk and rewards of the transaction.  There is no significant change 
for the Lessor as compared to the current standard IAS17.  The new standard does 
require additional disclosures to be presented.  
The effect of putting the leases on the balance sheets for the off-taker will result in higher 
reported liabilities and will affect how credit rating agencies (such as Moody’s, Fitch and 
Standard & Poor’s) assess a company’s default risk, and in turn its credit rating.  Vincent 
Papa, a director of financial reporting policy for Chartered Financial Analysts, states, 
“IFRS 16 will standardise the currently varied disclosure of leasing costs in footnotes”.   
He also is assured that IFRS 16 will improve the calculations of default risk, as presently 
a company’s reported leverage understates reality.6 
For companies with any significant leased assets, IFRS 16 will result in disclosure changes 
to reported profits, and recognition of previously unrecognized assets and liabilities.  
                                                        
6 Kate Burgess and Harriet Agnew, January 20, 2016, Financial Times, “Accounting’s big shake-
up to bring more transparency”  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/138fe994-bdd5-11e5-846f-
79b0e3d20eaf.html#axzz4CxzLXURH (accessed 29 June 2016) 
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These changes are likely to be material for corporates with large leased estates, such as 
certain distributors, manufacturers, retailers and hotel and leisure operators. 
These changes are likely to affect debt covenant calculations. The following are some 
implications to consider:  
2.5.1 Income statements 
Overall, IFRS16 is expected to have a limited impact on reported profit before tax.  
However the allocation of the expense would affect both EBITDA and EBIT, as these may 
increase materially, with property lease costs now being shown as depreciation and 
interest expenses and therefore no longer included as an expense in EBITDA and EBIT. 
This will have an impact on banking covenants and leverage ratios that are derived from 
standard income statement measures such as EBITDA and EBIT.  It could be suggested 
that lenders should revisit the definitions used for such covenant calculations, and ensure 
they are re-worded as necessary to take account of the forthcoming changes in 
accounting standards. 
2.5.2 Balance sheets  
The adoption of IFSR 16 is expected to result in a material increase in assets and 
liabilities, although it is estimated that the liabilities would exceed assets, resulting in a 
move from an overall net asset position to a net liability position. 
Lease liabilities will be classified as financial liabilities, and therefore will affect reported 
financial indebtedness, balance sheet ratios and covenants. 
2.5.3 Cash flow statements 
It is expected that IFSR 16 will have no direct effect on a company’s net cash flows. 
However the representation of cash flow statements would likely result in an increase in 
operating cash inflows, with a matching increase in financing cash outflows. 
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The principal payments on leases will now be classified as financing activities, whilst 
under IAS 7 the interest can be classified under operating, investing or financing cash 
flows. 
IFRS removes the requirement and subjectivity for investors, credit rating agencies and 
others to make adjustments for off-balance sheet leases.  Analysis has shown that 
common-practice adjustments are inconsistent, that they either over- or under-estimate, 
the value of off-balance sheet leases. (IFS Factsheet, 2016). 
Under IAS 17, credit rating agencies had adjusted credit scores to account for operating 
leases through disclosures in accounting footnotes.  However, different credit rating 
agencies use different methods to calculate how that they capitalize ‘operating leases’ as 
additional to property, plant and equipment assets. The corresponding debt obligations 
are only mentioned in footnotes to the financial statements, whereby the credit rating 
agencies calculate the corresponding debt by calculating the lease obligations net present 
value of the reported minimum lease commitments. The rating agencies then use this 
amount derived from the use of a sector multiple applied to annual cost of the lease. This 
is where the discrepancy has resulted in the past. As an example Moody uses a sector 
variable of 3x to 6x7, and Fitch have used 8x multiple as their base8. 
In light of IFRS 16, credit rating agencies announced that the revised methodology is 
expected to have a greater effect on industry sectors in which leases represent a large 
amount of the adjusted debt estimated by the credit rating agencies.  The credit rating 
agencies also stated that the revised approach for leases might result in a reduction in the 
                                                        
7 Moody article, June 2015, Moody's updates its global methodology for financial statement 
adjustments,https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-updates-its-global-methodology-for-
financial-statement-adjustments--PR_327853  (accessed 29 June 2016) 
8 Fitch article, 29 February 2016, “Lease Accounting Rule Changes Won't Hit Corporate Ratings”, 
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pressrelease?id=1000145  (accessed 29 June 2016) 
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adjusted debt estimated by the credit rating agency of about 5 per cent across all non-
financial corporates globally and positive rating actions for approximately 3 per cent of 
non-financial corporates globally.  The credit rating agencies concluded ‘that the effect is 
expected to be positive for companies where the reduction in adjusted debt results in a 
relatively large improvement in financial ratios’. (IFRS 2016) 
Given the above opinion about the future effect of IFRS 16, the disclosure of operating 
leases on the financial statements may result in companies reconsidering their use of 
them, as it will now be accounted for as an asset under IFRS 16. Unlike an actual owned 
fully purchased asset, there will be no asset owned at the end of the operating lease 
period.  
The implications of IFRS 16 are that off-take companies, who are currently the counter-
parties to Project Financed projects, might start steering away from entering into long 
term off-take agreements.  This is due to higher credit rating implications the off-take 
agreements might have on their companies, and in turn will lead to a decrease in number 
of projects being funded as non-recourse project-finance. 
2.6 Project Finance Theoretical Models  
Over the past few decades, non-recourse financing has attracted a large amount of 
academic awareness, with a large body of theoretical studies being made, but limited 
empirical studies available. 
Shah & Takor (1987) originally developed a theory regarding the ideal debt leveraged 
capital structure based on corporate taxed and information asymmetries.  The theory was 
used to explain why PF should be chosen in an organizational context for riskier 
investment projects and allows for higher debt financing than conventional commercial 
loans.   
In contrast to Shah & Takor(1987), Chemmanur & John (1996) further developed a 
symmetric information model, based on corporate control benefits. They concluded that 
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control benefits are a function of the project’s operating characteristics, weighing up the 
present value of control benefits against security benefits. 
John & John (1991) derived a model to calculate the optimal structure based on the 
agency cost of debt and the tax benefits of interest payments. The model showed that it 
is optimal to finance new projects with non-recourse PF.  They tested their hypothesis 
through providing a scenario where sponsors invest in a new project, take the tax subsidy 
and repay borrowers, while in the other chose not to and default.  Based on their 
theoretical results, the following four empirical implications were developed:  
 PF would be used if the growth  potential is large between two projects, due to the 
increase in project value also being large; 
 They predict a positive announcement of the sponsors stock value if PF is used, 
due to increase in growth options; 
 They predict less sponsor balance-sheet debt would be used for higher growth 
options; and 
 A certain amount of accounting choice predictions was made.   
Following on from this study, the model created by Chemmanur & John (1996) 
incorporates a choice between ownership and capital structure, testing the following 
scenarios to provide the best decisions for: 
 Incorporating new projects in the sponsor’s firm versus a SPV; 
 Amount of debt financing and structuring taking the above factor into account; 
and 
 The ultimate value position in each firm.   
The driving factor of the model is corporate control and the implication of using different 
kinds of financing with regard to capital and ownership structures. 
Chemmanur & John (1996) go on to derive two predictions from their model.  The first is 
that PF can be used to assure a level of control benefits for a project at a lower level than 
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the average level in the sponsor company.  Secondly, the sponsor company is able to 
develop several projects with a lower level of debt and higher levels of control benefits. 
2.7 Empirical Models 
The most comprehensive studies undertaken on PF has been Kleimeier & Megginson 
(1998, 2001). They empirically analysed variables within PF and the capital markets 
through regression methods. 
In their initial study, they tested if PF loans and non-PF loans are funded in an integrated 
market, or whether they are priced in separate markets, and found that both loan types 
are funded in a single market, and that floating-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads 
(over LIBOR) compared to non-PF loans.  They also found that PF loan spreads are 
directly related to borrower country risk, covenant and the degree of project leverage. 
Numerous academic literature was reviewed in the study and it used OLS regression 
analysis to analyse: 
 The influence of 18 independent variables on loan spreads; 
 Whether the different types of loans were priced in a similar manner (determining 
if the coefficient values and number of significant factors are similar for all 
groups); 
 Whether there is a price difference between PF loans and non-PF loans. 
Kleimeier & Megginson (2001:P18) used the Booth (1992) model and employed a 
standard OLS regression estimation technique and adjusted for heteroscedasticity using 
White (1980) methodology, to derive the following model: 
Spread = α + β1 Size + β2 Maturity + β3 Guarantee + β4 Currency Risk + β5 Country Risk                               
Rank + β6 Collateralisable Assets,              (1) 
where; 
Size:     Loan size, in US$ millions; 
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Maturity:   Loan maturity, in years; 
Guarantee: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan has a third-
party guarantee and 0 otherwise; 
Currency Risk:  Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is exposed to 
currency risk (the currency of the loan repayment cash flows 
differs from the borrower’s home country currency), and 0 
otherwise; 
Country Risk Rank:  Country risk rank, an integer ranking of country risk 
provided by Euromoney every year, where low risk 
countries have low ranks (Luxembourg =1 in late-1998) and 
high risk countries have high ranks (North Korea = 179); 
Collateralisable Assets: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the borrower is in an 
industry generally considered rich in Collateralisable 
(tangible, non-specialized) assets, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The results concluded that third-party guarantees significantly reduce loan spreads, 
while the size of the loan and time to maturity have no influence on PF loan-pricing.  It 
also concluded that credit-spreads were more if the project is in a sector rich in tangible 
assets, and that loan fees compliment loan spreads. 
Although heteroscedasticity was adjusted for by using the White (1980) methodology, 
‘panel data’ techniques can also be used to further compensate for heterogeneity as well 
(De Jager, 2008).  Panel data techniques refer to the combination of data from different 
time periods, thus creating a ‘pooled’ dataset where there is a limited amount of historical 
depth available for a particular individual data set.  Pooling the datasets increases the 
‘degrees of freedom’ and reduces the standard errors for the coefficients of a regression 
model.   
Subsequently, Kleimeier & Megginson in their 1998 paper have undertaken an empirical 
analysis of PF loans in Asia and the West (US and European markets) to investigate 
whether the same loan-pricing factors apply to both markets and what the impact of each 
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variable is on the two different loan types.  This was done in order to establish whether 
the two loan types are priced in an integrated market. 
The study uses the Chow test (the classical test for structural change) to establish 
whether the ‘Integrated Market Hypothesis’ is present in the PF loans and if they are 
priced in a ‘single market’.  The Chow test undertakes to test whether the loan-pricing 
factors examined are significantly present in both loan types, and if they are, whether the 
co-efficient values are also similar.  The Chow test used is shown below: 
F (J, n-k) = [(SSE* - SSE) / J] / [SSE / (n-k)],     
                                   With SSE   = SSE1 + SSEO;      (2) 
where;     
SSE* = Sum of squared errors from the regression on the combined sample;  
SSE1 = Sum of squared errors from the regression on the Asian sample; 
SSE0 = Sum of squared errors from the regression on the non-Asian sample; 
   J     = Number of independent variables, including the constant; 
   K     = Number of restrictions (2xJ); and 
   n     = Number of observations in the combined sample. 
The study went on to provide a detailed description of the loan-pricing variables, and 
each regression analysis included an intercept, three loan variables (Loan Size, Loan 
Maturity, and Guarantee Dummy) and three project variables (currency risk, country risk, 
and loan booked date).  The study found that with critical F-values of J (7), n (43) and k 
(14), it equals 3.38 with a 5% significance level.  Thus if the calculated test variables are 
more than this, the test Integrated Market Hypothesis needs to be rejected.  For values 
less than 3.38, it needs to be accepted.  The study concluded that F = 0.182 which was far 
below the critical level and it can be concluded that both types of loans have the same 
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pricing factors, and are priced based on the same risk factors in a single, integrated 
market. 
The paper concluded the following key points:  
 PF are on average larger with longer maturities than traditional loans;  
 PF are used by larger companies; 
 Larger and more capital intensive projects tended to have multiple sponsors 
involved, and dueto the fact that these PF projects are in riskier countries, it lead 
to conclude that sponsors prefer higher loan costs against a decrease in corporate 
risk for financing risky projects internally;  
 PF in turn has higher spreads compared to commercial loans, due to project risk 
factors; and 
 The loan spreads are positively related to loan maturities and riskiness of the 
project’s host nation, while negatively related to currency risk and the presence of 
loan guarantees by Sponsors, host governments, or development agencies.  
In summary, the paper concludes that PF is an efficient means of funding risky, high 
capital projects that have predictable, separable cash flows. 
Nguyen & Ross (2006) undertook a study on the asset risk-pricing decisions for 
Australian domestic project finance deals.  Lenders consisted of Australian commercial 
banks, consulting firms and superannuation funds.  They were presented with 16 
hypothetical risk-pricing cases and were required to participate in two level, five factor, 
one half fractional factorial experiment design (25-1), whereby the results were analysed 
using the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) method. 
The participants were asked to rate each project on a scale of 1 to 9, in order of riskiness 
of the five risk pricing factors (Operating, Environmental, Political / Regulatory, Market 
and Sponsor Risk) which the study concluded as key risk parameters affecting the project 
risk premium. 
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Their study found that market risk was the most influential factor, and accounts for 2.45 
basis points (bps) when the markets shifted from a low risk to high risk level. Operating 
(1.58 bps), political/regulation (1.52 bps) and sponsor (1.10) risks are also important in 
the risk allocation in pricing loans, but environmental risk (0.58 bps) carries the least 
importance in the weighting of loan risk pricing.  It must be noted that the projects were 
assumed to be domestically project financed projects, and that no foreign exchange 
currency risks were assumed. The study also concluded that even though the effect of 
political/regulation risk was not viewed as the most important parameter, that it could 
be a more important project risk cost driver for foreign project finance funding. 
The focus of this literature review has been on understanding what project finance is and 
how it has been applied to different industries. It is evident that the underlying basis to 
project finance are the various risks, and how these risks are mitigated and priced into 
the credit spreads by the lenders. 
To better understand how project finance is priced on the African continent, the cost 
determinants need to be derived through a linear regression model, using a historical 
loan database which indicates the various loan characteristics.   
The study follows on from here whereby an adequate loan database is obtained, filtered 
and the data processed so that the most relevant information can be extracted, and a 
linear regression model is derived in the Methodology chapter. The Finding chapter 
investigates and discusses the results of the regression model, where certain sensitivities 
were tested to check the suitability of the data and the regression models. The 
Discussions chapter follows on where the results of the regression models on the loan 
parameters are discussed and provides answers to the thesis hypothesis, through 
uncovering and discussing the regression model results, and how it ties in with what 
previous research has concluded. The Conclusion chapter focusses on the most important 
cost determinants are, and what conclusions are formed from the findings. Future 
research suggestions are also discussed in this chapter.  
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3 Data and Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to detail the research hypothesis and questions emanating 
from the Chapter One (Introduction) and the literature reviewed in Chapter Two 
(Literature Review), as well as deriving a suitable loan database to use.  
As the focus of this thesis is on understanding the risk-pricing determinants lenders use 
to price the resultant credit spreads (All-in Spread) for non-recourse project financed 
deals in Africa, a suitable database of loan information and an applicable regression 
model is required to determine the empirical analysis of what the cost determinants are. 
The first section of this Data and Methodology focuses on obtaining a suitable database 
with the various loan parameters, of which the most relevant parameters where filtered 
down in order to use the most relevant parameters in a regression model to determine 
which have the most significant effects on the pricing of loan credit spreads. 
The second section of this chapter investigates which previous regression models have 
been used in prior studies, and then a suitable regression model is derived in order to 
perform the empirical analysis. The findings of the analysis, is presented in the following 
chapter, Findings. 
 As the project risk pricing factors were identified as Operating, Environmental, 
Political/Regulation, Market and Sponsor Risk (Nguyen & Ross, 2006), a suitable loan 
database is required where the loan parameters can adequately be classified within these 
risk pricing categories. 
3.1 Loan Database 
The loan information was obtained from the online web Dealscan database, compiled by 
Thomas Reuters PLC, who provides the most comprehensive global financing deals from 
commercial and development banks. The Thomson Reuters Dealscan database contains 
historical information on the terms and conditions of financing deals on over 200,000 
loan transactions in the global commercial loan market. These transactions include 
finance M&A activity, working capital needs, non-recourse project finance, collaterised 
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loans and other general corporate purposes for loan participants worldwide. The 
database is compiled through sources which include regulatory filings, bank submissions 
and journalist contributions. The Dealscan database was accessed in November 2015, on 
which all the data was extracted for this thesis. 
Within the database, the user is able to set parameters and search for deals, and generate 
reports with the required loan parameters for further analysis. A description of all of the 
parameters in the Dealscan database is presented in Appendix A, with the original data 
abstracted, as well as the processed data, as described herewith below. 
3.2 Data Processing 
The Dealscan database lists loans for different purposes under the ‘Primary Purpose’ tab, 
including Acquisitions, Leverage Buyouts, Mergers, Leveraged Buyouts, Project Finance, 
Capital Expenditures, Working Capital, etc.  A filter was applied to extract the Project 
Finance loans, on which the loan data was further filtered by only viewing project finance 
deals in the ‘Market Segment’ tab.   
As the thesis is focused on the African continent, the ‘Region’ tab was selected as ‘Africa’ 
and all project finance loans were further reduced and resulted in 154 loan entries. 
The resultant list of project financed deals was further filtered in order to represent the 
loan agreements that commenced within the past 20 years, in the ‘Tranche Active Date’ 
tab. The 20 year period was chosen in order to obtain as much in loan deals as possible, 
and to establish a balanced weighing of the loan parameters. The earliest loans in the 
database were in 1997, of which there were 6 deals concluded Morocco (4), Ghana (1) 
and Seychelles (1). There were seven further deals in 1999 (five in Egypt and two in South 
Africa), where after there were a several deals each year until 2015. 
As we are investigating the cost determinants of project financing through analysing all 
of the loan variables, with the resultant output/dependent loan variable being the credit 
‘Margin’ rate that the lenders add onto the respective ‘Base Rate’.  This margin rate 
contains all the risks and costs which are priced into the loans, and is shown in the 
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database as the ‘All-In Spread Drawn’ tab as basis points (BPS), as well in the ‘Base Rate 
& Margin’, as basis points over the respective banking base rates (LIBOR, EURIBOR, FR, 
NIBOR, etc.). The database is further filtered to only show entries were the ‘Base Rate & 
Margin’ values are present. This reduced the database to 91 loan entries. 
The refined database contained complete entries of in the ‘Borrower Name’, ‘Region’, 
‘Country’, ‘Major Industry Group’, ‘Tranche Type’, ‘Tranche Active Date’, ‘Tranche 
Maturity Date’, ‘Tranche Amended’, ‘Tranche Amount’, ‘Tranche Amount Converted 
(USD)’, ‘Tranche Currency’, ‘Primary Purpose’, ‘Market Segment’, ‘Base Rate & Margin’, 
‘All in Spread Drawn’, ‘Secured’ and ‘Seniority’.  No information was provided for the 
Credit rating information (‘Moody’s Bank Loan Current’, ‘Moody’s Senior Unsecured’, 
‘S&P Bank Loan Current’ and ‘S&P Senior Unsecured’ tabs) and these tabs were 
subsequently removed from the database. Information in the ‘Sponsor’, ‘Floor’ and 
‘Original Issue Discount’ were also not provided, and these tabs were removed. 
There, however, appeared to be some incomplete tabs.  The ‘Guarantor’ tab only 
contained eight entries. This tab relates to the ‘Secured’ tab, whereby the loan is secured 
by any guarantees from the sponsors. The ‘Secured’ tab has 63 ‘Yes’ entries, implying that 
there is omitted information from the ‘Guarantor’ tab, and the tab is subsequently 
deleted.  
The ‘All in Spread Drawn’ tab has five omitted entries; however, these values can be 
copied over from the ‘Base Rate & Margin’ tab. The ‘Upfront Fee’ (11 entries), ‘Annual Fee’ 
(two entries), and ‘Commitment Fee’ (27 entries) have been deleted given it appears that 
there is incomplete data and that the ‘All in Spread Drawn’ includes these fees. 
As the thesis assumes that all PF loans are utilised, the All in Spread Undrawn’ tab, with 
six entries can be removed, as it does not serve a purpose in the regression model.  
The lenders’ information and identities are also incomplete, as ‘Top Tier Arranger’ only 
contains 34 entries, of which 14 are independent/standalone lenders, and 20 are a 
syndication of two or more lenders. This data field has incomplete entries in order derive 
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results as to whether domestic lenders price domestic projects cheaper than 
international lenders (only one domestic lender pricing a domestic project in the whole 
database), and whether domestic lenders price projects cheaper if there is no currency 
risk. Furthermore the database omits information on whether lenders price projects 
cheaper which are in the same legal frameworks, ( i.e. French-origin, British-origin, etc.) 
, whether syndicated lenders price loans differently to lenders on their own, and if the 
involvement of a development bank or agency further has an effect on the pricing. As 
there might be some inconsistence in how the ‘Top Tier Arranger’ tab is recorded in the 
Dealscan database, the lenders who are reported independent, might only be the main 
lender in a lender syndicate club, of which the status of the remaining lenders are 
unknown. Due to the inconsistencies in this data field, it would be best to delete it from 
the database. 
The data fields ‘LIN’ (4 entries), ‘Average Bid’ (3 entries), ‘Average Ask’ (3 entries), ‘Mean’ 
(3 entries),’Yield’ (3 entries) and ‘Discount Spread’ (3 entries) all relate to the pricing of 
the loans within the syndicated lender clubs. Due to insufficient data, this data fields are 
also deleted. 
The resulting database contains the borrower’s names (which can be ignored 
henceforward), Country, Industry type, Tranche Type, Tranche Active and Maturity Dates 
(i.e. loan term), Tranche Amendment details, Tranche amounts in local and US dollars, 
Tranche Currency, Base Rate & Margin, All-In Spread Drawn, Secured, and Loan Seniority 
Type. 
3.3 Loan Parameters 
The data fields are further refined to as follows to create tangible inputs for the regression 
model: 
3.3.1 Country  
As per the Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) model, each country was assigned a Country 
Risk Rank, taken directly from the semi-annual country risk tabulation in Euromoney 
magazine. Unfortunately, the Euromoney Country Risk Ranking database was not 
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available for this thesis, and a suitable alternative ranking was researched to be used as 
a proxy replacement. 
In order to take sovereign risk rating into account, the sovereign risk rating as per an 
international rating agency such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s can be used. Kamin & 
Von Kleist (1999) used a numerical conversion of the rating agency’s country credit 
rating into numerical rankings, with 1 being the best credit rating and 16 the worst. 
Kamin & Von Kleist (1999) found that previous investigations of developing markets’  
credit spreads have used various country performance variables, including the ‘debt/GDP 
ratio, debt service/exports, reserves/imports, etc., as measures of the borrower country’s 
creditworthiness’( Kamin & Von Kleist, 1999, P3).  
 Furthermore, Kamin & Von Kleist (1999: P12) suggests that the ‘credit ratings assigned 
to sovereign borrowers by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, completely subsume all 
information contained in country performance measures, and add information relative to 
those measures in explaining sovereign debt spreads.’ As credit rating agencies take the 
various credit worthiness properties relevant to an issuer into account, the value of the 
off-taker creditworthiness is increased, as the credit rating agencies do not merely 
provide a credit rating to the sovereign bond issuer’s country of origin. As the study’s 
database includes issues by both private and public bond institutions, the credit rating 
agencies affords a more detailed degree of the credit risk, than the specific issuer 
country’s performance measures alone. Therefore, Kamin & Von Kleist (1999) used the 
credit ratings agencies’ newly assigned loan and bond ratings, as a measure of credit risk. 
The Kamin & Von Kleist (1999) paper looked at credit spreads on emerging market 
sovereign bonds, whereby the country credit ratings assigned by Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor would be more applicable than Euromoney- or OECD Country Risk Ranking, as 
their study focused exclusively on credit spreads on sovereign bonds. 
The Euromoney Country Risk Ranking was used in the Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) 
model, this data was not available for this thesis, and data substitution source was 
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sourced. In light of limited country risk data available, Country Risk Ranking data from 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) website9 was 
obtained for the given year in which the project finance deal was undertaken. The risk 
rank is rated from 1 to 7, in order of the least to more riskiness of the country.  
The OECD website, defines the country risk classifications  as  the ‘Participants to the 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the ‘Arrangement‘)’ which are one of 
the most fundamental building blocks of the Arrangement rules on minimum premium 
rates for credit risk.  
As the country risk ratings are provided solely for the purpose of setting minimum 
premium rates for transactions supported according to the above mentioned 
arrangement, these are made available publicly so that any country that is not an OECD 
Member or a Participant to the Arrangement may observe the rules of the Arrangement 
if they so choose. 
It is also noted that the country risk classifications are meant to reflect country risk and 
under the OECD Participants’ System, country risk is composed of the transfer and 
convertibility risk (i.e. the risk a government imposes capital or exchange controls that 
prevent an entity from converting local currency into foreign currency and/or 
transferring funds to creditors located outside the country) and cases of force majeure 
(e.g. war, expropriation, revolution, civil disturbance, floods, earthquakes). 
It is important to note the the OECD Country Risk Classifications are not sovereign risk 
classifications and can therefore not be compared with the sovereign risk classifications 
of private credit rating agencies (CRAs). Conceptually, they are more similar to the 
‘country ceilings’ that are produced by some of the major CRAs. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the relative country risk rankings from OECD would be an 
adequate replacement for the Euromoney country risk rankings, in order to ascertain 
                                                        
9 OECD Website, http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/crc.htm, Country Risk Classification, Accessed 14 April 2015. 
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how lenders view the country risk ranking relative to each country in the database,  in 
the same manner as which Export Credit Agencies interpret transfer and convertibility 
risk of a country. 
3.3.2 Major Industry Group  
Previous research has not used industry grouping in any regression models to determine 
the impact it has on credit spreads. 
The database contains ten different types of industries categories, including Oil & Gas, 
mining, chemicals & plastics, Construction, Financial Services, Telecommunications, 
Beverage, Food & Tobacco Processing, Utilities, Business Services and Government.  
The industries can be grouped into two groups, namely commodity and non-commodity 
industries, with commodity industries consisting out of the Oil & Gas and Mining 
industries. The non-commodity grouping consists out of all the manufacturing, 
infrastructure, and servicing industries, namely; Chemicals & plastics, Construction, 
Financial Services, Telecommunications, Beverage, Food & Tobacco Processing, Utilities, 
Business Services and Government. 
Commodity industries have been found to have a higher price volatility compared to non-
commodity industries and markets (Jacks, O'Rourke & Williamson, 2011: p810). As such, 
the commodity markets have been classified as ‘High Risk’, and the non-commodity 
markets as ‘Low Risk’, as independent variables for the regression model, as to determine 
whether industry risk is a determinant which lenders price credit spreads at. 
The High Risk Group consists out of extractor/mineral industries, such as mining and Oil 
& Gas, where there exists resource and commodity price risks result in higher risks than 
other industries.  
Manufacturing of chemicals & plastics, Construction, Financial Services, 
Telecommunications, Beverage, Food and Tobacco Processing, Utilities, Business 
Services and Government all have more controlled input and off-taker prices, and a 
resultant reduction in the level of risk, and are thus classified as lower risk industries. 
    
52 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
The High Risk Industry will use a dummy variable with a value of one, and the low risk 
industry will have a dummy variable value of zero. 
3.3.3 Collateralisable Assets  
This variable was also present in the Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) study, and thus can 
be used as an independent variable. We assign as dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the borrower is in an industry generally considered to be rich in collateralisable assets 
(tangible, non-specialized assets), and 0 otherwise (such as financial- and business 
services, oil & gas, construction, mining and services). 
As per Kleimeier & Megginson (2001: P14) collateralisable assets are defined as 
industries with whereby the borrowers are within industries such as of airlines, 
apartment management, electricity utility, hotels, property, REIT, or shipping, whereby 
the loans are for projects which assets have tangible underlining assets. 
Furthermore, the study by Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim (1984) also concluded that indicates 
that companies with many such assets should be able to tolerate heavier debt levels than 
other companies. 
It must be noted that mining and oil & gas industries were categorised as non-
collateralisable assets, due to the fact that in the underlining value of the cash flow of 
these industries are the relevant commodity- and oil prices, and in turn effects the 
valuation of the project’s assets, which the lenders see as specialised with limited value. 
Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) applied a similar classification when they arranged the 
loan data into categories of size, maturity, guarantee, currency risk, country risk and 
collaterisable assets, in order to hypothesise the loan spread as a function of these loan 
characteristics. 
3.3.4 Tranche Type 
Term Loan, Revolver/Line loans with maturities greater than 1 year, Guarantee Loans, 
Mezzanine Tranche, Bridge Loans and Other Loans are recorded in this data field. The 
loans can be further simplified, with the ‘Revolver/Line loans with maturities greater 
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than 1 year, Guarantee Loans, Mezzanine Tranche, Bridge Loans and Other Loans’ all 
grouped into ‘Other Loans’ and the Term Loans remain as ‘Term Loans’, with a dummy 
variable value of one, and Other Loans with a value of zero. 
3.3.5 Tranche Active and Trance Maturity Dates (Loan Term) 
The loan term can be calculated as the difference between the maturity (“Tranche 
Maturity Date” data field) and activation (“Tranche Active” data field) dates of the loans.  
Loan Term will be presented in months, as a Continuous Predictor, and is represented in 
the frequency histogram below: 
                                     
Graph 1: Loan Term 
3.3.6 Tranche Amended 
This data field only indicated a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ input, and represented whether a loan trance 
was amended or not prior to being issued. The data field  only had five ‘Yes’ data points. 
The ‘No’ field will be assigned a value of one, and the ‘Yes’ field a value of zero. Two 
‘Tranche Maturity Dates’ were omitted, of which one data entry was able to be obtained 
from the previous entry which appeared identical, but the second omitting date entry and 
loan data field was deleted from the database, and could not be established. 
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3.3.7 Tranche Amount, Tranche Amount Converted & Tranche Currency 
 As Tranche Amounts are shown in the local currencies, for consistency, the ‘Tranche 
Amount Converted’ will be used as the Loan Size and will be recorded as US$ millions. 
Currency Risk is determined if the ‘Tranche Currency’ is not the local currency of the 
‘Country’, with a dummy variable of the value one if a loan is exposed to currency risk and 
zero otherwise; Tranche Amount converted to Loan Size is a continuous predictor which 
has a long tail to the right, as shown in the graph below: 
                                    
Graph 2: Loan Size 
While theoretically the regression models to be used do not rely on any assumptions 
about the distribution of the predictors, we nevertheless chose to log transform the 
extremely right-skewed distribution for loan size (base 10 log transformation). This was 
intended to reduce the influence of a very small number of observations with relatively 
large loan size values on the fit of the model. 
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Graph 3: Log of Loan Size 
Post the log transformation, one data point has a relatively low loan size. The new log-
transformed loan size can be interpreted as a one-unit increase corresponding to a 
tenfold increase in the original untransformed loan size. 
3.3.8 Secured 
 A dummy variable with a value of one will be used if the loan is secured by a third-party 
guarantee, and zero otherwise. 
3.3.9 Seniority Type 
 The loans are categorised in Senior, Mezzanine and Subordinate loans.  Grouping 
Mezzanine and Subordinate loans together, we can assign senior loans a dummy variable 
with a value of one and Mezzanine/subordinate loans a value of zero. 
3.3.10 Base Rate & Margin 
 The base rate is presented as LIBOR, EURIBOR, FR, SP5,  NIBOR AND SP1. As these are 
the default rates in which the banks trade, they are not viewed as a pricing determinant, 
and can thus be removed from the database. 
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3.3.11 All in Spread Drawn 
The ‘All-In Spread Drawn’ is presented in basis points, and represents the total cost of the 
loans to the borrower. This data field is thus the dependent variable in the regression 
model, in order to determine the other variables for the pricing of project finance loans. 
In applying the project risk pricing factors were identified by Nguyen & Ross (2006) to 
the Dealscan database, the only loan parameters in the database which can confidently 
be grouped within the following risk pricing factors are Country and Currency into the 
Political/Regulation Risk category. 
It can be argued that Industry Risk and Collateralisable Assets can be viewed as being 
loan parameters for Operating Risk, but they do not satisfy the criteria that cost, 
performance, management and technical parameters can be contained within, or 
mitigated by them. 
Loan Term can be viewed as a parameter to Market Risk, as the longer the loan term is, 
the more exposure the loan has to the specific market. However, the Dealscan parameter 
provides no meaningful insight on how off-take prices and demands are controlled. 
There are no loan parameters in the database which would appropriately group into 
Environmental and Sponsor Risk, as the remaining database parameters (Tranche Type, 
Tranche Amended, Loan Secured, Loan Seniority Type and Loan size) do not fit 
adequately into these loan risk pricing factors. 
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3.4 Data Size  
The resultant database was filtered down to 89 loan entries.  This is substantively less 
than the sample of 1’803 project finance loans from 1975 to 1992, which Kleimeier & 
Megginson (2001) used in their regression model, and research was done on how best to 
undertake a regression model with small data sets. The processed data is provided for in 
Appendix A. 
An indication of the African countries, number of projects, industry sector, mean loan 













Algeria 1 Construction 144 66 300 
Botswana 2 Mining 44 102.5 413 
Cameroon 3 Utilities(2),Oil & Gas(1) 65 86 550 
Egypt 14 
Chemicals(2), 
Telecommunications(2), Oil & 
Gas(7), Utilities(3) 
109 188 185 
Gabon 5 Business Services(4), Oil & Gas(1) 73 53 465 
Ghana 6 
Mining(1), Oil & Gas(4), 
Utilities(1) 
70 743 453 
Ivory Coast 2 Financial Services 24 130 750 
Kenya 5 Utilities(3), Food & Beverage (2) 146 75 565 
Liberia 3 Mining 71 33 583 
Mali 1 Mining 66 80 175 
Morocco 4 Utilities 144 176 172 
Mozambique 1 Utilities 116 767 190 
Nigeria 7 
Food & Beverage(4), Chemicals(2), 
Oil & Gas(1) 
79 151 567 
Senegal 2 Utilities 168 37 525 
Seychelles 1 Financial Services 36 30 200 
South Africa 27 
Utilities(8), Construction(3), 
Mining(15), Services(1) 
115 160 357 
Tanzania 1 Mining 84 142 250 
Tunisia 1 Telecommunications 84 165 150 
Zambia 3 Utilities(1), Mining (2) 92 381 317 
Table 1: Filtered Dealscan project finance loans in Africa (1997 – 2015) 
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As noted throughout the Kleimeier & Megginson (1998) paper, limited empirical research 
on project finance is available due to difficulty researchers have in collecting large data 
samples of project finance loans. Their study only had 120 project finance loan deals 
available to use for inputs in the pricing model, and constructed the model to specify if 
the loan’s margin rate is a dependent function of two sets of characteristics: Loan 
Characteristics, i.e. loan size, maturity, etc., and Project Characteristics, i.e. currency risks, 
country risk, presence of guarantees, etc. 
Their 120 loan deals were almost evenly spread between Asian (62) and non-Asian (58) 
project finance deals. The loan deals were tested to see whether they were priced in an 
integrated market using the Chow test. It was confirmed that the loans were priced in an 
integrated market, and the loan-pricing analysis was undertaken thereafter. 
 Four models were constructed, with the Country Risk Rank and Country Risk Score was 
used as alternating dummies, and an Asian dummy was used for the non-Asian loans. Two 
models had 43 data points and the other two models had 45 data points.  
The determinants for loan spreads were examined using an Ordinary Least Square 
Regression analysis, with the loan spread as the dependent variable.  Heteroscedasticity 
in the findings were corrected for by adjustments of the t-statistics, and in turn did not 
change the overall results.  
Both of Kleimeier & Megginson (1998) and Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) studies 
referred to Booth (1992)’s ‘Contract Costs, Bank Loans and the Cross-monitoring 
Hypothesis’. The Booth (1992) study examined whether monitoring related contract costs 
were reflected through to bank loan spreads, and constructed a model on bank loan 
pricing. The study also had a relatively small loan dataset of 642 publicly traded loans 
and 145 loans owned to privately held equity companies. The loan spread was the 
dependent variable, with Total Sales, Loan Size, Maturity Term, Fees, Commitment, Price 
Option, Restructure, and Ratings being the independent Variables. Test/Dummy 
variables were used to measure whether loan-pricing reflected monitoring related 
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contract costs, and were Private (if a firm was held privately), Public x LBO, Earnings / 
Price, Public Debt and Loan Seniority. 
The Booth (1992) study observes that loan spreads may have a nonlinear relationship 
with the individual variables, and that model misalignment might occur. The Durbin-
Watson statistics and residuals from the model were compared against the individual 
variables, with results rejecting departures from linearity for these variables. The study 
calculates all p-values using the uniform covariance matrix as described in White (1980), 
and states the correlation index of coefficient of determinants for the regression models. 
Further studies such as Datta et al. (1999)’s ‘Bank Monitoring and Pricing of Corporate 
Public Debt’ examined the lender-borrower relationship and whether it lowered the cost 
of public debt. Their sample size was limited to 98 data points, where they found that the 
relatively small and limited records of deals could result in information asymmetry. A 
multivariate regression model was applied, with the yield spreads as the dependent 
variable. Heteroscedasticity was corrected for by using the White (1980) method. The 
independent variables were controlled for by collinearity, and were first regressed as the 
control and test variables in separate regression models. The residual from these 
regressions should be orthogonal to each of the other independent variables, and were if 
not were omitted in the final regression model. 
3.5 Multiple Linear Regression Model 
As described earlier in the Literature Review, the most comprehensive empirical study 
done to date on project finance was undertaken by Kleimeier & Megginson (2001), who 
studied the organisational structure in order to determining whether the project sponsor 
should use project finance or corporate finance when deciding which type of loan to use 
for borrowing funds for new projects.  
The study observed that project finance loan spreads (which included the total loan and 
risk costs) are positively related to loan maturities, and the country riskiness in which 
the project is. There is also a negative relationship between loan spreads and the 
presence of currency risk and loan guarantees, from the project sponsors, or third parties. 
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The study went on to examine whether project finance or syndicated loans are funded 
and priced in a single integrated market, or in separate markets, and concluded with a 
pricing study comparing project finance loans with syndicated loans. The model 
employed in the Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) publication, will be used with an ordinary 
least squares regression estimation technique and consideration made for 
heteroskedastic outliners in the findings. 
The Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) regression model (Equation 1 on page 41 of this 
thesis) is used as a basis for the multiple linear regression model to include all loan 
parameters obtained from the Dealscan database, into the revised model below, where 
by the model specifies that the response for all observations 𝑖 is presented by: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑅 ∙ 𝑥1𝐼𝑅 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐴 ∙ 𝑥2𝐶𝐴 +𝛼3𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑥3𝑇𝑇 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑇 ∙ 𝑥4𝐿𝑇 + 𝛼5𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑥5𝑇𝐴 +
𝛼6𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝑥6𝐶𝑅 +  𝛼7𝐶𝑅𝑅 ∙ 𝑥7𝐶𝑅𝑅 + 𝛼8𝐿𝑆 ∙ 𝑥8𝐿𝑆 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑇 ∙ 𝑥9𝑆𝑇 + 𝛼10𝐿𝐿𝑆 ∙ 𝑥10𝐿𝐿𝑆 + 𝑖 (3) 
Whereby: 
𝛼0, 𝛼𝑥𝑥 are the model parameters that are estimated by a method of maximum likelihood, 
and (other than 𝛼0) show how the loan parameters impact the mean response, similarly 
to as above; and 
𝑖 represents standard deviation, i.e. ‘noise’ (independently and identically drawn for 
every measurement), and follows a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 𝜎  (also an estimated model parameter). 
𝑥𝑥𝑥  contain the loan data parameter, with each subscript xx denoting a loan variable 
parameter, such that the multiple linear regression model contains all 10 predictor as 
main effects (no interactions): Country Risk Rank (CRR), Industry Risk (IR), 
Collateralisable Assets (CA), Tranche Type(TT), Loan Term in months (LT), Tranche 
Amended (TA), log transformed of Loan Size in US $’millions (LLS), Currency Risk (CR), 
Loan Secured (LS) and Loan Seniority Type (ST). The impact of a given parameter on the 
response is modelled to be the same regardless of the values of other parameters. 
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A given parameter in the multiple linear regression model shows the impact of a single 
predictor on the mean response, when holding all other variables constant / when 
holding all else equal.  
The significance of each ‘slope’ parameter was assessed based on the asymptotic (large 
sample) normality of the parameter estimator (p-values). 
For each parameter (other than intercepts), the estimated parameter (effect size) is 
reported together with a 95% confidence interval (CI) and p-value (as described above). 
The 95% CI has a 95% probability of containing the true parameter value.  
Residuals plots were used to assess model assumptions, fit and to check for the presence 
of heteroscedasticity in the data. As a residual is the difference between the observed 
response and the model-fitted expected response for that observation, scaled by an 
appropriate factor. Standardized Pearson Residuals are plotted, whereby a positive 
residual indicates an observed value that is higher than expected by the fitted model; a 
negative residual indicates an observed value that is lower than expected by the model. 
Scatter plot of residuals (y-axis) against fitted values (x-axis), and Histogram of residuals 
were produced as diagnostic residual plots in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, by dropping the two categorical (binary) variables with very small sample 
sizes in a category (Tranche Amended, and Loan Seniority Type) the sensitivity of the 
regression findings for the following changes was assessed. Thereafter, the sensitivity 
analysis was continued through dropping the data point with the lowest loan size, which 
seemed to be a potentially influential point and including a quadratic term for the Log 
Loan Size variable (to allow for a non-linear relationship between Log Loan Size and the 
mean response).  The loan size parameter dropped had a value of US$ 0.03 million, 
compared with the mean of  US$ 194.410 million for the dataset and new minimum value 
of US$ 3.92 million and maximum value of US$ 2 billion for the dataset.  
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to compare the models to the original 
multiple regression model. As AIC measures the relative quality of a model, where a lower 
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value indicates better fit. It is based on quantifying how likely it would be to observe the 
data you have if the fitted model were in fact ‘true’, but also penalises models that have a 
greater number of parameters. 
3.6 Data Processing and Regression Model 
The Software used for the regression model was R (Version 3.1.3, 64-bit version, The R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing), whereby the regression models were fitted using 
the function lm. A simple linear regression (one predictor at a time) was first undertaken, 
thereafter followed by a multiple linear regression model (including all predictors).  The 
suitability of model assumptions and model fit were assessed using residual plots.   
The data was further grouped into Categorical Predictors and Continuous Predictors, 
whereby the Categorical Predictors consisted out of Yes/No or Low/High inputs, included 
Country Risk Rank, Industry Risk, Collateralisable Assets, Tranche Type, Tranche 
Amendment, Currency Risk, Loan Secured, and Seniority Type. 
Continuous Predictors consisted out of variable inputs and consisted out of Loan Term 
and Loan Size. Loan size had a long tail to the right. A log (base 10) transformation was 
applied to the data set, in order to pull in the tail and avoid having some data points with 
‘very different’ predictor values and possibly pulling the regression line. 
Eighty-nine complete observations were used, with no missing data inputs. Appendix B 
contains the analysis of the Categorical and Continuous Predictors. A summary of the data 
observations is presented in the table below.
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Yes  No 
Country Risk Rank 
 3 4 5 6 7 
Categorical Predictors: 
Industry Risk  55.06% 44.94%             
Collateralizeable Assets  51.69% 48.31%             
Tranche Type  29.21% 70.79%             
Tranche Amended  5.62% 94.38%             
Currency Risk  22.47% 77.53%             
Loan Secured  26.97% 73.03%             
Loan Seniority Type  4.49% 95.51%             
County Risk Rank   33.7% 21.4% 16.8% 22.5% 5.6%    
Continuous Predictors: 
Loan Term (Months)          101.00 84.00 54.741 
Loan Size ($ Mn)          192.23 106.18 297.005 
Dependent Variable: 
All-in Spread          378.99 310.00 213.968 
Table 2: Data Observation Summary  
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4 Findings 
Following on from the previous chapters where previous research on PF was reviewed, 
the Dealscan database processed, and a base multiple linear regression model derived, 
this chapter focuses on determining the best regression models to use, after running 
various sensitivities to determine the best-fit model.  
In summary, in this chapter an initial linear regression model (Model A) was created, 
whereby homoscedasticity was assumed by changing the ‘noise’ of the model. The 
residual plots of Model A indicated some model misfit, caused by possible variance of the 
model response and therefore to check for the potential presence of heteroscedasticity, a 
variance function was modelled for in Model B, whereby the standard deviation of noise 
was modelled to be proportional to the power of the responses. To check that 
heteroscedasticity cannot be further reduced, a more flexible and variant model with 
more flexible variants (Model C) was created. However for Model C the AIC increases 
slightly, and therefore Model B was retained as being better fit. A series of sensitivity 
analyses were undertaken on Model B, in order to assess the effect of certain parameters 
on the model and empirical results. 
It must also be noted that a simple regression model was also created, with each loan 
parameter being independently regressed against the dependent (All-in Spread) variable. 
It was decided not to use the findings of the simple regression model, as it was found that 
the fitted variance function changes quite a bit for each predictor (compared to the 
multiple regression model with comparing the different simple regression models). The 
results of the simple regression model were not included in this discussion, but is 
attached as Appendix C for completeness. 
All of the various models were created with the software R, where the R function ‘gls’ was 
used for model fitting (in the library ‘nlme’) and models were fitted by a method of 
restricted maximum likelihood.  The Likelihood ratio tests and AIC are used to compare 
models, whereby the models were fitted by maximum likelihood for such comparisons.  
 
 
    
65 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
4.1 Model A 
The base model (as derived on page 55) was altered whereby the standard deviation 
‘noise’ ( 𝑖) was changed from a normal distribution with mean 0, to where each each 
observation 𝑖  is independently drawn (there is no correlation amongst the 𝑖 values). The 
assumptions were relaxed in fitted models to allow the variance of the noise ( 𝑖) to be a 
function of the mean response, i.e. 𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑖) = 𝑓(𝐸(𝑦𝑖)). 
Assuming the variance of ‘noise’ is a constant standard linear regression, whereby;   
( 𝑖) =  𝜎
2 .   The results of the regression are shown in the table below, with the 
“Intercept” variable representing All-In Spread when all predictors are equal to zero. 
 
  Estimate 95% CI lower limit 95% CI upper limit P-value 
(Intercept) 
436.686 104.950 768.422 0.011 
Industry Risk 
-71.555 -172.073 28.964      0.160 
Collateralizeable Assets 
-86.287 -184.590 12.015     0.084** 
Tranche Type 
69.689 -20.574 159.953 0.128 
Tranche Amended 
-112.539 -305.824 80.745      0.250 
Currency Risk 
-67.272 -192.820 58.276 0.289 
Loan Secured 
150.937 59.244 242.629  0.002* 
Loan Seniority Type 
-152.577 -340.941 35.788     0.111** 
County Risk Rank 
57.780 20.166 95.394   0.003* 
Loan Term (Months) 
-0.034 -0.768 0.699 0.926 
Log of Loan Size (log10) 
-47.384 -113.530 18.762 0.158 
Table 3: Model A Fitted regression model assuming homoscedasticity 
 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was employed to test fit of the multiple 
regression models against each other. AIC measures the relative quality of a model, where 
a lower value indicates better fit and is based on quantifying how likely it would be to 
Footnote 1: The estimate for standard deviation (𝜎  ) for the model was 168.41 (95% CI for effect: 145.63; 199.72).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Footnote 2: * represents P-values between 0% and 5%, and ** represents P-values between 5% and 12%. 
 
 
    
66 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
observe the data you have if the fitted model were in fact ‘true’, but also penalises models 
that have a greater number of parameters.  
The AIC for Model A was calculated as 1086.105. 
A likelihood ratio test comparing this model to one with no predictors resulted in a P-
value of less than 0.01%. 
4.1.1 P-values 
The significance of each ‘slope’ parameter was assessed based on the asymptotic (large 
sample) normality of the parameter estimator. In each case, the null hypothesis is that 
the parameter equals zero (i.e. there is no impact on the mean response resulting from 
changes in the predictor). Small p-values suggest evidence against the null, i.e. that 
there is a non-zero parameter and a significant impact (i.e. evidence of a relationship 
between the predictor and response). A large p-value shows that there is a lack of 
evidence for this.  
Two categories of statistically significant P-values, were chosen, with the first category 
(represented by “*” in the results table) having P-values between 0% and 5%, and the 
second category of P-values (represented by “**” in the results table), having P-values 
between 5% and 12%. As per Goodman (2016), recent academic publication in statistics 
and scientific reasoning have seen the movement in statistics focusing more on the actual 
P-values and reporting effect sizes, rather than having thresholds, and in-turn measuring 
the credibility of result, such as having a statistically significant threshold level of 5% for 
all results.  
Creating two categories for the P-values, as described above, allows for a broader 
understanding of the regression models’ results, as not only the statistically significance 
of the findings is taken into account, but also the significance of the results from previous 
literature can be considered in context.  
4.1.2 Observations 
From the table above it is observed that Country Risk Rank and Loan Secured variables 
are both in the first P-values category, with both having P-values of less than 5%.  As the 
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Country Risk Rank variable is moved by one unit from low to higher risk (and hence to a 
more ‘riskier’ country), the average All-In Spread increases by 57.780 (95% CI for effect: 
20.166; 95.394; P-value: 0.003). For Loan Secured, if there is a third-party guarantee 
present the mean response on AIS increases by 150.937 (95% CI for effect: 59.244; 
242.629; P-value: 0.002).  
In the second category of P-values (5% to 12%), Collateralisable Assets and Loan 
Seniority Type ended up into this category. For the loan parameter Collateralisable 
Assets, the All-In Spread decreases by 86.287 (95% CI for effect: -184.590; 12.015; P-
value: 0.084), as the borrower moves from an industry which is not rich in collateralisable 
assets (such as financial- and business services, oil & gas, construction, mining and 
services) to an industry generally considered rich in collateralisable assets (tangible, non-
specialized assets). Loan Seniority Type changed the mean response on All-In Spread 
decreases by 152.577 (95% CI for effect: -340.941; 35.788; P-value: 0.111) as the loans 
were changed from subordinate to senior type loans. 
Tranche Type, Industry Risk and Loan Size (log of) both have P-values between 12% and 
16%. Tranche Type increasing the All-In Spread by 69.689 (95% CI for effect: -20.574; 
159.953; P-value: 0.128) as this loan parameter moves from non-specific PF loans to 
loans which are term-loans, revolver/line loans, guarantee Loans, mezzanine tranches 
and bridge loans.  
Industry Risk and Loan Size have higher P-values of around 16%, with Industry Risk 
reducing the All-In Spread by 71.555 (95% CI for effect: -172.073; 28.964; P-value: 
0.160). Log of Loan Size was found to decrease the mean All-In Spread by 47.384 (95% 
CI for effect: -113.530; 18.762; P-value: 0.158) as the size of the loan increases by $ 10 
million increments. 
Tranche Amended and Currency Risk both have P-values in the 25% to 29% range with 
Tranche Amended decreasing the All-In Spread by 112.539 (95% CI for effect: -305.824; 
80.745; P-value: 0.25) as loans move from being amended prior to being finalised to loans 
which are not amended prior being granted.  The effect on All-In Spread also decreased 
by 67.272 (95% CI for effect: -192.82; 58.276; P-value: 0.289), as the loan currency is 
moved from local to a foreign sourced one. 
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Loan Term had the largest P-value of 92.6%, and decreases All-In Spread by 0.034 (95% 
CI for effect: -0.768; 0.699; P-value: 0.926), as the maturity of loans increases by one 
month increments. 
4.1.3 Residual Plots 
Residuals plots were employed to assess model assumptions and fit, with Standardized 
Pearson Residuals plotted. The visual examination of the residuals (miss-predictions of 
the fitted data to the model) is a useful mean to observe obvious deviations from 
randomness. 
The following diagnostic residual plot was produced, with a scatter plot of residuals (y-
axis) against fitted All-in Spread mean values (x-axis). It should be noted that the scatter 
of residuals should fall into a horizontal band, centred on 0, and that there should not be 
much variation in the vertical spread of points, or trends, as the fitted value changes. 
Residuals should thin out as you move away from 0 (vertically), with only about 5% of 
values larger than 2 in magnitude. 
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Graph 4: Model Residuals Vs All-In Spread Mean Fitted Values 
Observations from the residual plots indicate that heteroscedasticity might be present, 
as there appears to be increasing variance of residuals appears with increasing fitted 
values, resulting in the pattern which can be seen in the plot. 
4.2 Model B 
To address the presence of heteroscedasticity, a second multiple linear regression model 
(Model B) was created whereby the standard deviation of noise is proportional to power 
of a response, such that: 𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑖) = 𝜎
2 ∙ |𝐸(𝑦𝑖)|
2𝛿. 
The results of this regression model is shown in the table below, with the “Intercept” 
parameter representing a variable on the All-In Spread when all other predictors are set 
equal to zero. 
 
 
Estimate 95% CI lower limit 95% CI upper limit P-value 
(Intercept) 
639.708 268.566 1010.851 0.001 
Industry Risk 
-44.971 -100.649 10.706     0.112** 
Collateralizeable Assets 
-36.351 -85.689 12.987 0.146 
Tranche Type 
34.824 -7.693 77.341    0.107** 
Tranche Amended 
-270.972 -565.433 23.489    0.071** 
Currency Risk 
-30.219 -101.646 41.208 0.402 
Loan Secured 
196.942 144.361 249.523    <0.001* 
Loan Seniority Type 
-149.643 -345.850 46.565 0.133 
County Risk Rank 
27.697 3.946 51.448   0.023* 
Loan Term (Months) 
0.015 -0.527 0.557 0.955 
Log of Loan Size (log10) 
-49.037 -100.069 1.996    0.059** 
Table 4: Model B Fitted regression model assuming heteroscedasticity 
Footnote 1: The estimate for standard deviation (𝜎  ) for the model was 0.000667 (95% CI for effect: 0.0006627; 
0.14784), and the estimate of 𝛿 for the model was 1.626431 (95% CI for effect: 1.168176; 2.084687).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Footnote 2: * represents P-values between 0% and 5%, and ** represents P-values between 5% and 12%. 
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Comparing the two models two each other, Model B had a 2.70% lower AIC at 1056.986.  
A likelihood ratio test comparing this model A to Model B resulted in a P-value of less 
than 0.01%, thus concluding that there is lack of fit for Model A compared to Model B, 
suggesting that the variance function applied to Model B is appropriate.  Furthermore, a 
likelihood ratio test comparing Model B to a model with no predictors resulted in a P-
value of less than 0.01%, suggesting there are significant relationships between the 
predictors and response. 
4.2.1 Observations 
 The two P-value categories of statistically significant P-values were kept in place as per 
the previous model, with Country Risk Rank and Loan Secured variables both remaining 
in the first P-values category. The Country Risk Rank variable estimate, however, reduced 
to 27.697 (95% CI for effect: 3.946; 51.448 ; P-value: 0.023),  from 57.780 (95% CI for 
effect: 20.166; 95.394 ; P-value: 0.003) in Model A, and the Loan Secured estimate 
increased to 196.942 (95% CI for effect: 144.361; 249.523; P-value: <0.001), from 
150.937 (95% CI for effect: 59.244 ; 242.629; P-value: 0.002) in Model A. Both models 
were observed had a tighter fit within their CI ranges, than in Model A. 
The second category of P-values (5% to 12%) included Industry Risk, Tranche Type, 
Tranche Amended and Loan Size (log of), who all had reduced P-values lower than 12% 
in Model B.  
Collateralisable Assets and Loan Seniority Type that had P-values of less than 12%, now 
had P-values in the 13% to 15% range.  
Tranche Type, Industry Risk and Loan Size (log) both have P-values between 12% and 
16%, with Tranche Type increasing All-In Spread by 69.689 (95% CI for effect: -20.574; 
159.953; P-value: 0.128) as longs move from non-specific PF loans to Term loans, 
revolver/line loans with maturities greater than 1 year, guarantee Loans, mezzanine 
Tranche, bridge loans.  
Industry Risk and Loan Size have higher P-values around 16%, with Industry Risk 
reducing the mean by 71.555 (95% CI for effect: -172.073; 28.964; P-value: 0.160) and 
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the log of Loan Size decreases All-In Spread by 47.384 (95% CI for effect: -113.530; 
18.762; P-value: 0.158) as the size of the loan increases by $ 10 million increments. 
The P-value for Currency Risk increased to 40.2% from 25%, and the P-value for Loan 
Term remained relatively the same at 95.5% (from 92.6% previously). 
It is further noted that the negative or positive effect of the variables’ estimates on the 
All-In Spread remained all the same, except for Loan Term. Loan Term’s Estimate changed 
from decreasing the All-In Spread from 0.034 (95% CI for effect: -0.768; 0.699; P-value: 
0.926) in Model A, to increasing the All-In Spread by 0.015 (95% CI for effect: -0.527; 
0.557; P-value: 0.955) in Model B, as the maturity of loans increases by one month 
increments. The relatively high P-values indicate that the effect on of Loan Term is 
statistically insignificant on the All-In Spread. 
4.2.2 Residual Plots 
The residuals plot for Model B was used to assess model assumptions and fit, with 
Standardized Pearson Residuals plotted. The visual examination of the residuals 
indicates that there is a random scatter of points centred on zero, with the pattern of 
potentially increasing variance no longer evident as in the residuals plot for Model A.  
As Model B has accounted for the heteroscedasticity present, the below graph indicates 
the fit assumed in Model B seems reasonable.  
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Graph 5: Model Residuals Vs All-In Spread Mean Fitted Values 
Further residual plots for each loan parameter is presented in Appendix D. 
4.3 Model C 
In addition, a number of variance functions could be considered to test whether a more 
general variance function, compared to the one chosen in Model B would improve the 
model fit,. A more flexible and variant model (Model C) with more flexible variants was 
tested, with the fitted regression model where the standard deviation of noise is 
proportional to constant plus power of response (𝑣𝑎𝑟( 𝑖) = 𝜎




This provides a more flexible variance function than in Model B. However the AIC 
increases slightly by 0.19% to 1058.982, and based on the lack of reduction in the AIC, 
and the good fit of Model B (based on the residual plot above), the form of Model B was 
retained as the primary model. 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
A series of sensitivity analysis were conducted on Model B, whereby the results to the 
following changes were assessed: 
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Model 1: Dropping the data point with the lowest loan size (see Graph 6 and 7 below), 
which seemed to be a potentially influential point; 
                                  
Graph 6:  Loan Size    Graph 7:  Log of Loan Size 
Model 2: Removing the two categorical (binary) variables, Tranche Amended (Tr Amd 
Regg), and Loan Seniority Type (Sen Regg), which both have very small sample sizes in 
their respective category, from the Dealscan database;  
Model 3: Including a quadratic term for the Log Loan Size variable (to allow for a non-
linear relationship between Log Loan Size and the mean response). This was based on 
the following plot, whereby the red dots represented the loan size data points against 
their respective All-in Spreads. The black line represents the smoothing out of the data, 
whereby locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS smoothing) was applied to the 
data points.  
 
Graph 8: Quadratic Term for Long of Loan Size Vs All-In Spread          
The results from the sensitivity analyses are shown in the table on the following page. 
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1. Remove lowest loan size observation 
2. Remove variables Trance Amended & 
Seniority Regression Parameters 

























642.459 267.379 1017.540  0.001 262.209 62.420 461.998  0.011 661.176 244.253 1078.099  0.002 
Industry Risk 
-44.481 -99.895 10.934  0.114** -48.665 -123.616 26.286  0.200 -44.861 -100.882 11.160  0.115** 
Collateralizeable Assets 
-35.571 -84.759 13.617  0.154 -74.903 -146.588 -3.218  0.041* -36.488 -86.313 13.336  0.149 
Tranche Type 
34.689 -7.823 77.201 0.108** 21.698 -41.817 85.212  0.499 34.788 -8.328 77.905 0.112** 
Tranche Amended 
-273.321 -572.726 26.084 0.073**  -272.250 -573.301 28.801  0.076* 
Currency Risk 
-29.888 -101.798 42.023 0.410 -96.155 -198.464 6.153 0.065* -30.154 -102.408 42.101  0.409 
Loan Secured 
198.117 145.262 250.972 <0.001* 168.585 100.574 236.596  <0.001* 195.035 141.581 248.490 <0.001* 
Loan Seniority Type 
-148.231 -345.444 48.983  0.139  -149.599 -347.463 48.265  0.136 
County Risk Rank 
27.432 3.679 51.185  0.024* 43.904 10.337 77.472   0.011* 27.816 3.424 52.208 0.026* 
Loan Term (Months) 
0.027 -0.523 0.578  0.922 -0.122 -0.733 0.488 0.691 0.014 -0.538 0.566  0.960 
Log of Loan Size (log10) 
-50.523 -104.493 3.448 0.066** -38.869 -97.698 19.960 0.192 -70.603 -270.875 129.669  0.485 
Log of Loan Size – Squared  
 5.483 -45.211 56.178  0.830 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity analyses 
The estimate for standard deviation (𝜎  ) for 
Model 1 was 0.009 (95% CI for effect: 0.0006; 
0.1345), and the estimate of 𝛿 for the model 




The estimate for standard deviation (𝜎  ) for 
Model 2 was 0.285 (95% CI for effect: 0.011; 
7.719), and the estimate of 𝛿 for the model was 
1.074 (95% CI for effect: 0.515; 1.634). 
 
The estimate for standard deviation (𝜎  ) for 
Model 3 was 0.010 (95% CI for effect: 0.001; 
0.143), and the estimate of 𝛿 for the model was 
1.630 (95% CI for effect: 1.175; 2.086). 
 
Footnote 2:             * represents P-values between 0% and 5%, and ** represents P-values between 5% and 12%. 
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4.4.1 Observations 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to compare the models to Model B (AIC 
of 1056.986) for suitability with the models on which the sensitivities were run.  
All the parameters’ estimates and P-values remained relatively the same, for both P-value 
grouping (P-value < 5% and P-values between 5% and 12%). There was no clear change 
for any of the parameters, even with the effect for the Loan Size (log of) parameter, and 
was expected to have the most significant effect. The only change was experienced from 
decreasing the AIS by 49.037 (95% CI for effect: -100.069; 1.996; P-value: 0.059) to 
50.523 (95% CI for effect: -104.493; 3.448; P-value: 0.066) when the lowest loan size 
observation was removed from the database. 
The AIC for Model 2 in table above: 1096.78.  
The changes in the results seen are seen as the initial grouping of P-values of up to 5% 
have had the Loan Secured parameter’s effect decrease from 196.942 to 168.585, with 
the P-values remaining the same at 0.1%. Country Risk Rank’s P-value, however, 
decreased from 2.3% to 1.1%, with the effect on the AIS changing from 27.697 to 43.904. 
The P-values of the parameters in the second grouping of P-values (5% to 12%) all 
increased with Industry Risk’s P-value increasing from 11.2% to 20%, Tranche Type 
increasing from 10.7% to 49.9% and Loan Size (log of) increasing from 5.9% to 19.2%. It 
must be noted that the P-values for Collateralisable Assets decreased from 14.6% to 4.1%, 
Currency Risk decreased from 40.2% to 6.5%. Loan Term also had a decrease in P-value 
from 95.5% to 69.1%. 
In conclusion, Loan Secured and Country Risk Rank continue to have very low p-values 
and the directions of their effects are the same, with Loan Term continuing to have a very 
large p-value (highly non-significant). Nevertheless, the remaining findings appear 
sensitive to whether the tranche was amended or not (Tr Amd Regg), and the seniority of 
the loan (Sen Regg) are included in the model. In this dataset, there is little variation in 
Tr Amd Regg and Sen Regg (5 or fewer observations). Therefore, in future studies, efforts 
should be made to collect observations with varying values of Tr Amd Regg and Sen Regg 
to better understand the impact of these variables, and other predictors when controlling 
for the effects of Tr Amd Regg and Sen Regg, on AIS. 
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From the findings discussed above, it is observed that these results are quite sensitive to 
whether there is a control for the two variables in the sensitivity model, seeing that there 
is a small number for the categories of each of these two variables. This suggests that 
further work could be done on the collection of observations that are currently scarce to 
further explore whether there is no benefit in removing these two variables. This is 
further supported but the change in the estimates of standard deviation ( 𝜎  ) remained 
similar for Model 2, compared to Models 1 and 3, to Model B.  
Removing the two variables changes the fitted variance function by a fair amount, with 
the AIC increasing substantially form Model B, and as the AIC increases, it suggests that 
the quality of fit decreases, and therefore this sensitivity model can be disregarded. The 
AIC for Model 3 in table above: 1050.996  
The AIC improved by 0.57% from Model B, however, there are no improvements in the 
Estimate or P-Value of the parameters. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a need to 
allow for non-linear relationships between log of Loan Size and the expected All-In 
Spreads, as the estimates and P-values barely changed in Model 3.  
  
Model 3 Sensitivity  Original Model B 
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
(Intercept) 
661.176 0.002 639.708 0.001 
Industry Risk 
-44.861    0.115** -44.971     0.112** 
Collateralizeable Assets 
-36.488     0.149 -36.351 0.146 
Tranche Type 
34.788    0.112** 34.824    0.107** 
Tranche Amended 
-272.25 0.076* -270.972    0.071** 
Currency Risk 
-30.154    0.409 -30.219 0.402 
Loan Secured 
195.035 <0.001* 196.942    <0.001* 
Loan Seniority Type 
-149.599     0.136 -149.643 0.133 
County Risk Rank 
27.816  0.026* 27.697   0.023* 
Loan Term (Months) 
0.014 0.960 0.015 0.955 
Log of Loan Size (log10) 
-70.603 0.485 -49.037    0.059** 
Log of Loan Size - Squared 
5.483 0.830   
Table 6: Model 3 Sensitivity vs Original Model 
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4.5 Fitted means versus observed means 
The fitted means for the expected Model B response are shown against the observed 
means of the data in the tables below. 
As indicated in Model B, Country Risk Rank and Loan Secured were the statistically the 
most significant (P-values < 5%) and Industry Risk, Tranche Type, Tranche Amended and 
Loan Size (log of) had P-values in the range of 5% to 12%. 
From tables below, it can be observed that the fitted and observed means are well aligned 
for the six loan parameters mentioned above.  
Industry Risk** 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 49 399.01 400.66 
1 40 349.86 352.45 
    
Collateralizeable Assets 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 46 401.11 413.98 
1 43 351.03 341.57 
    
Tranche Type** 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 26 328.92 305.71 
1 63 396.73 409.24 
    
Tranche Amended** 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 5 618.33 491.00 
1 84 362.55 372.33 
    
Currency Risk 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 20 424.66 400.40 
1 69 363.08 372.79 
    
Loan Secured* 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 24 198.22 208.23 
1 65 442.90 442.05 
    
78 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
 
    
Loan Seniority Type 
 Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
0 4 526.18 543.00 
1 85 369.90 371.28 
 
   
County Risk Rank* 
CRR Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
3 30 367.67 353.43 
4 19 244.31 188.29 
5 15 425.68 483.00 
6 20 439.63 452.75 
7 5 539.21 650.00 
    
Loan Term (Months) 
Term Range Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
7.9 to 60 27 350.88 359.26 
60 to 78 10 473.65 445.00 
78 to 96 18 398.91 422.06 
96 to 144 17 300.90 317.85 
144 to 216 17 414.10 387.06 
    
Log of Loan Size (log10)** 
Size Range Frequency Fitted Mean Observed Mean 
-0.07 to 35 20 437.09 453.35 
3 to 90 17 357.87 369.47 
90 to 135 16 363.57 364.38 
135 to 230 18 349.57 371.67 
230 to 2000 18 367.27 325.69 
 Footnote: * represents P-values between 0% and 5%, and ** represents P-values between 5% and 12%. 
Table 7: Fitted means versus observed means 
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5 Discussion  
The findings of the empirical analysis of the previous chapter are discussed in this 
chapter. 
The thesis focuses on establishing the cost determinants for non-recourse project finance 
funding on the African continent. The empirical results of the loan parameters, and were 
analysed using multiple linear regression models, are compared with the expected loan 
parameters reviewed in the literature review chapter in order to establish which 
parameters influence project-risk pricing in Africa. 
The findings grouped the loan parameters which are the most statistically significant first 
(P-values of 0% to 5%), followed by the loan parameters which have slightly higher P-
values of 5% to 12%, and lastly those which have a P-value above 12% (statistically 
insignificant). 
The first grouping consists of the Secured Loans and Currency Risk Rank parameters 
which both have P-values of less than 5% and can be viewed as being statistically 
significant. 
5.1 Secured Loans 
The loan parameter ‘Secured Loans’ had the smallest P-value at less than 0.1% and was 
seen as the most statistically significant loan parameter. Loans Secured, essentially 
through guarantees from either the project sponsors or third parties, was found to have 
a significant effect on the All-in interest rates.  The All-in interest rates increased by 
196.942 basis points when the loan parameter moved from ‘unsecured’ to ‘secured’ loans. 
This is contradictory to earlier findings by Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) who found in 
their empirical analysis on limited-recourse project finance that third-party guarantees 
significantly reduce loan spreads. We attempt to provide a possible explanation in this 
chapter. 
The empirical results relate to Dailami & Hauswald (2001) who found that project risks 
can significantly be reduced through the prudent application of a debt service reserve 
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account (or a guarantee from equity-holders) and that lenders compensate project 
sponsors with lower credit-spreads. 
The Dealscan database does not provide a description or a distinction between the types 
of guarantees that are provided for securing the loan.  Reviewing the Dealscan data, only 
27% of the data fields had ‘NO’ unsecured loans.  These data fields were for projects in 
the following industries: Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber (7.6%), Construction (7.6%), 
Mining (31.3%), Financial (3.8%), Telecommunications (7.6%), Oil and Gas (19.2%), 
Utilities (19.2%) and Government (3.8%). 
As the major industries were Mining, Utilities and Oil & Gas, unsecured loans only 
accounted for 32% of Mining, 20% of Utilities and 34% of Oil & Gas project finance loans. 
There is, however, no clear industry in which these unsecured loans are the majority. 
The countries in which these unsecured projects were financed were Egypt (Chemicals, 
Telecommunications, Oil & Gas), South Africa (Mining & Construction), Mali (Mining), 
Uganda (Government), Morocco (Utilities), Mozambique (Utilities), Seychelles (Financial 
Services), Ghana (Mining) and Algeria (Construction). These entries also have relatively 
low country credit ratings, with 80% of the entries being in countries (South Africa, Egypt 
and Morocco) with a CRR of 3 and 4 and the remaining 20% being in countries with the 
highest CRRs of 6 and 7.  
Of the countries with the majority of the unsecured loans (South Africa, Egypt and 
Morocco), unsecured loans represent 26% of all South African PF loans, 57% of Egyptian 
PF loans and 100% of all Moroccan PF loans (note: Morocco had 15% of the total 
unsecured PF loans).  There is no clear indication why these countries, which have a 
dominant market for unsecured loans, have lenders which price unsecured loans cheaper 
than secured loans.  As such, the results contradict the expected hypothesis that secured 
loans are priced with cheaper credit-spreads. 
The size of these unsecured loans had a mean of 181.8 ($ Mn) and median of 102.7 ($ Mn) 
compared to a mean of 192.2 ($ Mn) and median of 106.2 ($ Mn) for all 89 loan 
observations.  The loan term has a mean of 106.2 months and median of 84 months, 
compared to a mean of 101 months and median of 84 months for all 89 loan observations. 
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The All-in Spread for the unsecured loans had a mean of 374.6 bps and median of 310 bps 
compared to the mean of 378 bps and median of 310 bps for all 89 loan observations. 
Furthermore, it is noted that 46% of the unsecured loans were projects that had 
collateralisable assets and 84% of the loans were in a foreign currency to the country in 
which they are located.  Except for one loan, all loans were senior loans.   
From the discussion above there is, however, no indication as to any specific variables or 
inputs in the loan data observations as to why lenders price unsecured loans cheaper 
than secured loans in Africa.  
A possible reason for unsecured loans being priced cheaper and having a lower All-in 
Spread compared to secured loans could be because those projects established project 
sponsors and the projects have off-take agreements which the lenders are comfortable 
with and therefore they don’t foresee any severe project risks. The level of reassurance 
that lenders require to mitigate project risks can be provided through some form of 
project insurance guarantees; the project developer having a reputable track record and 
a strong relationship with the lenders; and the off-taker having an acceptable credit 
rating. From the database, it can be observed that the Egyptian borrowers were the 
Egyptian Natural Gas Company, Egyptian Refining Company and Egyptian LNG 2 
Company, all of which are state-owned enterprises. In Morocco, the borrower was the 
Jorf Lasfar Energy Company, and in South Africa, the borrower was Avgold Ltd, owned by 
Harmony (South Africa’s largest gold producer). These are all large and influential 
companies with undoubtedly established relationships with lenders.  In addition, we note 
that the loans in these countries are only to the abovementioned borrowers, thereby 
confirming that the loans are for the same, or an extension of, an existing project.  
A further argument for the loan secured pricing phenomenon might be due to the 
majority of project financing being secured prior to the construction phase of a project. 
Construction should only last for a couple of years at best, and then ideally the borrower 
should refinance once the project’s risk profile has changed.  This implies borrowing 
expensive money (secured through third-party guarantees) for a short period of time, 
and then substituting it for cheaper financing against the operational assets of the project 
once construction is complete.  
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5.2 Country Risk Rank 
Country Risk Rank had the second smallest P-value at 2.3% and an increase in Country 
Risk Rank results in a 27.697 bps increase in the All-in Spread in the multiple linear 
regression model.  The CRR P-value being below 5% indicates that the Country Risk Rank 
is statistically significant. 
The Country Risk Rank relates back to the relative sovereign riskiness of one country to 
another and how lenders perceive the country’s sovereign riskiness in relation to the 
credit-spreads for the loans. 
Furthermore, lenders also take a view on whether there are any government support 
agreements in place with the project and borrower (in the event that the project is in a 
market which has price fluctuations, e.g. natural gas) or off-taker (in the event the private 
borrower sells to a state-owned company). This information is unfortunately not 
supplied in the Dealscan database and further investigation would be required as to what 
the effect would be as an additional cost determinant of CCR on the All-In Spread. 
The CRR finding is supported by Dailami & Hauswald (2001: P10) who found that the 
credit quality of the purchaser of the off-take agreement and, more essentially, the 
lender’s assessment of the ‘off-taker’s economic prospects’ determine the project’s ‘credit-
spreads and the pricing thereof.’ In their study, the off-taker, who in turn was 50% owned 
by the Republic of Korea, shared its commercial credit rating with the South Korean’s 
sovereign credit rating by having the sovereign credit rating take superiority over the off-
taker’s commercial credit rating.  
Kamin & Von Kleist (1999) also could not establish why credit spreads from certain parts 
of the world were systematically higher than in other parts.  One of their hypotheses was 
that project sponsors methodically differ in their valuation of off-taker creditworthiness 
compared to ratings agencies.  An additional theory was that ‘investors and credit ratings 
agencies share the same estimates of expected default, but that investors also charge a 
premium for greater uncertainty about current and prospective creditworthiness.’ (Kamin 
& Von Kleist, 1999: P18).  They observed that ’Latin American and eastern European 
economies have exhibited greater volatility than Asian economies, and that these countries 
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charged higher credit spreads to their borrowers, which may reflect a premium for higher 
uncertainty.’ (Kamin & Von Kleist, 1999: P18)   
A further important project finance structure feature, which was not available in the 
database, is the ‘cash-flow waterfall’ of the projects i.e. whether parties will receive 
payments first from the revenue stream. A general working cash flow structure (Davis, 
1996:P9) of a PF project would be in the following order: Operation & Maintenance 
Company; Senior Loan Repayments; Subordinate Loan Repayments; Royalties & Taxes; 
and Shareholder Dividends.  In some African countries, the cash-flow waterfall order 
might change with Royalties and Taxes paid before Senior Loan Repayments. This would 
make it uncertain as to whether the Royalties, Taxes, and O&M Costs might increase in 
the future, resulting in less retained earnings for debt repayments.  Lenders address this 
through requiring loan covenants in the form of debt service reserve accounts and letters 
of credit from the project sponsors to be present. However this information was also 
omitted from the database.  Dailami & Hauswald (2001) found that a project’s revenue 
flow, rather than the project’s underlining assets are viewed by lenders as the true 
collateral, and thus a well-thought out cash flow structure provides additional security to 
lenders. 
Interestingly Dailami & Hauswald (2001) also ascertained that a project’s debt structure 
could be used to create an ‘implicit option’ for any future debt re-financing in a way 
whereby the new debt can match the real option for a project expansion. 
A potential shortcoming of the Dealscan database is the omission of the debt and equity 
ratios for each project i.e. the degree of debt leverage each project has. Generally viewed, 
the proportion of debt to equity funding is either a determination set by the statutory 
thin-capitalisation laws of a country or by the degree of debt that lenders are comfortable 
with.  Decreased debt leverage results in the project sponsors having to provide more 
capital to offset any risks lenders perceive in the project.  This directly effects the cost of 
the loan, impacts loan covenants and has an impact on other project loan cost drivers. As 
Davis (1996: P14) stated; ‘Not all projects are created equal.’  A large differentiation 
between strong and weaker projects exists whereby the challenge for project lenders is 
to be able to distinguish between the two and price risk accordingly. 
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Sorge (2011: P100) concluded that there is a significant impact on the loan’s All-in credit-
spread for project finance funding in emerging markets where political risk is present 
and any political risk guarantees are in place. This can be observed from the Country Risk 
Rank findings in this thesis. 
5.3 Loan Size, Tranche Amended, Tranche Type and Industry Risk 
The group of loan parameters which had P-values between 5% and 12% were; Loan Size 
(log of), Tranche Amended, Tranche Type and Industry Risk. 
Due to one large loan size entry in the Dealscan database, the parameter Loan Size had a 
long tail to the right, on which a log (base 10) transformation was applied to the variable 
to pull in this tail and to avoid having some data points with ‘very different’ predictor 
values and possibly pulling the regression line. 
The variable Loan Size was observed to have a negative effect on the All-In credit-spread 
by 49.037 bps in the multiple linear regression for each additional ten million US Dollars 
the loans size increases. The P-value for the multiple linear regression was 5.9% resulting 
in the variable being statistically significant to the All-in Spread. 
Sensitivity testing was done through removing the data point with the lowest loan size 
(Graph 6 and 7), and seemed to be a potentially influential point, and including a 
quadratic term for the Log Loan Size variable (to allow for a non-linear relationship 
between Log Loan Size and the mean response, as per Model 2). 
The first sensitivity test whereby the data point with the lowest loan size was removed 
did not result in any improvement in the loan variables’ P-values to the degree that an 
additional variable could become statistically significant. 
The second sensitivity test, whereby a quadratic term for the Log of Loan Size variable 
was entered developed an AIC value of 1096.78 resulting in a lower quality of fit to the 
original multiple linear regression model (1056.986).  However an interesting 
observation in this model is that the Log of Loan Size variable’s P-value worsened from 
5.9% in the original multiple linear regression model to 6.6%. All other loan parameters’ 
P-values remained similar with no improvement in statistical significance. In this 
    
85 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
sensitivity test, the Log of Loan Size was found to decrease the AIS by 50.523 bps (95% 
CI for effect: -104.493; 69.684; P-value: 3.448) for each additional ten million US Dollars 
the loans size increases with.  Kleimeier & Megginson’s (2001) empirical analysis on 
project finance concluded the size of the loans have no influence on PF loan-pricing. 
The Tranche Amended variable was represented with 94.4 % of loans having no tranches 
amended.  Loan tranches which were amended decreased the credit-spread by 270.972 
bps in the multiple linear regression. The P-value was calculated at 7.1%, resulting in the 
variable being statistically significant to the All-in Spread to a degree.  
It should be noted that both Tranche Amended and Loan Seniority had very small sample 
sizes (Tranche Amended: 5.62% Yes, 94.38% No; Loan Seniority: 4.49% Yes, 95.51% No) 
in their categories and they were removed from the multiple linear regression model to 
see what the sensitivity would be on the other variables. The AIC for the sensitivity mode 
(1096.78) was higher than the original multiple linear regression, with most loan 
variables’ P-values remaining the same. Collateralisable Assets improved its P-Value from 
14.6% to 4.1% thereby becoming statistically significant to the All-in Spread. The 
presence of collateralisable assets decreased the AIS by 74.903 bps (95% CI for effect: -
146.588; -3.218).  The higher AIC for the sensitivity model does not validate the use of 
the revised Collateralisable Assets results. 
The loan parameter Loan Tranche Type was also analysed and it was observed to increase 
the credit-spread by 34.824 bps in the multiple linear regression, with the P-value at 
10.7%.  It is thus expected that these longer duration term loans would have a higher 
credit-spreads over the mezzanine and revolver / line loans, with durations of about 12 
months, as lenders are exposed to project risk for a longer period of time (Sorge & 
Gadanecz, 2008). As 70.8% of the loan tranche observations were term loans, further 
insight into the impact of the duration of the term loans on credit-spreads can be analysed 
through the Loan Term regression. 
It was observed in the empirical model that the presence of Industry Risk decreases All-
in credit-spreads by 44.971 basis points, with the P-value for both models (A and B) being 
11.2%. Previous research provided no indication as to why the credit-spreads decrease 
with the increase in industry risk, but from the literature reviewed it could be argued that 
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riskier industries are better at contracting their risk out to third parties through NFC 
agreements.  These riskier industries could also make use of a higher degree of project 
guarantees (67.5% of high-risk PF finance observations have the loans secured through 
guarantees). 
The Dealscan database, however, provides no indication as to the level of NFC agreements 
entered into by the project company SPV with third parties, as well as to how the lenders 
view the enforceability of the NFC agreements provided. 
The grouping of remaining loan parameters is presented below which represent the 
parameters with P-values above 12%. 
5.4 Collateralisable Assets, Loan Term, Currency Risk, Loan Seniority 
It was observed that the loan variable Collateralisable Assets decreases the credit-spread 
by 36.4 basis points, with a P-value of 14.6%. Despite it having a high P-value, this is an 
important empirical result due to the fact that lenders can attach a value to 
collateralisable assets. It was expected the presence of these assets would decrease 
lender credit-spreads to a degree, however, previous research (Dailami & Hauswald, 
2001) concluded that a project’s revenue cash flow is more important than the physical 
underlining assets as a project’s real collateral in being able to negotiate lower interest 
rates. Our empirical results, however, indicate that the presence of physical underlining 
assets do have an effect on the credit-spread of a project.  This is contradictory to the 
Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) empirical analysis on project finance which concluded 
that credit-spreads were higher if the project is in a sector rich in tangible assets, and that 
loan fees compliment loan spreads. 
The loan parameter Loan Terms was calculated as the monthly difference between the 
maturity and activation dates of each loan. The Loan Term parameter was observed to 
increase the credit-spread by 0.015 bps in the multiple linear regression for each 
additional month of loan term, with a P-value of 95.5%. This unfortunately resulted in the 
loan parameter being statistically insignificant to the All-in Spread in both regression 
models.  
    
87 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
Sorge (2011) previously investigated the impact of credit risk and found that there 
appears to be a hump-shaped term structure when the credit-spread was plotted against 
the loan maturity duration. The study found that the size of the ‘hump’ increases as the 
level of leverage increases, and that longer maturity (15 to 20 years) loans are priced 
cheaper than shorter term (10 to 15 years) loans.  
In applying a filter to Dealscan PF database to indicate the shorter-term (10 to 15 years) 
loans, 20 loans met this criterion, with a mean of 338 months (with a standard deviation 
of 173.54) and a median of 350 months. The longer maturity (15 to 20 years) loans 
represented 14 loans, and had a mean of 370 months (with standard deviation of 135.21) 
and a median of 310 months. These findings correspond to the finding of Kleimeier & 
Megginson (1998) where their paper concluded the credit-spreads are positively related 
to loan maturities.  However further research by Kleimeier & Megginson (2001) 
concluded time to maturity have no influence on PF loan-pricing. 
There exists a discrepancy between the hump-shaped loan tenor in the Sorge (2011) 
study, compared to Kleimeier & Megginson (1998) and the empirical results of this thesis.   
A possible reason for this might be due to loan tenor being more of a function of what 
available funds lenders have for a particular market, as well as what they are willing to 
provide, as per the Basel Accords, for a given period of time.  
The loans with exposure to foreign currency represented 77.5% of the loans in the 
database, and were assigned the Currency Risk variable. The Currency Risk variable was 
found to decrease the All-in credit-spread by 30.22 bps in the multiple linear regression 
for loans which were issued in a different currency to the country of the project.  The P-
value was calculated at 40.2%, resulting in this variable being statistically insignificant to 
the All-in Spread in the regression models and findings. 
The Currency Risk results support the findings of Kleimeier & Megginson (2001: P22), 
where their paper concluded that loan credit-spreads are negatively related to currency 
risk and to the presence of loan guarantees by Sponsors, host governments, or 
development agencies. This might be because larger international lenders can provide 
cheaper loans compared to domestic lenders, due to domestic lenders having limited 
deposits books, and the Basel Accord requiring lenders who provide PF to have a higher 
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banking capitalisation requirement than other corporate loans. Domestic lenders might 
find it more profitable to use the limited available lending capital for more profitable 
unsecured retail lending in turn driving up the cost of project finance lending. 
There is, however, no information provided for in the Dealscan database as to whether 
projects were required to take out foreign exchange hedging agreements for the loan 
repayments. Long-term forward-looking foreign exchange hedging covers are expensive 
and limited in the duration in which they can be provided for.  However the PF loans that 
had currency risk exposure had a mean duration of 91 months, with 91% of all the 
Dealscan loans having exposure to the US Dollar. A variety and combination of forward 
curve, exchange rate swaps and options could be used to mitigate the risk. A further 
currency mitigation measure that can be employed by the borrower is to have a 
mechanism in the off-taker agreement to de-risk any currency volatilities i.e. where the 
sale price increases when the local currency weakens by a certain amount. 
A ‘natural hedge’ for currency risk can be arranged through the project’s off-take 
agreement being in the foreign currency of the debt funding. Unfortunately, there is no 
indication of this information in the Dealscan database. 
The Loan Seniority variable was represented by 95.5 % of loans that were senior loans. 
Senior loans were found to decrease the credit-spread by 149.64 bps in the multiple 
linear regression over mezzanine and subordinate loans. The P-value was calculated at 
13.3%, 
As senior loans have priority debt repayments over subordinated and mezzanine loans 
in the cash flow structure of a project finance project, it appears that lenders prefer to 
provide PF financing as senior loans. 
5.5 Database Shortcomings  
The empirical findings would have been more useful if the Dealscan database provided 
information on whether lenders required any loan covenants, such as debt service 
reserve accounts or any plant maintenance reserve accounts. Although these covenants 
do not have a direct correlation to the All-in Spread, it allows lenders to adequately 
provide additional loan security and protection from asset substitution for riskier 
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projects. These loan covenants are expected to result in overall increased project costs 
during the operational phase of the projects.  
There is limited information available on the Commitment Fees presented in the Dealscan 
database, and was thus removed as a loan parameter in the regression models. These 
commitment fees are also viewed as lenders’ upfront fees where they require lenders to 
be committed to a project during the initial and the riskier phase of the project’s lifecycle.  
There is also no information available on the level of NFC agreements and project risk 
guarantees that the project companies enter into with third parties, or how the lenders 
price the risk mitigation of NFC agreements and guarantees and whether it is a definite 
funding requirement. 
As such, the level of performance guarantees, provided by either the Engineering, 
Procurement & Construction (EPC) and Operational & Maintenance (O&M) contractors, 
nor whether these contractors are third parties or subsidiary companies of the project’s 
equity sponsors, is provided for. No information is available on how lenders perceive the 
risks from either party, what level of performance guarantees are required and how this 
is priced into the project’s capital expenditure or operational expenditure costs indirectly 
driving up the cost of credit for the projects.  
There is also no information available of off-taker guarantees, whether the off-taker 
provides parent company guarantees (in the event that the off-taker is a private entity) 
or any government/treasury guarantees (in the event that the off-taker is a government 
owned entity), or the credit ratings of the off-takers and how the lenders price the off-
taker’s credit worthiness.  
Unfortunately, the database also does not provide an indication if the project has any off-
taker insurance guarantee from third parties such as the World Bank’s International 
Development Agency (IDA) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
nor any export credit agencies (ECAs), who provide insurance guarantees for the equity 
and debt portions for projects. These insurance costs are, however, not reflected in the 
cost of credit, but can indirectly increase the cost of credit for the projects. 
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As previously mentioned, the debt / equity ratios of the specific projects were not 
provided in the Dealscan database and it could be that the borrowers are providing a 
higher amount of equity funding in order for lenders receive appropriate comfort from 
the sponsors, for them to provide unsecured PF loans to them.   
Another means for lenders to receive greater security over the project is for the equity 
sponsors to provide their equity contributions first during the initial (higher risk) stages 
of construction.  This allows the lenders to provide the debt financing at a much later 
stage.  Unfortunately, this level of detail is not provided for in the Dealscan database. 
Another important factor that wasn’t accounted for was the impact of the Basel Capital 
Accords as to when they came into effect during the 1997 to 2015 period of the Dealscan 
database’s African records.  As per the Esty & Christov (2002) paper, project finance is 
perceived as riskier than other corporate loans under the Basel Capital Accords. However 
there is no indication in the Dealscan database how the increased capital requirements 
(due to project finance having lower degrees of recourse) have been priced into the 
various loans over the time period as various Basel Capital Accords have come into effect. 
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6 Conclusion  
From the empirical findings and subsequent discussion, we conclude that the most 
significant cost determinants in non-recourse financing in Africa are Country Risk Rank 
and the Loan Secured parameters.  
Country Risk Rank had a 27.697 bps increase in the All-in Credit spread (P-value < 2.3%) 
if a country’s risk ranking is increased. 
The core risk-pricing factor for Political / Regulatory Risks being present in a country is 
Country Risk Rank.  As such, Country Risk Rank is not influenced by the strength of a 
project, nor by any internal project risk-pricing factors such as Operating-, 
Environmental-, Market- and Sponsor Risk (as identified by Nguyen & Ross (2006)) 
which can be mitigated by project stakeholders. 
As project stakeholders have limited or no control over external Political / Regulatory 
Risks, it highlights a stern caution to governments, as with government bonds, the 
country’s credit rating, which is determined by external credit rating agencies and 
applied by international lenders, have a real impact on the cost of projects, even when the 
debt is not used for government projects. This has real and deep implication for policy 
makers, since government policies and the economic health of a country have the largest 
impact on any credit rating. These credit ratings have a direct impact on the borrowing 
capabilities of governments as well as the borrowing costs by private companies, as was 
indicated in the empirical results of this thesis.  These Political / Regulatory Risks could 
be mitigated through project insurances and guarantees, where these risks can be priced 
into the project and are reflected in the All-in credit-spread of the project.  
The empirical results also established that the parameter Loan Secured increases the All-
In credit-spread by 196.94 bps (P-value < 0.1%) if the loan parameter is moved from an 
unsecured- to a secured loan. 
There is limited information available on the loan secured information provided in the 
Dealscan database and it can thus not be ascertained as to what degree of  securitisation 
are priced into project financed loans. 
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A possible hypothesis for the loan secured phenomenon mentioned is that the majority 
of project financing is secured prior to the construction phase of a project, and that 
construction should only last for a couple of years, at best, where-after the borrower 
should refinance once the project’s risk profile has changed. This implies borrowing 
expensive money (secured through third-party guarantees) for a short period and until 
the construction risk has been completed, and then substituting it for cheaper financing 
against the operational assets of the project.  
The empirical findings of this thesis could support this hypothesis, whereby the secured 
loans (through guarantees) are more expensive, than unsecured loans where lenders can 
use the completed and operational physical assets as security.   
All other loan parameters such as Industry Risk, Collateralisable Assets, Tranche Type, 
Tranche Amended, Currency Risk, Loan Seniority, Loan Term and Loan Size resulted in 
statistically insignificant cost determinants for the credit-spreads.  
Of the project risk pricing factors identified by Nguyen & Ross (2006), this study has 
addressed the Political / Regulatory risk. However due to the lack of additional project 
information in the Dealscan database, Operating, Environmental, Market and Sponsor 
Risk could not properly be discussed and accounted for in this study. 
Possible future academic research can investigate the effect of IFRS16 on the cost and 
utilization of Project Finance. Research can also be conducted on the credit pricing of 
projects during different stages of a project’s lifecycle in order to determine how lenders 
price the lifecycle risk of a project. In addition, further studies can be undertaken to 
understand how project insurance and guarantees can effectively offset Political / 
Regulatory Risks, and what the implications are on the credit-spread and the cost benefits 
are to the projects. 
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8 Appendix A : Dealscan Data 
The Dealscan database provides information of the ‘Borrower’s Identity’, geographic 
‘Region’, ‘Country’ and ‘Major Industry Group’ which sets out wherein the borrower 
trades, i.e. chemicals, mining, utilities, oil & gas, construction, financial services, 
beverages, etc.   
Loan information is shown as the ‘Loan Tranche’ type, which is categorised as ‘term 
loans’, ‘revolver/lines for more than 1 year’, ‘guarantees’, ‘bridge loan’ and ‘other loans’. 
‘Tranche Activation’ and ‘Tranche Maturity’ dates are provided with ‘Tranche Currency’, 
‘Trance Amounts’ in the stated currency, and ‘Trance Amount Converted’ to US Dollars. 
There is also a ‘Trance Amendment’ tab indicating whether any of the tranches has 
previously been amended. ‘Primary Purpose’ and ‘Market Segment’ tabs are provided 
indicating which nature of the loans. Loan-pricing is provided through the ‘Base Rate & 
Margin’ (as a spread over LIBOR, EURIBOR, FR, NIBOR, etc.), ‘Floor’, ‘Original Issue 
Discount Rate’, ‘All in Spread Drawn’, ‘All in Spread Undrawn’, ‘Upfront Fee’, ‘Annual Fee’ 
and ‘Commitment Fee’ tabs. Lenders information is shown as ‘Top Tier Arranger’, 
‘Sponsor’, ‘Guarantor’, ‘LIN’, ‘Average Bid’, ‘Average Ask’, ‘Mean’, ‘Yield’, ‘Discount Spread’, 
‘Secured’, and ‘Seniority’ tabs. Credit rating information is provided by ‘Moody’s Bank 
Loan Current’, ‘Moody’s Senior Unsecured’, ‘S&P Bank Loan Current’ and ‘S&P Senior 
Unsecured’ tabs. 
The following tables present the unfiltered Dealscan database, followed by the filtered 
Dealscan database, and finally the inputs are presented for the regression models, with 
the applicable codebook. 
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Unfiltered Dealscan Database
Borrower Name Region Country Major Industry Group Tranche Type Tranche Currency Market Segment Sponsor Guarantor LIN Mean Secured
Abdali Boulevard Middle East Jordan Business Services Term Loan 23-Jul-2008 22-Jul-2020 No 100 141.6 Jordanian Dinar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
ACWA Power Solafrica Bokpoort CSP Power Plant (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 28-Jun-2013 28-Jun-2031 No 3000 305.19 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 390 390 Yes Senior
Adani Ports & Special Economic Zone Ltd [Ex-Mundra Port & Special Economic Zone] Asia Pacific India Shipping Term Loan 30-Apr-2011 30-Jul-2018 No 100 100 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 353 353 Axis Bank Ltd Yes Senior
Addax Petroleum NV Latin America/Caribbean Netherlands Antilles Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 07-Mar-2002 06-Mar-2006 No 100 100 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance BNP Paribas SA Yes Senior
AE-AMD Independent Power Producer One (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 12-Nov-2012 30-Apr-2029 No 226 25.98 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
AE-AMD Independent Power Producer One (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 12-Nov-2012 30-Apr-2029 No 65 7.47 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
AE-AMD Independent Power Producer One (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 12-Nov-2012 30-Apr-2029 No 443 50.92 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
AE-AMD Independent Power Producer One (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 12-Nov-2012 30-Apr-2029 No 130 14.94 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
AES Nigeria Barge Ltd Africa Nigeria Utilities Term Loan 10-Sep-2004 No 120 120 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
AES Nile Power Africa Uganda Utilities Other Loan 09-Jan-2002 No 53 53 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Afren Plc Western Europe United Kingdom Oil and Gas Term Loan 13-Mar-2015 30-Apr-2019 Yes 300 300 U.S. Dollar General Purpose  Borrower Base, Leveraged LIBOR + 440 440 BNP Paribas SA, Citi, Natixis SA A000S0018TL01 47.5 50.5 49 32.89 3260.2 Yes Senior
Afren Plc Western Europe United Kingdom Oil and Gas Term Loan 25-Mar-2013 30-Apr-2016 Yes 300 300 U.S. Dollar General Purpose  Borrower Base, Non Investment Grade LIBOR + 440 440 BNP Paribas SA, Citi, Natixis SA A000S0018TL01 47.5 50.5 49 32.89 3260.2 Yes Senior
African Minerals Ltd [AML] Western Europe United Kingdom Mining Term Loan 09-Feb-2012 Yes 417.7 417.7 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
African Minerals Ltd [AML] Western Europe United Kingdom Mining Standby Letter of Credit 09-Feb-2012 Yes 100 100 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
AfriSam (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2019 Yes 2176.57 277.64 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 400 400 Yes Senior
AfriSam (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2019 Yes 2087.43 236.8 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 450 450 Yes Senior
AfriSam (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Mezzanine Tranche 27-Feb-2013 27-May-2019 Yes 936 106.18 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 825 825 No Senior
AfriSam (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Bridge Loan 30-Jan-2012 30-Nov-2012 Yes 5200 663.31 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
AIBD SA [Aeroport International Blaise Diagne] Africa Senegal Transportation Term Loan 04-Aug-2010 03-Feb-2013 No 90 118.42 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance BNP Paribas SA Yes Senior
AIBD SA [Aeroport International Blaise Diagne] Africa Senegal Transportation Bridge Loan 14-May-2009 13-Jan-2011 No 21 28.63 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance BNP Paribas SA Yes Senior
Al Fajr Co Middle East Jordan Oil and Gas Revolver/Term Loan 06-Feb-2004 05-Feb-2016 No 160 160 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Al Nahda Co for Industries Africa Egypt Construction Term Loan 09-Dec-2009 08-Dec-2019 No 1200 219.02 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Al Nouran Sugar SAE Africa Egypt Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Ijara 27-Apr-2014 No 1500 214.06 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Islamic Financing, Project Finance
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank PJSC [ADIB], Banque Audi 
SAL
Yes Senior
Al Nouran Sugar SAE Africa Egypt Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Other Loan 27-Apr-2014 No 400 57.08 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
[AFESD], Islamic Corp for the Development of the 
Private Sector [ICD]
Yes Mezzanine
Al Sharkeya Sugar Manufacturing SAE [ASSM] Africa Egypt Agriculture Ijara 27-Apr-2014 No 1500 214.06 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Islamic Financing, Project Finance
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank PJSC [ADIB], Banque Audi 
SAL
Yes Senior
Al Waddan Hotel Africa Libya Hotel & Gaming Term Loan 05-Nov-2007 04-Nov-2014 No 16 16 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Alexandria Fertilizer Company [AlexFert] Africa Egypt Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Revolver/Term Loan 23-Jan-2004 22-Jan-2012 No 110 110 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 No Senior
Alexandria Fertilizer Company [AlexFert] Africa Egypt Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Revolver/Term Loan 23-Jan-2004 22-Jan-2012 No 75 12.21 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 200 200 No Senior
Al-Futtaim Trading Group Middle East United Arab Emirates Financial Services Term Loan 08-Oct-2009 No 2000 365.23 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Algerian Cement Company (ACC) Africa Algeria Construction Other Loan 02-Dec-2002 01-Dec-2014 No 66 66 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance EURIBOR + 300 300 90 Citibank No Senior
Ambatovy Nickel Project Asia Pacific Japan Term Loan 22-Aug-2007 22-Aug-2024 No 150 150 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 65 65 No Senior
Arab Republic of Egypt Africa Egypt Government Other Loan 07-Jun-2012 No 2600 2600 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
 European Investment Bank [EIB], Kexim 
Asia Ltd, Nippon Export & Investment 
Insurance (NEXI)
Yes Senior B3 AA+
Arkan Building Materials Co PJSC Middle East United Arab Emirates Construction Murabaha 15-Jun-2008 No 283.2 283.2 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Islamic Financing, Project Finance Union National Bank PJSC [UNB] Yes Senior
Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd Africa Ghana Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 22-Sep-1997 22-Sep-2001 No 60 60 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 160 160 NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd [US] No Senior
Avgold Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 30-Mar-2001 30-Mar-2006 No 350 43.57 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 225 225 100 75 Deutsche Bank AG No Senior
Avgold Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 30-Mar-2001 29-Mar-2006 No 350 43.57 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 275 275 100 75 Deutsche Bank AG No Senior
Avgold Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 17-May-1999 16-May-2003 No 24.21 24.21 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 75 100 75 No Senior
Avgold Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 17-May-1999 16-May-2003 No 100 100 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 100 No Senior
Avon Peaking Power Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 05-Aug-2013 05-Aug-2028 No 9660 986.37 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Azura Edo Independent Power Project [Azura-Edo IPP] Africa Nigeria Utilities Term Loan 07-May-2014 No 530 530 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
B2Gold Corp USA/Canada Canada Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 17-Apr-2013 17-Apr-2017 No 50 50 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance LIBOR + 350 350 Macquarie Bank Ltd Yes Senior
B2Gold Corp USA/Canada Canada Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 17-Apr-2013 17-Apr-2017 No 50 50 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance LIBOR + 350 350 Macquarie Bank Ltd Yes Senior
B2Gold Corp USA/Canada Canada Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 17-Apr-2013 17-Apr-2017 No 50 50 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance LIBOR + 350 350 Macquarie Bank Ltd Yes Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 11-Jun-2009 10-Dec-2028 No 1400 176.36 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 11-Jun-2009 10-Dec-2028 No 1500 188.95 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 11-Jun-2009 10-Dec-2028 No 650 81.88 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Guarantee 11-Jun-2009 10-Jun-2011 No 150 18.9 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 18-Sep-2001 17-Sep-2021 No 1014 117.1 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Standby Letter of Credit 18-Sep-2001 17-Sep-2021 No 60 6.93 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) Ltd [BPCC] Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 18-Sep-2001 17-Sep-2021 No 180 20.79 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance No Subordinated
Base Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 24-Sep-2012 24-Sep-2018 No 80 80 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 600 600 250 Yes Senior
Base Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 24-Sep-2012 24-Sep-2020 No 70 70 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 600 600 250 Yes Senior
Base Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 24-Sep-2012 No 20 20 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 600 600 250 Yes Senior
Blue Falcon 140 Trading Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 01-Jul-2013 01-Jul-2028 No 1975 199.77 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Blue Ridge Platinum Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 14-Dec-2007 13-Dec-2015 No 505 73.62 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP1 + 365 351 Yes Senior
Blue Ridge Platinum Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 14-Dec-2007 13-Dec-2019 No 120 17.49 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP1 + 525 511 Yes Mezzanine
Blue Ridge Platinum Africa South Africa Mining Other Loan 14-Dec-2007 13-Dec-2015 No 90 13.12 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP1 + 625 611 Yes Subordinated
Bombela [Gautrain Rapid Rail Link] Africa South Africa Transportation Other Loan 07-Feb-2007 07-Feb-2024 No 4500 630.25 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Bulyanhulu Mining Project Africa Tanzania Mining Term Loan 19-Dec-2012 19-Dec-2019 No 142 142 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 250 250 Yes Senior
Capital Meters Ltd [CML] Western Europe United Kingdom Utilities Other Loan 05-Mar-2004 No 14.1 26.03 Great Britain Pound Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 400 400 Yes Mezzanine
Cenpower Generation Co Africa Ghana Utilities Undisclosed 03-Oct-2014 No 650 650 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Central Bank of Seychelles Africa Seychelles Financial Services Term Loan 19-Dec-1997 19-Dec-2000 No 30 30 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 200 200 100 Citibank No Senior
Cerro Matoso SA Latin America/Caribbean Colombia Mining Term Loan 09-Dec-1999 09-Dec-2004 No 240 240 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance, Sponsored LIBOR + 100 100  Billiton Plc No Senior
Core Energy Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 16-Dec-2012 31-Mar-2031 No 771 89.69 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Core Energy Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 16-Dec-2012 31-Mar-2031 No 125 14.54 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Core Energy Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 16-Dec-2012 31-Mar-2031 No 150 17.45 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Coria (PKF) Investments 28 Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 15-Nov-2012 29-Jun-2029 No 1102 123.49 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Coria (PKF) Investments 28 Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 15-Nov-2012 29-Jun-2029 No 300 33.62 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
DA Tollroads Pvt Ltd Asia Pacific India Term Loan 01-Jan-2015 30-Jan-2030 No 18600 293.61 Indian Rupee Project Finance  Project Finance FR + 1225 SBI Capital Markets No Senior
Damietta International Port Co [DIPCO] Africa Egypt Shipping Murabaha 06-Feb-2008 05-Feb-2023 No 480 480 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Islamic Financing, Project Finance
Ahli United Bank BSC [AUB], Arab Banking Corp BSC 
[ABC]
Yes Senior
Dark Fibre Africa Africa South Africa General Manufacturing Term Loan 01-Jul-2012 01-Jul-2021 No 1758 215.44 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Barclays Bank Plc Yes Senior
Dark Fibre Africa Africa South Africa General Manufacturing Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 01-Jul-2012 01-Jul-2014 No 200 24.51 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Barclays Bank Plc Yes Senior
Dark Fibre Africa Africa South Africa General Manufacturing Mezzanine Tranche 01-Jul-2012 01-Jul-2017 No 635 77.82 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Barclays Bank Plc Yes Mezzanine
Department of Education Head Office Accommodation PPP Africa South Africa Services Term Loan 04-Aug-2009 03-Aug-2027 No 30.6 3.92 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP1 + 824 810 Yes Senior
Discovery Metals (Botswana) Pty Ltd Africa Botswana Mining Term Loan 25-Jul-2011 31-Mar-2015 No 180 180 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 375 375 Yes Senior
Discovery Metals (Botswana) Pty Ltd Africa Botswana Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 25-Jul-2011 31-Mar-2015 No 25 25 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 450 450 Yes Senior
Dorper Wind Farm Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 31-Oct-2012 30-Jul-2029 No 140 16.15 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp  Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs AG Yes Senior
Eastern Platinum Ltd (Eastplats) USA/Canada Canada Mining Term Loan 28-Oct-2010 27-Oct-2016 No 100 100 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 385 385 Yes Senior
Eastern Platinum Ltd (Eastplats) USA/Canada Canada Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 28-Oct-2010 27-Oct-2016 No 0 0 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 385 385 Yes Senior
Econet Wireless Nigeria (EWN) Africa Nigeria Telecommunications Other Loan 16-May-2002 No 127 127 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Egypt Palm Hills Development Africa Egypt Real Estate Term Loan 15-Mar-2010 14-Mar-2015 No 567 103.46 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Egypt Power Station [Orascom Construction] Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Undisclosed 16-Mar-2015 No 1950 1950 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
Arab Bank Plc, National Bank of Abu Dhabi PJSC 
[NBAD]
No Senior
Egyptian Co for Mobile Services Africa Egypt Telecommunications Term Loan 22-Apr-1999 21-Oct-2005 No 220 220 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 140 140 65 50 Yes Senior
Egyptian Co for Mobile Services Africa Egypt Telecommunications Term Loan 22-Apr-1999 22-Oct-2006 No 350 350 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 160 160 70 50 No Senior
Egyptian LNG 2 Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Term Loan 14-Jul-2005 13-Jul-2017 No 411.2 411.2 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Group No Senior
Egyptian LNG 2 Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Guarantee 14-Jul-2005 13-Jul-2015 No 144 144 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Group No Senior
Egyptian LNG 2 Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Guarantee 14-Jul-2005 No 144 144 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Group No Senior
Egyptian Natural Gas Co Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Term Loan 13-Dec-2001 12-Dec-2008 No 104 104 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 No Senior
Egyptian Nitrogen Products Co SAE [ENPC] Africa Egypt Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Term Loan 16-Dec-2009 No 1050 1050 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding Company (ECHEM) Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Other Loan 27-Feb-2003 No 127.5 127.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding Company (ECHEM) Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Other Loan 23-Jan-2003 No 225 225 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Egyptian Refining Co SAE Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Other Loan 08-Sep-2010 07-Mar-2028 No 112.5 112.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 300 300 No Mezzanine
Egyptian Refining Co SAE Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Term Loan 08-Sep-2010 08-Mar-2028 No 200 200 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 300 300 Yes Senior
Egyptian Refining Co SAE Africa Egypt Oil and Gas Guarantee 08-Sep-2010 31-Dec-2025 No 472.5 472.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 300 300 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd [BTMU]  European Investment Bank [EIB] Yes Senior
El Hamarawan coal-fired power Africa Egypt Utilities Term Loan 12-Jun-2015 No 600 676.08 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
El Hamarawan coal-fired power Africa Egypt Utilities Term Loan 12-Jun-2015 No 3000 393.18 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Elektrocieplownia Nowa Sarzyna Sp zoo Eastern Europe/Russia Poland Utilities Term Loan 01-Jun-1998 01-Dec-2015 No 118.5 118.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance, Sponsored LIBOR + 125 125 50 50 50  Enron Corp No Senior
Eleme Petrochemicals Co Africa Nigeria Oil and Gas Term Loan 20-Mar-2007 No 125 125 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Eleme Petrochemicals Co Africa Nigeria Oil and Gas Other Loan 20-Mar-2007 No U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Energy City Development Co WLL Middle East Qatar Utilities Murabaha 21-Apr-2008 20-Apr-2011 No 300 300 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Islamic Financing, Project Finance LIBOR + 250 250 Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC [EIB] Yes Senior
Erika Energy Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 16-Dec-2012 31-Mar-2031 No 660 76.78 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Erika Energy Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 16-Dec-2012 31-Mar-2031 No 125 14.54 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Erika Energy Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 16-Dec-2012 31-Mar-2031 No 150 17.45 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
EuroChem Mineral & Chemical Co JSC [EvroKhim] Eastern Europe/Russia Russian Federation Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Term Loan 30-Mar-2010 29-Mar-2020 No 261 261 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 250 250 Barclays Capital, Citi
 Export Credit Insurance Corp of South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd [ECIC]
Yes Senior BB
Fonds d'Entretien Routier [FER] Africa Ivory Coast / Cote d'Ivoire Financial Services Term Loan 20-Feb-2014 20-Feb-2016 No 86 86 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance FR + 700 10 BGFIBank, BNP Paribas SA, Societe Generale SA Yes Senior
Fonds d'Entretien Routier [FER] Africa Ivory Coast / Cote d'Ivoire Financial Services Term Loan 20-Feb-2014 20-Feb-2019 No 174 174 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance FR + 800 10 BGFIBank, BNP Paribas SA, Societe Generale SA Yes Senior
Fountain Set (Holdings) Ltd Asia Pacific Hong Kong Textiles and Apparel Term Loan 21-May-1997 21-May-2002 No 450 Hong Kong Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance HIBOR + 160 77.5 37.5 Paribas Asia Ltd, Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB] No Senior
Gabon Special Economic Zone [GSEZ] Africa Gabon Business Services Term Loan 22-Aug-2011 01-Mar-2015 No 28.73 28.73 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 700 700 245 Yes Senior
Gazprom OAO Eastern Europe/Russia Russian Federation Utilities Term Loan 03-Mar-2003 02-Sep-2008 No 450 450 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 330 330 85 ABN AMRO Bank NV [RBS], HypoVereinsbank Yes Senior WR BB+
Ghana Airports Company Ltd [GACL] Africa Ghana Transportation Term Loan 22-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2021 No 350 350 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Glencore Exploration (EG) Ltd Latin America/Caribbean Bermuda Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 13-Aug-2012 23-Sep-2018 No 390 390 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance
BNP Paribas SA, Credit Agricole SA, Natixis SA, 
Societe Generale SA
 Glencore International AG Yes Senior
Golden Sugar Co Ltd Africa Nigeria Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Term Loan 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 No 50 50 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance NIBOR + 300 300 45 Yes Senior
Golden Sugar Co Ltd Africa Nigeria Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Term Loan 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 No 13.3 13.3 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance FR + 900 Yes Senior
Golden Sugar Co Ltd Africa Nigeria Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Term Loan 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 No 80 80 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance NIBOR + 300 300 Yes Senior
Golden Sugar Co Ltd Africa Nigeria Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Term Loan 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 No 80 80 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 500 500 45 Yes Senior
Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd Asia Pacific India Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Term Loan 30-Sep-1999 30-Mar-2008 Yes 50 50 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance, Sponsored LIBOR + 225 125 50 ANZ Investment Bank Tatas, West  State Bank of India No Senior
Henri Konan Bedie Toll Bridge Africa Ivory Coast / Cote d'Ivoire Construction Term Loan 09-Jul-2012 No 127 156.44 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance
 Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA)
Yes Senior
Herald Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 20-Jun-2005 No 65 50.41 Australian Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa Sarl Africa Mozambique Utilities Term Loan 30-Apr-2008 30-Dec-2017 No 5736 763.78 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 190 190
Banco BPI SA, Credit Agricole Corporate & 
Investment Bank SA [ex-Calyon]
No Senior
Highlands Kainantu Ltd Asia Pacific Papua New Guinea Mining Term Loan 13-Jan-2004 13-Jan-2008 No 31 31 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance  Highlands Pacific Ltd Yes Senior
Independent Power Southern Africa Plc [IPSA] Africa South Africa Utilities Other Loan 29-Jan-2008 No U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Indorama Eleme Petrochemicals Ltd [IEPL] Africa Nigeria Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Term Loan 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2024 No 475 475 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 495 495
Bank of India, Belgian Investment Company for 
Developing Countries [BIO], CDC Group Plc 
[Colonial/Commonwealth Development Corp], DEG 
[Deutsche Investitutions-und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH], Nederlandse 
Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden 
NV [FMO]
Yes Senior
Indorama Eleme Petrochemicals Ltd [IEPL] Africa Nigeria Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Term Loan 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2021 No 135 135 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 475 475 Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB] Yes Senior
Itezhi Tezhi Hydro Power Project Africa Zambia Utilities Term Loan 12-Jun-2015 12-Jun-2028 No 142 142 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 350 350
Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor 
Ontwikkelingslanden NV [FMO], Proparco [Promotion 
et Participation pour la Cooperation Economique]
Yes Senior
Itezhi Tezhi Hydro Power Project Africa Zambia Utilities Term Loan 28-Dec-2012 No 55 55 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Jorf Lasfar Energy Co SA Africa Morocco Utilities Term Loan 20-Jun-2012 31-May-2028 No 4500 518.43 Moroccan Dirham Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Jorf Lasfar Energy Co SA Africa Morocco Utilities VAT 20-Jun-2012 20-Dec-2012 No 700 80.65 Moroccan Dirham Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Jorf Lasfar Energy Co SA Africa Morocco Utilities Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 No 237 237 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 212.5 212.5 50 50 Credit Suisse First Boston No Senior
Jorf Lasfar Energy Co SA Africa Morocco Utilities Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 No 256 256 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 100 100 50 50 Credit Suisse First Boston No Senior
Jorf Lasfar Energy Co SA Africa Morocco Utilities Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 No 35 35 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 200 200 50 50 Credit Suisse First Boston No Senior
Jorf Lasfar Energy Co SA Africa Morocco Utilities Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 No 176 176 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 175 175 50 50 Credit Suisse First Boston No Senior
Jubilee Field Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Term Loan 13-Jul-2009 31-Dec-2015 No 600 600 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Borrower Base, Project Finance Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB] Yes Senior
Jubilee Field Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Term Loan 13-Jul-2009 30-Jun-2016 No 150 150 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Borrower Base, Project Finance Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB] Yes Senior
Kansanshi Copper Project Africa Zambia Mining Term Loan 31-Jan-2012 24-Jan-2017 No 300 300 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 300 300 BNP Paribas SA, Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB] Yes Senior
Kansanshi Copper Project Africa Zambia Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 31-Jan-2012 24-Jan-2017 No 700 700 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 300 300 BNP Paribas SA, Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB] Yes Senior
Kansanshi Copper Project Africa Zambia Mining Other Loan 29-Nov-2002 No 60 60 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Kansanshi Copper Project Africa Zambia Mining Other Loan 29-Nov-2002 No 60 60 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Kayelekera Uranium Mine Africa Malawi Mining Term Loan 30-Jun-2009 31-Mar-2015 No 35 35 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Kayelekera Uranium Mine Africa Malawi Mining Term Loan 30-Jun-2009 31-Mar-2015 No 110 110 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) (Olkaria) Africa Kenya Oil and Gas Term Loan 11-Dec-2008 No 105 105 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Citi Yes Senior
Keysbrook Mineral Sands Project Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2019 No 37.5 37.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 474 474 No Senior
Keysbrook Mineral Sands Project Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2019 No 3 3 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 400 400 No Senior
Keysbrook Mineral Sands Project Asia Pacific Australia Mining Guarantee 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2019 No 11.5 9.91 Australian Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Kinangop Wind Park Project Africa Kenya Utilities Other Loan 09-Oct-2013 09-Oct-2023 No 90 90 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 575 575 Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Korea Electric Power Corp [KEPCO] Asia Pacific South Korea Utilities Term Loan 21-Jun-2013 21-Jun-2020 No 303 303 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior Aa3 A+
Korea Electric Power Corp [KEPCO] Asia Pacific South Korea Utilities Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 21-Jun-2013 21-Jun-2014 No 5 5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior Aa3 A+
Kosmos Energy Ghana HC Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 14-Mar-2014 31-Mar-2021 Yes 1500 1500 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Borrower Base, Project Finance LIBOR + 325 325
BNP Paribas SA, Credit Agricole Corporate & 
Investment Bank SA [Credit Agricole CIB], HSBC 
Bank Plc, SG Corporate & Investment Banking, 
Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB]
K0004W049RC01 99 100 99.5 3.89 360.5 Yes Senior B
Kosmos Energy Ghana HC Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 15-Jul-2011 29-Mar-2018 Yes 2000 2000 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 325 455 170 130 40
BNP Paribas SA, Citi, Credit Agricole Corporate & 
Investment Bank SA [Credit Agricole CIB], HSBC 
Bank Plc, SG Corporate & Investment Banking, 
Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB]
K0004W049RC01 99 100 99.5 3.89 360.5 Yes Senior
Kosmos Energy Ghana HC Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Term Loan 13-Jul-2009 12-Dec-2015 No 600 600 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 550 550
Asean Finance Corp Ltd [AFC Merchant Bank], 
Cordiant Capital
K0004W013TL01 Yes Senior
Kpone Independent Power Project Africa Ghana Utilities Other Loan 20-Nov-2013 20-Nov-2028 No 1000 1000 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Kribi Power Development Co SA [KPDC] Africa Cameroon Utilities Term Loan 17-Jan-2012 No 138 175.77 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Kribi Power Development Co SA [KPDC] Africa Cameroon Utilities Bridge Loan 31-May-2011 05-Jan-2012 No 119.76 119.76 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 250 250 35 Yes Senior
Kuvaninga Energia Africa Mozambique Utilities Term Loan 31-Dec-2013 30-Mar-2027 No 34 34 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Investec Bank Plc Yes Senior
Kwale International Sugar Co Ltd [KISCOL] Africa Kenya Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Term Loan 12-Aug-2013 12-Aug-2022 No 100 100 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 700 700 Yes Senior
Kwale International Sugar Co Ltd [KISCOL] Africa Kenya Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing Term Loan 12-Aug-2013 12-Aug-2025 No 20 20 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 600 600 Yes Senior
Lafarge Cement Syria SA [ex-Syrian Cement] Middle East Syria Construction Bridge Loan 28-Jul-2008 No 380 380 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Lake Turkana Wind Power Africa Kenya Utilities Term Loan 26-Mar-2014 26-Mar-2029 No 110 151.59 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 475 475 Yes Senior
Lake Turkana Wind Power Africa Kenya Utilities Term Loan 26-Mar-2014 26-Mar-2029 No 10 13.78 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 475 475 Yes Senior
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Borrower Name Region Country Major Industry Group Tranche Type Tranche Currency Market Segment Sponsor Guarantor LIN Mean Secured
Leading Spirit Electronics Ltd Asia Pacific Hong Kong General Manufacturing Term Loan 24-Jul-1995 24-Jul-1997 No 126 Hong Kong Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance HIBOR + 175 45 40 Banque Nationale de Paris Hong Kong No Senior
Ledjadja Coal Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 11-Oct-2012 11-Oct-2021 No 400 400 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Lekki-Epe Expressway Africa Nigeria Construction Term Loan 20-Oct-2008 19-Oct-2023 No 85 85 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Lekki-Epe Expressway Africa Nigeria Construction Term Loan 20-Oct-2008 19-Oct-2023 No 93 93 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Liberian Palm Developments Ltd Africa Liberia Agriculture Term Loan 27-Feb-2013 No 140 140 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Llanga 100MW CSP Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 25-Feb-2015 No 8000 698.96 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Luanda Shopping Africa Angola Construction Term Loan 05-Nov-2012 05-Nov-2016 No 62.2 62.2 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Banco Caixa Geral SA [BCG] No Senior
Lundin Petroleum AB Western Europe Sweden Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 06-Feb-2014 25-Jun-2019 Yes 4000 4000 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Borrower Base, Project Finance LIBOR + 275 275
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd [BTMU], BNP 
Paribas SA, Citi, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 
Credit Agricole SA, Deutsche Bank AG, DNB ASA, 
HSBC, ING Bank NV, JP Morgan, Lloyds Bank, 
Natixis SA, Nordea Bank AB, SG Corporate & 
Investment Banking, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
AB [SEB]
L0006X010RC01 Yes Senior
Lundin Petroleum AB Western Europe Sweden Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 25-Jun-2012 25-Jun-2019 Yes 2500 2500 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Borrower Base, Investment Grade, Project Finance LIBOR + 275 275
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd [BTMU], BNP 
Paribas SA, Citi, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 
Credit Agricole SA, Deutsche Bank AG, DNB ASA, 
HSBC, ING Bank NV, JP Morgan, Lloyds Bank, 
Natixis SA, Nordea Bank AB, Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken AB [SEB], Societe Generale SA
L0006X010RC01 Yes Senior
Mainstream Renewable Power Ltd (South Africa) Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 02-Nov-2012 02-Nov-2029 No 967.13 110.91 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 310 310 100 Yes Senior
Mainstream Renewable Power Ltd (South Africa) Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 02-Nov-2012 02-Nov-2029 No 2067.18 237.06 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 310 310 100 Yes Senior
Mainstream Renewable Power Ltd (South Africa) Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 02-Nov-2012 02-Nov-2029 No 991.91 113.75 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 310 310 100 Yes Senior
Majid Al Futtaim Group LLC [MAF] Middle East United Arab Emirates Retail & Supermarkets Term Loan 07-Nov-2013 07-Apr-2026 No 3000 435.5 Egyptian Pound Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior BBB
Mamba Cement Co (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 21-May-2014 21-May-2024 No 1100 106.1 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Bank of China Ltd Yes Senior
Minas de Aguas Tenidas SAU Western Europe Spain Mining Term Loan 28-May-2008 27-Aug-2013 No 170 170 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 225 225 BNP Paribas SA, SG Corporate & Investment Banking Yes Senior
Minas de Aguas Tenidas SAU Western Europe Spain Mining Term Loan 28-May-2008 27-Aug-2013 No 30 30 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 300 300 BNP Paribas SA, SG Corporate & Investment Banking Yes Senior
Minas de Aguas Tenidas SAU Western Europe Spain Mining Term Loan 28-May-2008 27-Aug-2013 No 10 10 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 225 225 BNP Paribas SA, SG Corporate & Investment Banking Yes Senior
Minas de Aguas Tenidas SAU Western Europe Spain Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 28-May-2008 27-May-2009 No 20 20 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance BNP Paribas SA, SG Corporate & Investment Banking Yes Senior
Minera Isla Riesco Latin America/Caribbean Chile Mining Other Loan 22-Jul-2011 22-Jul-2021 No 450 450 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Banco Itau BBA SA No Senior
Moma Titanium Mineral Sands Project Africa Mozambique Mining Other Loan 22-May-2003 No 40 40 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Moxie Patriot LLC USA/Canada United States Oil and Gas Term Loan B 19-Dec-2013 19-Dec-2020 No 585 585 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Institutional, Non Investment Grade, Project Finance
Ares Capital Corp, Credit Suisse AG, Goldman Sachs 





Moxie Patriot LLC USA/Canada United States Oil and Gas Standby Letter of Credit 19-Dec-2013 19-Dec-2020 No 52.5 52.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance
Ares Capital Corp, Credit Suisse AG, Goldman Sachs 





Moxie Patriot LLC USA/Canada United States Oil and Gas Other Loan 19-Dec-2013 19-Dec-2020 No 14 14 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance
Ares Capital Corp, Credit Suisse AG, Goldman Sachs 





Mulilo 100MW De Aar 1 wind farm Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 No 800 69.9 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance EURIBOR + 310 310 Yes Senior
Mulilo 140MW De Aar 2 wind farm Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 No 1115 97.42 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 310 310 Yes Senior
Mulilo Prieska 75MW Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 No 550 48.05 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 310 310 Yes Senior
Mulilo-Sonnedix 75MW Prieska Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 No 1160 101.35 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 310 310 Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
MZI Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Bridge Loan 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2015 No 4 4 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 100 100 No Senior
MZI Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Bridge Loan 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2015 No 13 13 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 100 100 No Senior
MZI Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Bridge Loan 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2015 No 12.5 12.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 100 100 No Senior
MZI Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Bridge Loan 19-Nov-2014 19-Nov-2015 No 4 4 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 100 100 No Senior
New Liberty Gold Project Africa Liberia Mining Term Loan 04-Dec-2013 13-Sep-2019 No 80 80 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 500 500
 Export Credit Insurance Corp of South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd [ECIC]
Yes Senior
New Liberty Gold Project Africa Liberia Mining Term Loan 04-Dec-2013 13-Sep-2019 No 8 8 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 500 500 Yes Senior
New Liberty Gold Project Africa Liberia Mining Term Loan 04-Dec-2013 13-Mar-2020 No 12 12 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 750 750
 Export Credit Insurance Corp of South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd [ECIC]
Yes Subordinated
NGL II Supplemental Cost Financing Africa Nigeria Oil and Gas Term Loan 17-Jun-2008 17-Jun-2009 No 220 220 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas Ltd [NLNG] Africa Nigeria Oil and Gas Other Loan 18-Dec-2002 No 200 200 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance BNP Paribas SA, Citibank No Senior
Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [NNPC] Africa Nigeria Oil and Gas Other Loan 18-May-2012 No 900 900 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Nord Resources Corp USA/Canada United States Mining Term Loan 30-Jun-2008 31-Dec-2008 No 25 25 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance P + 350 605 25 Yes Senior
Nyumba Ya Akiba SA Africa Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) Construction Term Loan 19-Dec-2014 No 30 30 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
 Danish Export Credit Fund (Eksport 
Kredit Fonden (EKF))
Yes Senior
Nyumba Ya Akiba SA Africa Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) Construction Term Loan 19-Dec-2014 No 30 30 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
O3b Networks Ltd [Other 3 Billion] Western Europe United Kingdom Telecommunications Other Loan 19-Nov-2010 No 145 145 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 195 195 78 78 No Mezzanine
Olam Palm Gabon Ltd [OPG] Africa Gabon Business Services Term Loan 12-Jul-2012 12-Jul-2019 No 100 100 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 400 400 35  Olam Palm Gabon Ltd [OPG] Yes Senior
Olam Palm Gabon Ltd [OPG] Africa Gabon Business Services Term Loan 12-Jul-2012 12-Jul-2022 No 20 20 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 400 400 35  Olam Palm Gabon Ltd [OPG] Yes Senior
Olam Palm Gabon Ltd [OPG] Africa Gabon Business Services Term Loan 12-Jul-2012 12-Jul-2019 No 70 85.37 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance EURIBOR + 625 625 35  Olam Palm Gabon Ltd [OPG] Yes Senior
Optimum Coal Holdings (Pty) Ltd [OCH] Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 15-Dec-2009 31-Dec-2015 No 600 80.75 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Optimum Coal Holdings (Pty) Ltd [OCH] Africa South Africa Mining Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 15-Dec-2009 31-Dec-2015 No 200 26.92 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Optimum Coal Holdings (Pty) Ltd [OCH] Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 15-Dec-2009 31-Dec-2015 No 350 47.11 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Optimum Coal Holdings (Pty) Ltd [OCH] Africa South Africa Mining Standby Letter of Credit 15-Dec-2009 31-Dec-2015 No 100 13.46 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Orascom Telecom Tunisie SA [OTT] Africa Tunisia Telecommunications Term Loan 02-Nov-2004 01-Nov-2011 No 130 165.42 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150
Arab Banking Corp BSC [London], HypoVereinsbank, 
Standard Bank Plc [Ex-Standard Bank London Ltd]
 Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour 
le Commerce Exterior [COFACE], 
Hermes Kreditversicherungs AG 
[Hermes]
No Senior
Orascom Telecom Tunisie SA [OTT] Africa Tunisia Telecommunications Term Loan 02-Nov-2004 01-May-2011 No 110 139.98 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance
Arab Banking Corp BSC [London], HypoVereinsbank, 
Standard Bank Plc [Ex-Standard Bank London Ltd]
No Senior
Palabora Mining Co Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 15-Jun-2001 20-Jan-2006 No 90 90 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 75 Citibank SA, Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd No Senior
Palabora Mining Co Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 15-Jun-2001 14-Jan-2006 No 35 35 U.S. Dollar eral Purpose/Refina  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 75 Citibank SA, Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd No Senior
Paladin Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 26-Aug-2011 26-Aug-2017 Yes 135 135 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance SG Corporate & Investment Banking Yes Senior
Paladin Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Standby Letter of Credit 26-Aug-2011 26-Aug-2017 Yes 6 6 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance SG Corporate & Investment Banking Yes Senior
Paladin Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 05-Sep-2005 05-Sep-2012 Yes 65 65 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance SG Australia Ltd No Senior
Paladin Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Standby Letter of Credit 05-Sep-2005 05-Sep-2012 Yes 6 6 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance SG Australia Ltd No Senior
Palm City Ltd Africa Libya Real Estate Term Loan 20-Mar-2007 19-Mar-2014 No 55 73.23 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa Ghana Ltd [PetroSA Ghana] Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2022 No 150 150 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Borrower Base, Project Finance LIBOR + 325 325 Yes Senior
PG Group (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Term Loan 15-Mar-2006 14-Mar-2018 No 790 127.94 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
PG Group (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Construction Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 15-Mar-2006 14-Mar-2018 No 350 56.68 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Platinum Group Metals Ltd USA/Canada Canada Mining Term Loan 11-Nov-2013 11-Nov-2021 No 195 195 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Barclays Bank Plc, Societe Generale SA No Senior
Platinum Group Metals Ltd USA/Canada Canada Mining Term Loan 06-Dec-2012 06-Dec-2020 No 260 260 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 500 500 Societe Generale SA Yes Senior
Platmin Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 02-Nov-2007 No 200 200 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Rapu Rapu Processing Inc Asia Pacific Philippines Mining Term Loan 07-May-2004 31-Dec-2008 No 31.5 31.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance  Lafayette Mining Ltd No Senior
Rapu Rapu Processing Inc Asia Pacific Philippines Mining Term Loan 07-May-2004 31-Dec-2008 No 3.5 3.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance  Lafayette Mining Ltd No Senior
Red Cap Kouga Wind Farm Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 15-Nov-2012 31-Jan-2030 No 1056 118.33 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Red Cap Kouga Wind Farm Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 15-Nov-2012 31-Jan-2030 No 264 29.58 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Red Cap Kouga Wind Farm Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Mezzanine Tranche 15-Nov-2012 31-Jan-2030 No 188 21.07 South African Rand Project Finance  Hybrid, Institutional, Project Finance, Second Lien Standard Bank Plc Yes Mezzanine
Reliance Ports & Terminals Ltd Asia Pacific India Shipping Term Loan 28-Apr-2007 28-Apr-2017 No 500 500 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 55
Arab Bank Plc, BNP Paribas SA, DBS Bank Ltd, 
Emirates NBD PJSC [ex-Emirates Bank], ICICI Bank, 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA [ISP], Mashreqbank psc, 
Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB], Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corp, Union National Bank PJSC [UNB]
R0007Z016TL01 97.16 97.65 97.41 3.41 312.2 No Senior
Reliance Ports & Terminals Ltd Asia Pacific India Shipping Term Loan 28-Apr-2007 28-Apr-2017 No 425 425 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 150 150 55
Arab Bank Plc, BNP Paribas SA, DBS Bank Ltd, 
Emirates NBD PJSC [ex-Emirates Bank], ICICI Bank, 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA [ISP], Mashreqbank psc, 
Standard Chartered Bank Plc [SCB], Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corp, Union National Bank PJSC [UNB]
R0007Z014TL02 97.16 97.65 97.41 3.41 312.2 No Senior
Republic of Uganda Africa Uganda Government Term Loan 30-Oct-2007 30-Oct-2047 No 3484 30.4 Japanese Yen Project Finance  Project Finance FR + 1 Japan Bank for International Cooperation No Senior
Safi Independent Power Plant  [Safi IPP] Africa Morocco Utilities Term Loan 16-Sep-2014 01-Sep-2032 No 4592.6 536.14 Moroccan Dirham Project Finance  Project Finance
 Nippon Export & Investment Insurance 
(NEXI)
Yes Senior
Sasol Chemicals (USA) LLC USA/Canada United States Utilities Term Loan 22-Dec-2014 22-Dec-2021 No 3995 3995 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance LIBOR + 225 225
Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd 
[BTMU], Barclays, BNP Paribas SA, Citibank, HSBC, 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, ING, Intesa 
Sanpaolo SpA [ISP], JP Morgan, KfW IPEX-Bank 
GmbH, Korea Development Bank, Mizuho Bank Ltd, 
Societe Generale SA, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp
No Senior
Sasol Chemicals (USA) LLC USA/Canada United States Utilities Standby Letter of Credit 22-Dec-2014 22-Dec-2021 No 45 45 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance LIBOR + 225
Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd 
[BTMU], Barclays, BNP Paribas SA, Citibank, HSBC, 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, ING, Intesa 
Sanpaolo SpA [ISP], JP Morgan, KfW IPEX-Bank 
GmbH, Korea Development Bank, Mizuho Bank Ltd, 
Societe Generale SA, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp
No Senior
Sasol Ltd Africa South Africa Oil and Gas Bridge Loan 13-Jan-2003 11-Jan-2004 No 550 63.78 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Sasol Ltd Africa South Africa Oil and Gas Other Loan 29-Aug-2002 28-Aug-2014 No 393 393 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance No Senior
Scatec Solar SA 166 Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 06-Nov-2012 29-Dec-2028 No 1250 144.96 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Scatec Solar SA 166 Pty Ltd Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 06-Nov-2012 29-Dec-2028 No 400 46.39 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Standard Bank Plc Yes Senior
Seacom Africa South Africa Telecommunications Term Loan 19-Nov-2007 No 650 650 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
SENDOU Senegal Project Africa Senegal Utilities Other Loan 15-Sep-2013 15-Sep-2027 No 55 73.11 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 525 525 Yes Senior
SENDOU Senegal Project Africa Senegal Utilities Other Loan 15-Sep-2013 15-Sep-2027 No 0.03 0.03 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 525 525 Yes Senior
SENDOU Senegal Project Africa Senegal Utilities Other Loan 15-Sep-2013 15-Sep-2025 No 0.08 0.08 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Seven Energy International Ltd Africa Nigeria Oil and Gas Term Loan 02-Apr-2013 02-Apr-2020 No 225 225 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 1000 1000 S000PR013TL01 84 87 85.5 17.23 1694.6 Yes Senior
Sidi Krir Generating Co Africa Egypt Utilities Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2014 No 6 6 U.S. Dollar Working capital  Project Finance Yes Senior
Sidi Krir Generating Co Africa Egypt Utilities Term Loan 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2010 No 130 130 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 175 175 55 Yes Senior
Sidi Krir Generating Co Africa Egypt Utilities Term Loan 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2014 No 187 187 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 230 230 Yes Senior
Sidi Krir Generating Co Africa Egypt Utilities Bridge Loan 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2002 No 35 35 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 35 35 15 Yes Senior
Sidi Krir Generating Co Africa Egypt Utilities Other Loan 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2014 No 19.5 19.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Sociedad Concesionaria Autopista de Antofagasta SA Latin America/Caribbean Chile Construction Term Loan 16-Dec-2010 16-May-2026 No 900 0.04 Chilean Unidad de Fomento Project Finance  Project Finance Corpbanca No Senior
Socieded Contractual Minera Centenario Copper Chile Latin America/Caribbean Chile Other Loan 15-May-2009 15-May-2014 No 30 30 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Portigon AG [ex-WestLB AG] No Senior
Socieded Contractual Minera Centenario Copper Chile Latin America/Caribbean Chile Other Loan 15-May-2009 15-May-2014 No 7.5 7.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Portigon AG [ex-WestLB AG] No Senior
Societe Anonyme Marocaine de l'Industrie du Raffinage [Samir] Africa Morocco Oil and Gas Term Loan 28-Feb-2006 27-Feb-2019 No 267 267 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
 SACE [Sezione speciale per 
l'Assicurazione del Credito alla 
Esportazione]
Yes Senior
Societe Anonyme Marocaine de l'Industrie du Raffinage [Samir] Africa Morocco Oil and Gas Term Loan 28-Feb-2006 27-Feb-2019 No 85 85 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Societe des Mines de Loulo SA [SOMILO] Africa Mali Mining Term Loan 26-Oct-2004 25-Apr-2010 No 81.5 81.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd [US] No Senior
Societe des Mines de Morila SA Africa Mali Mining Term Loan 06-Sep-2004 05-Mar-2010 No 81.5 81.5 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 175 175 NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd [US] No Senior
Societe du Metro Leger de Tunis [Tunis Metro Project] Africa Tunisia Transportation Term Loan 28-Jun-2005 27-Jun-2015 No 42.7 51.49 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance
Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank SA [ex-
Calyon]
 Republic of Tunisia No Senior
Societe Nationale de Raffinage (Sonara) Africa Cameroon Oil and Gas Term Loan 21-Jun-2011 01-Apr-2019 No 107.08 107.08 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance FR + 700 35 Yes Senior
Societe Nationale de Raffinage (Sonara) Africa Cameroon Oil and Gas Term Loan 21-Jun-2011 01-Apr-2019 No 29.74 29.74 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 700 700 35 Yes Senior
Solar IPP Namibia Africa Namibia Utilities Undisclosed 03-Dec-2014 No 7 7 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Sonatrach Africa Algeria Oil and Gas Other Loan 21-Nov-2008 No 2060 2060 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Sorfert Algeria Africa Algeria General Manufacturing Term Loan 16-Apr-2008 15-Apr-2023 No 1100 1754.39 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Takoradi International Co LLC [Takoradi 2 Power Plant] Africa Ghana Utilities Term Loan 23-Jul-2012 23-Jul-2028 No 330 330 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor 
Ontwikkelingslanden NV [FMO]
Yes Senior
Talvivaara Mining Co Ltd Western Europe Finland Mining Term Loan 07-May-2007 06-May-2016 No 320 320 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance EURIBOR + 275 275
Nordea Bank AB, SG Corporate & Investment 
Banking, UniCredit Group (HVB)
T000FA010TL01 Yes Senior
Tamar Gas Field Middle East Israel Oil and Gas Term Loan 20-Apr-2012 20-Apr-2020 No 900 900 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance, Sponsored LIBOR + 475 475
Bank Hapoalim BM, Barclays Bank Plc, Citibank NA 
London, Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank 
SA [Credit Agricole CIB], HSBC Bank Plc, ING Bank, 
Israel Discount Bank Ltd [IDB], Mizrahi Tefahot Bank 
Ltd, Natixis SA, Societe Generale London
T000DM016TL01 97.5 98.5 98 5.95 566.7 Yes Senior
Tarfaya Wind Farm Africa Morocco Utilities Term Loan 16-Jan-2013 16-Jul-2028 No 2000 238.9 Moroccan Dirham Project Finance  Project Finance BRED Banque Populaire SA Yes Senior
Tarfaya Wind Farm Africa Morocco Utilities Term Loan 16-Jan-2013 16-Jul-2028 No 2000 238.9 Moroccan Dirham Project Finance  Project Finance BRED Banque Populaire SA Yes Senior
TAV [Tepe Akfen Vie Yatirim Yapim ve Isletme AS] Eastern Europe/Russia Turkey Transportation Term Loan 12-Mar-2003 11-May-2005 No 60 60 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance SP1 + 528 514 HSBC No Senior
Tema Oil Refinary Co Ltd  [TOR] Africa Ghana Oil and Gas Other Loan 06-Feb-2002 No 24.67 24.67 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 200 200 No Senior
Tharisa Minerals (Pty) Ltd Africa South Africa Mining Term Loan 03-Feb-2012 03-Feb-2019 No 1000 132.72 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance SP5 + 340 340 125 HSBC Yes Senior
Tiger Resources Ltd Asia Pacific Australia Mining Term Loan 10-Jan-2013 No 80 80 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 180 180 Yes Senior
Tiomin Kenya Ltd Africa Kenya Mining Term Loan 31-Jul-2007 No 40 40 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance  Tiomin Resources Inc Yes Senior
Titan Africa Inc USA/Canada United States Delay Draw Term Loan 10-Dec-1999 31-Dec-2003 No 300 46.34 French Franc Project Finance  Non Investment Grade, Project Finance FR + 950
 Office des Postes et 
Telecommunications du Benin
Yes Senior
Total Gabon SA Africa Gabon Oil and Gas Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 30-May-2013 30-May-2016 No 30 30 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 200 200 Yes Senior
Tynagh Energy Ltd Western Europe Ireland Utilities Other Loan 08-Dec-2004 No 25 33.34 Euro Project Finance  Project Finance KBC Bank NV, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [RBS] No Mezzanine
United Development Co PSC [UDC] Middle East Qatar Real Estate Term Loan 30-Aug-2008 29-Aug-2017 No 285.7 285.7 US Dollar (Same Day) Project Finance  Project Finance SP4 + 165 130
Al Khaliji Commercial Bank QSC [KCBK], 
Commercial Bank of Qatar QSC [CBQ], Mashreqbank 
psc, Qatar Islamic Bank QSC, Standard Chartered 
Bank Plc [SCB]
Yes Senior
United Republic of Tanzania Africa Tanzania Government Term Loan 09-Aug-2011 09-Aug-2018 No 50 50 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
United Republic of Tanzania Africa Tanzania Government Term Loan 09-Aug-2011 09-Aug-2018 No 150 150 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
 African Trade Insurance Agency [ATI], 
Export Credit Insurance Corp of South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd [ECIC]
Yes Senior
United Republic of Tanzania Africa Tanzania Government Term Loan 09-Aug-2011 09-Aug-2016 No 50 50 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Vivo Energy Investments BV Western Europe Netherlands Wholesale Term Loan 31-Oct-2014 31-Oct-2018 No 160 160 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance
Barclays, BNP Paribas SA, Societe Generale SA, 
Standard Bank Plc
Yes Senior
Vodafone Ghana Ltd Africa Ghana Telecommunications Other Loan 17-Jun-2011 No 33 33 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance International Finance Corp Yes Senior
Volta River Authority Africa Ghana Utilities Term Loan 30-Nov-2012 30-Nov-2017 No 150 150 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance LIBOR + 900 900 Yes Senior
Windfall 59 Properties Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 03-Jul-2013 03-Jul-2028 No 1754 174.7 South African Rand Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Xina Solar One CSP Africa South Africa Utilities Term Loan 17-Mar-2015 No 660 660 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior
Yau Lee Construction Co Ltd Asia Pacific Hong Kong Construction Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 08-May-1997 01-Nov-1999 No 220 Hong Kong Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance HIBOR + 125 45 35 Banque Nationale de Paris Hong Kong  Yau Lee Holdings Ltd Yes Senior
Zain Communications Ghana Ltd Africa Ghana Telecommunications Term Loan 15-Jul-2009 No 70 70 U.S. Dollar Project Finance  Project Finance Yes Senior





























All In Spread 
Drawn (bps)













Converted (MM)(USD) Primary Purpose
Unfiltered Dealscan Database
    
101 | P a g e  




Country CRR Major Industry Group Tranche Type Secured Seniority Type
Algeria 4 Construction 0 0 Other Loan 0 02-Dec-2002 01-Dec-2014 144 No 1 66 66 66 U.S. Dollar 1 300 0 0 Senior 1
Botswana 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 25-Jul-2011 31-Mar-2015 44 No 1 180 180 180 U.S. Dollar 1 375 1 1 Senior 1
Botswana 3 Mining 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 25-Jul-2011 31-Mar-2015 44 No 1 25 25 25 U.S. Dollar 1 450 1 1 Senior 1
Cameroon 6 Utilities 0 1 Bridge Loan 0 31-May-2011 05-Jan-2012 8 No 1 119.76 119.76 119.76 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 250 1 1 Senior 1
Cameroon 6 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 21-Jun-2011 01-Apr-2019 94 No 1 107.08 107.08 107.08 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 700 1 1 Senior 1
Cameroon 6 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 21-Jun-2011 01-Apr-2019 93 No 1 29.74 29.74 29.74 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 700 1 1 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber 0 1 Revolver/Term Loan 0 23-Jan-2004 22-Jan-2012 96 No 1 110 110 110 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber 0 1 Revolver/Term Loan 0 23-Jan-2004 22-Jan-2012 96 No 1 75 12.21 12.21 Egyptian Pound 0 200 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Telecommunications 0 1 Term Loan 1 22-Apr-1999 21-Oct-2005 78 No 1 220 220 220 U.S. Dollar 1 140 1 1 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Telecommunications 0 1 Term Loan 1 22-Apr-1999 22-Oct-2006 78 No 1 350 350 350 U.S. Dollar 1 160 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 14-Jul-2005 13-Jul-2017 144 No 1 411.2 411.2 411.2 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Guarantee 0 14-Jul-2005 13-Jul-2015 120 No 1 144 144 144 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Guarantee 0 14-Jul-2005 13-Jul-2015 120 No 1 144 144 144 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 13-Dec-2001 12-Dec-2008 84 No 1 104 104 104 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Other Loan 0 08-Sep-2010 07-Mar-2028 210 No 1 112.5 112.5 112.5 U.S. Dollar 1 300 0 0 Mezzanine 0
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 08-Sep-2010 08-Mar-2028 210 No 1 200 200 200 U.S. Dollar 1 300 1 1 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Oil and Gas 1 0 Guarantee 0 08-Sep-2010 31-Dec-2025 183 No 1 472.5 472.5 472.5 U.S. Dollar 1 300 1 1 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2010 12 No 1 130 130 130 U.S. Dollar 1 175 1 1 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2014 60 No 1 187 187 187 U.S. Dollar 1 230 1 1 Senior 1
Egypt 4 Utilities 0 1 Bridge Loan 0 02-Aug-1999 01-Aug-2002 36 No 1 35 35 35 U.S. Dollar 1 35 1 1 Senior 1
Gabon 5 Business Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 22-Aug-2011 01-Mar-2015 43 No 1 28.73 28.73 28.73 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 700 1 1 Senior 1
Gabon 5 Business Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 12-Jul-2012 12-Jul-2019 84 No 1 100 100 100 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 400 1 1 Senior 1
Gabon 5 Business Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 12-Jul-2012 12-Jul-2022 120 No 1 20 20 20 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 400 1 1 Senior 1
Gabon 5 Business Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 12-Jul-2012 12-Jul-2019 84 No 1 70 85.37 85.37 Euro 1 625 1 1 Senior 1
Gabon 5 Oil and Gas 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 30-May-2013 30-May-2016 36 No 1 30 30 30 U.S. Dollar 1 200 1 1 Senior 1
Ghana 6 Mining 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 22-Sep-1997 22-Sep-2001 48 No 1 60 60 60 U.S. Dollar 1 160 0 0 Senior 1
Ghana 6 Oil and Gas 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 14-Mar-2014 31-Mar-2021 84 Yes 0 1500 1500 1500 U.S. Dollar 1 325 1 1 Senior 1
Ghana 6 Oil and Gas 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 15-Jul-2011 29-Mar-2018 80 Yes 0 2000 2000 2000 U.S. Dollar 1 455 1 1 Senior 1
Ghana 6 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 13-Jul-2009 12-Dec-2015 65 No 1 600 600 600 U.S. Dollar 1 550 1 1 Senior 1
Ghana 6 Oil and Gas 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2022 84 No 1 150 150 150 U.S. Dollar 1 325 1 1 Senior 1
Ghana 6 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 30-Nov-2012 30-Nov-2017 60 No 1 150 150 150 U.S. Dollar 1 900 1 1 Senior 1
Ivory Coast 7 Financial Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 20-Feb-2014 20-Feb-2016 24 No 1 86 86 86 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 700 1 1 Senior 1
Ivory Coast 7 Financial Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 20-Feb-2014 20-Feb-2019 24 No 1 174 174 174 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 800 1 1 Senior 1
Kenya 6 Utilities 0 1 Other Loan 0 09-Oct-2013 09-Oct-2023 120 No 1 90 90 90 U.S. Dollar 1 575 1 1 Senior 1
Kenya 6 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 0 1 Term Loan 1 12-Aug-2013 12-Aug-2022 108 No 1 100 100 100 U.S. Dollar 1 700 1 1 Senior 1
Kenya 6 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 0 1 Term Loan 1 12-Aug-2013 12-Aug-2025 144 No 1 20 20 20 U.S. Dollar 1 600 1 1 Senior 1
Kenya 6 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 26-Mar-2014 26-Mar-2029 180 No 1 110 151.59 151.59 Euro 1 475 1 1 Senior 1
Kenya 6 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 26-Mar-2014 26-Mar-2029 180 No 1 10 13.78 13.78 Euro 1 475 1 1 Senior 1
Liberia 7 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 04-Dec-2013 13-Sep-2019 69 No 1 80 80 80 U.S. Dollar 1 500 1 1 Senior 1
Liberia 7 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 04-Dec-2013 13-Sep-2019 69 No 1 8 8 8 U.S. Dollar 1 500 1 1 Senior 1
Liberia 7 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 04-Dec-2013 13-Mar-2020 75 No 1 12 12 12 U.S. Dollar 1 750 1 1 Subordinated 0
Mali 6 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 06-Sep-2004 05-Mar-2010 66 No 1 81.5 81.5 81.5 U.S. Dollar 1 175 0 0 Senior 1
Morocco 4 Utilities 0 1 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 144 No 1 237 237 237 U.S. Dollar 1 212.5 0 0 Senior 1
Morocco 4 Utilities 0 1 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 144 No 1 256 256 256 U.S. Dollar 1 100 0 0 Senior 1
Morocco 4 Utilities 0 1 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 144 No 1 35 35 35 U.S. Dollar 1 200 0 0 Senior 1
Morocco 4 Utilities 0 1 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 30-Sep-1997 30-Sep-2009 144 No 1 176 176 176 U.S. Dollar 1 175 0 0 Senior 1
Mozambique 6 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 30-Apr-2008 30-Dec-2017 116 No 1 5736 763.78 763.78 South African Rand 1 190 0 0 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 0 1 Term Loan 1 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 60 No 1 50 50 50 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 300 1 1 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 0 1 Term Loan 1 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 60 No 1 13.3 13.3 13.3 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 900 1 1 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 0 1 Term Loan 1 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 60 No 1 80 80 80 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 300 1 1 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 0 1 Term Loan 1 26-Jan-2011 25-Jan-2016 60 No 1 80 80 80 U.S. Dollar 1 500 1 1 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber 0 1 Term Loan 1 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2024 132 No 1 475 475 475 U.S. Dollar 1 495 1 1 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber 0 1 Term Loan 1 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2021 96 No 1 135 135 135 U.S. Dollar 1 475 1 1 Senior 1
Nigeria 5 Oil and Gas 1 0 Term Loan 1 02-Apr-2013 02-Apr-2020 84 No 1 225 225 225 U.S. Dollar 1 1000 1 1 Senior 1
Senegal 6 Utilities 0 1 Other Loan 0 15-Sep-2013 15-Sep-2027 168 No 1 55 73.11 73.11 Euro 1 525 1 1 Senior 1
Senegal 6 Utilities 0 1 Other Loan 0 15-Sep-2013 15-Sep-2027 168 No 1 0.03 0.03 0.03 US Dollar (Same Day) 1 525 1 1 Senior 1
Seychelles 6 Financial Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 19-Dec-1997 19-Dec-2000 36 No 1 30 30 30 U.S. Dollar 1 200 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 28-Jun-2013 28-Jun-2031 96 No 1 3000 305.19 305.19 South African Rand 0 390 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Construction 0 0 Term Loan 1 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2019 72 Yes 0 2176.57 277.64 277.64 South African Rand 0 400 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Construction 0 0 Term Loan 1 27-Feb-2013 27-Feb-2019 72 Yes 0 2087.43 236.8 236.8 South African Rand 0 450 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Construction 0 0 Mezzanine Tranche 0 27-Feb-2013 27-May-2019 75 Yes 0 936 106.18 106.18 South African Rand 0 825 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 30-Mar-2001 30-Mar-2006 60 No 1 350 43.57 43.57 South African Rand 0 225 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 30-Mar-2001 29-Mar-2006 60 No 1 350 43.57 43.57 South African Rand 0 275 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 17-May-1999 16-May-2003 48 No 1 24.21 24.21 24.21 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 17-May-1999 16-May-2003 48 No 1 100 100 100 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 30-Jan-2013 30-Jan-2028 180 No 1 650 650 650 U.S. Dollar 1 350 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 14-Dec-2007 13-Dec-2015 96 No 1 505 73.62 73.62 South African Rand 0 351 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 14-Dec-2007 13-Dec-2019 144 No 1 120 17.49 17.49 South African Rand 0 511 1 1 Mezzanine 0
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Other Loan 0 14-Dec-2007 13-Dec-2015 96 No 1 90 13.12 13.12 South African Rand 0 611 1 1 Subordinated 0
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 14-Dec-2011 15-Dec-2013 24 No 1 150 150 150 U.S. Dollar 1 400 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Services 0 0 Term Loan 1 04-Aug-2009 03-Aug-2027 216 No 1 30.6 3.92 3.92 South African Rand 0 810 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 14-Nov-2006 14-Nov-2016 120 No 1 150 150 150 U.S. Dollar 1 45 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 01-Jul-2009 30-Jun-2018 108 No 1 750 97.06 97.06 South African Rand 0 450 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 02-Nov-2012 02-Nov-2029 204 No 1 967.13 110.91 110.91 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 02-Nov-2012 02-Nov-2029 204 No 1 2067.18 237.06 237.06 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 02-Nov-2012 02-Nov-2029 204 No 1 991.91 113.75 113.75 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 192 No 1 800 69.9 69.9 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 192 No 1 1115 97.42 97.42 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 192 No 1 550 48.05 48.05 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 25-Feb-2015 25-Feb-2031 192 No 1 1160 101.35 101.35 South African Rand 0 310 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 1 Term Loan 1 15-Jun-2001 20-Jan-2006 54 No 1 90 90 90 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 1 Term Loan 1 15-Jun-2001 14-Jan-2006 54 No 1 35 35 35 U.S. Dollar 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 1 Term Loan 1 21-Nov-2008 20-Nov-2009 12 No 1 1000 1000 1000 U.S. Dollar 1 425 1 1 Senior 1
South Africa 3 Mining 1 1 Term Loan 1 03-Feb-2012 03-Feb-2019 84 No 1 1000 132.72 132.72 South African Rand 0 340 1 1 Senior 1
Tanzania 6 Mining 1 0 Term Loan 1 19-Dec-2012 19-Dec-2019 84 No 1 142 142 142 U.S. Dollar 1 250 1 1 Senior 1
Tunisia 3 Telecommunications 0 1 Term Loan 1 02-Nov-2004 01-Nov-2011 84 No 1 130 165.42 165.42 Euro 1 150 0 0 Senior 1
Zambia 5 Utilities 0 1 Term Loan 1 12-Jun-2015 12-Jun-2028 156 No 1 142 142 142 U.S. Dollar 1 350 1 1 Senior 1
Zambia 5 Mining 1 1 Term Loan 1 31-Jan-2012 24-Jan-2017 60 No 1 300 300 300 U.S. Dollar 1 300 1 1 Senior 1
Zambia 5 Mining 1 1 Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr. 0 31-Jan-2012 24-Jan-2017 60 No 1 700 700 700 U.S. Dollar 1 300 1 1 Senior 1
1







(MM) Tranche Amount Converted (MM)(USD)
Loan Size ($ 
MN) Tranche Currency Currency Risk
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Regression Model Parameters 
  
CRR Industry Risk Coll Assets Tranche Regg Loan Term (Months) Tr Amd Regg Loan Size ($ MN) Currency Risk Secured Regg Sen Regg All In Spread Drawn (bps)
4 0 1 0 96 1 110 1 0 1 150
4 0 1 0 96 1 12.21 0 0 1 200
4 0 0 0 144 1 66 1 0 1 300
6 1 0 0 48 1 60 1 0 1 160
6 1 0 1 84 1 142 1 1 1 250
6 0 0 1 36 1 30 1 1 1 200
3 1 0 1 44 1 180 1 1 1 375
3 1 0 0 44 1 25 1 1 1 450
4 0 1 1 78 1 220 1 1 1 140
4 0 1 1 78 1 350 1 0 1 160
4 1 0 1 144 1 411.2 1 0 1 150
4 1 0 0 120 1 144 1 0 1 150
4 1 0 0 120 1 144 1 0 1 150
4 1 0 1 84 1 104 1 0 1 150
4 1 0 0 210 1 112.5 1 0 0 300
4 1 0 1 210 1 200 1 1 1 300
4 1 0 0 183 1 472.5 1 1 1 300
7 0 0 1 24 1 86 1 1 1 700
7 0 0 1 24 1 174 1 1 1 800
5 0 0 1 43 1 28.73 1 1 1 700
5 0 1 1 60 1 50 1 1 1 300
5 0 1 1 60 1 13.3 1 1 1 900
5 0 1 1 60 1 80 1 1 1 300
5 0 1 1 60 1 80 1 1 1 500
6 0 1 1 116 1 763.78 1 0 1 190
5 0 1 1 132 1 475 1 1 1 495
5 0 1 1 96 1 135 1 1 1 475
5 0 1 1 156 1 142 1 1 1 350
4 0 1 0 144 1 237 1 0 1 212.5
4 0 1 0 144 1 256 1 0 1 100
4 0 1 0 144 1 35 1 0 1 200
4 0 1 0 144 1 176 1 0 1 175
5 1 1 1 60 1 300 1 1 1 300
5 1 1 0 60 1 700 1 1 1 300
6 0 1 0 120 1 90 1 1 1 575
6 1 0 0 84 0 1500 1 1 1 325
6 1 0 0 80 0 2000 1 1 1 455
6 1 0 1 65 1 600 1 1 1 550
6 0 1 0 8 1 119.76 1 1 1 250
6 0 1 1 108 1 100 1 1 1 700
6 0 1 1 144 1 20 1 1 1 600
6 0 1 1 180 1 151.59 1 1 1 475
6 0 1 1 180 1 13.78 1 1 1 475
7 1 0 1 69 1 80 1 1 1 500
7 1 0 1 69 1 8 1 1 1 500
7 1 0 1 75 1 12 1 1 0 750
5 0 0 1 84 1 100 1 1 1 400
5 0 0 1 120 1 20 1 1 1 400
5 0 0 1 84 1 85.37 1 1 1 625
3 0 1 1 84 1 165.42 1 0 1 150
6 1 0 0 84 1 150 1 1 1 325
6 0 1 0 168 1 73.11 1 1 1 525
6 0 1 0 168 1 0.03 1 1 1 525
5 1 0 1 84 1 225 1 1 1 1000
4 0 1 1 12 1 130 1 1 1 175
4 0 1 1 60 1 187 1 1 1 230
4 0 1 0 36 1 35 1 1 1 35
6 1 0 1 66 1 81.5 1 0 1 175
6 1 0 1 94 1 107.08 1 1 1 700
6 1 0 1 93 1 29.74 1 1 1 700
5 1 0 0 36 1 30 1 1 1 200
6 0 1 1 60 1 150 1 1 1 900
3 0 1 1 96 1 305.19 0 1 1 390
Regression Model Parameters
CRR Industry Risk Coll Assets Tranche Regg Loan Term (Months) Tr Amd Regg Loan Size ($ MN) Currency Risk Secured Regg Sen Regg All In Spread Drawn (bps)
3 0 0 1 72 0 277.64 0 1 1 400
3 0 0 1 72 0 236.8 0 1 1 450
3 0 0 0 75 0 106.18 0 0 1 825
3 1 0 1 60 1 43.57 0 0 1 225
3 1 0 1 60 1 43.57 0 0 1 275
3 1 0 0 48 1 24.21 1 0 1 150
3 1 0 1 48 1 100 1 0 1 150
3 1 0 1 180 1 650 1 1 1 350
3 1 0 1 96 1 73.62 0 1 1 351
3 1 0 1 144 1 17.49 0 1 0 511
3 1 0 0 96 1 13.12 0 1 0 611
3 1 0 1 24 1 150 1 1 1 400
3 0 0 1 216 1 3.92 0 1 1 810
3 1 0 1 120 1 150 1 1 1 45
3 1 0 1 108 1 97.06 0 1 1 450
3 0 1 1 204 1 110.91 0 1 1 310
3 0 1 1 204 1 237.06 0 1 1 310
3 0 1 1 204 1 113.75 0 1 1 310
3 0 1 1 192 1 69.9 0 1 1 310
3 0 1 1 192 1 97.42 0 1 1 310
3 0 1 1 192 1 48.05 0 1 1 310
3 0 1 1 192 1 101.35 0 1 1 310
3 1 1 1 54 1 90 1 0 1 150
3 1 1 1 54 1 35 1 0 1 150
3 1 1 1 12 1 1000 1 1 1 425
3 1 1 1 84 1 132.72 0 1 1 340
1
Regression Model Parameters
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Regression Model Parameters Descriptions 
  
Name Label Type of data Format Codes Notes
CRR Country Risk Rank Numerical 1 TO 7 The risk rank is rated from 1 to 7, in order of the more riskiness.
Industry Risk Industry Risk Rank Binary 0/1 1= High Risk The High Risk Industry will use a dummy variable with a value of one, and the low risk industry will have a dummy variable value of zero.
0 = Low Risk
Coll Assets Collateralizeable Assets Binary 0/1 1= Asset Rich
0= No Assets
Tranche Reg Tranche Type Binary 0/1 1= Term Loans, etc Term Loan, Revolver/Line loans with maturities greater than 1 year, Guarantee Loans, Mezzanine Tranche, Bridge Loans and Other Loans are recorded in this data field. 
0= "Other" loans
Loan Term (Months) Loan Term (Months) Numerical # months The loan term can be calculated as the difference between the maturity and activation dates, and will be presented in months.
Tr Amd Regg Tranche Amended Binary 0/1 1 = No This is data field which only represents a “Yes” or “No” input
0 = Yes
Loan Size ($ MN) Loan Size ($ MN) Numerical
Currency Risk Currency Risk Binary 0/1 1 = Yes The “Tranche Currency” is not the local currency of the “Country”
0 = No
Secured Regg Loan Secured Binary 0/1 1 = Yes A dummy variable with a value of one will be used if the loan is secured by a third‐party guarantee, and zero otherwise;
0 = No
Sen Regg Seniority Type Binary 0/1 1 = Senior Senior loans a  dummy variable with a value of one and Mezzanine/subordinate loans a value of zero
0 = Subordinate
All In Spread Drawn (bps) All in Spread Drawn Numerical Presented in basis points, and represents the total cost of the loans to the borrower
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the borrower is in an industry generally considered to be rich in collateralizeable assets (tangible, non‐specialized assets), and 0 otherwise
(such as financial‐ and business services, oil & gas, construction, mining and services);
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9 Appendix B: Categorical Predictors 
 
Frequency tables for categorical predictors follow. 
County Risk Rank (CRR) 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
3 30 33.71 33.71 
4 19 21.35 21.35 
5 15 16.85 16.85 
6 20 22.47 22.47 
7 5 5.62 5.62 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
The sample size is small for category 7. Although strictly categorical, the variable is 
brought into the model as continuous to reduce the number of model parameters. 
Industry Risk 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 49 55.06 55.06 
1 40 44.94 44.94 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
 
Collateralisable Assets 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 46 51.69 51.69 
1 43 48.31 48.31 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
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Tranche Regg 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 26 29.21 29.21 
1 63 70.79 70.79 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
 
Tr Amd Regg 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 5 5.62 5.62 
1 84 94.38 94.38 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
There are very few data points for category 0. 
Currency Risk 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 20 22.47 22.47 
1 69 77.53 77.53 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
 
Secured Regg 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 24 26.97 26.97 
1 65 73.03 73.03 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
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Sen Regg 
  Frequency Percentage 
Valid 
Percentage 
0 4 4.49 4.49 
1 85 95.51 95.51 
Total 89 100.00 100.00 
There are very few data points for category 0. 
Continuous Predictors 
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This variable has a long tail to the right. A log (base 10) transformation was applied to 
the variable, to pull in the tail, to avoid having some data points with ‘very different’ 
predictor values and possibly pulling the regression line.  
 
After transformation, there is now one data point with a relatively low loan size (further 
discussed below).  
Interpretation of the new (transformed) loan size: A one-unit increase corresponds to a 
tenfold increase in the original untransformed loan size.  
Continuous Response 
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10 Appendix C: Simple Linear Regression Model 
 
The results of the simple linear regression model are shown in the table below. 
 
Simple Linear Regression 
 




95% CI lower 
limit 
95% CI upper limit P-value 
Industry Risk -48.213 -137.517 41.090 0.293 
Collateralizeable Assets -72.408 -160.572 15.755    0.111** 
Tranche Type 103.527 7.649 199.404  0.037* 
Tranche Amended -118.673 -311.220 73.875 0.230 
Currency Risk -27.610 -134.564 79.344 0.614 
Loan Secured 233.817 145.868 321.766 <0.001* 
Loan Seniority Type -171.724 -384.477 41.030    0.117** 
County Risk Rank 61.453 29.776 93.130 <0.001* 
Loan Term (Months) -0.112 -0.933 0.709 0.789 
Log of Loan Size (log10) -71.458 -141.437 -1.479 0.048* 
 
All-in Spread 
As the All-in-Spread (AIS) is the dependent variable, the mean is 378.99, with a standard 
deviation of 212.76 and Median of 310.00. 
Running all the Categorical and Continuous Predictors in the simple linear regression 
model provided indication of their independent effects on AIS. The findings are discussed 
herewith below: 
Industry Risk: 
Industry Risk consisted out of 55.06% “0” and 44.94% “1” indicators, with 0 representing 
low risk industries and 1 representing high-risk industries. 
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In the simple linear regression model, as the Industry Risk variable is moved from 0 to 1 
(i.e. low risk to high risk industry), the mean response on AIS decreases by 48.213 (95% 
CI for effect: -137.517; 41.090; P-value: 0.293). This P-value is relatively large at 29.3% 
and can be viewed as been statistically insignificant on AIS.  
From the results above, Industry Risk does decrease the All-in-Spread as the industry 
changes from a low risk to a high risk sector, but the high P-values result in the Industry 
Risk variable actually not having a real effect on the AIS. 
Collateralisable Assets: 
Collateralisable Assets consisted out of 51.69% “0” and 48.31% “1” indicators, with 1 
representing the borrower who is in an industry wish is not rich in collateralisable assets 
(such as financial- and business services, oil & gas, construction, mining and services) to 
an industry generally considered rich in collateralisable assets (tangible, non-specialized 
assets). 
In the simple linear regression model, as the Collateralisable Assets variable is moved 
from 0 to 1, the mean response on AIS decreases by 72.408 (95% CI for effect: -160.572; 
15.755; P-value: 0.111). This P-value is moderately large at 11.1% and can be viewed as 
being statistically insignificant on AIS.  
From the results above, Collateralisable Assets does decrease the All-in-Spread as the 
industry changes from a non-collateralisable to collateralisable sector, but the high P-
values result in the Collateralisable Assets variable actually not having a real effect on the 
AIS. 
Tranche Type 
Tranche Type consisted out of 29.21% “0” and 70.79% “1” indicators, with 1 representing 
Term loans, revolver/line loans with maturities greater than 1 year, guarantee Loans, 
mezzanine Tranche, bridge loans and 0 for all other loans which are not specific to project 
finance. 
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In the simple linear regression model, as the Tranche Type variable is moved from 0 to 1, 
the mean response on AIS increases by 103.527 (95% CI for effect: 7.649; 199.404; P-
value: 0.037). This P-value at 3.7% and can be viewed as being statistically significant on 
AIS.  
From the results above, Tranche Type does increase the All-in-Spread as the industry 
changes from a low risk to a high risk sector, but the high P-values result in the Tranche 
Type variable actually having a real effect on AIS in the simple linear regression model, 
but not having a real effect in the multiple linear regression model. 
Tranche Amended 
Tranche Amended consisted out of 5.62% “0” and 94.38% “1” indicators, with 0 
representing “Yes”, indicating that the loan tranche has been amended before, and 1 
indicating “No” indicating that the loan tranche has not been amended prior to being 
finalised and granted. 
In the simple linear regression model, as the Tranche Amended variable is moved from 0 
to 1, the mean response on AIS decreases by 118.673 (95% CI for effect: -311.220; 73.875; 
P-value: 0.230). This P-value at 23.0% is extremely high and can be viewed that Tranche 
Amended is not statistically significant on AIS.  
From viewing the results above inversely, as a loan tranche has been amended, it 
increases the All-in-Spread, but the high P-values result in the Tranche Amended having 
no real effect on AIS in both the simple linear regression model and in the multiple linear 
regression model. 
Currency Risk 
Currency Risk consisted out of 22.47% “0” and 77.53% “1” indicators, with 0 representing 
loan tranche currency being the same currency as the currency as the country in which 
the project is, and 1 representing whether the loan tranche currency is from a foreign 
currency. 
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In the simple linear regression model, as the Currency Risk variable is moved from 0 to 
1, the mean response on AIS decreases by 27.610 (95% CI for effect: 134.564; 79.344; P-
value: 0.614). The P-value at 61.4% is extremely high, which results in Currency Risk 
having no real effect on AIS. 
From the results above, as Currency Risk moved from local to foreign sourced, it 
decreases the All-in-Spread, but the high P-values result in the Currency Risk having no 
real effect on AIS in both the simple linear regression model and in the multiple linear 
regression model. 
Loan Secured  
Loan Secured consisted out of 26.97% “0” and 73.03% “1” indicators, with 1 representing 
a dummy variable if the loan is secured by a third-party guarantee, and 0 otherwise. 
In the simple linear regression model, as the Loan Secured variable is moved from 0 to 1, 
the mean response on AIS increases by 233.817 (95% CI for effect: 145.868; 321.766; P-
value: <0.001). This P-value at <0.1% and can be viewed as being highly statistically 
significant on AIS.  
From the results above, Loan Secured does increase the All-in-Spread as the borrower 
changes from a loan requiring no third-party guarantees to loans which do, and the 
extremely low P-values result in the Loan Secured variable having a real effect on AIS in 
the simple linear- and multiple linear regression models. 
Loan Seniority Type 
Loan Seniority Type consisted out of 4.49% “0” and 95.51% “1” indicators, with 0 
indicating subordinate loan types and 1 indicating senior loan types. 
In the simple linear regression model, as the Loan Seniority Type variable is moved from 
0 to 1, the mean response on AIS decreases by 171.724 (95% CI for effect: -384.477; 
41.030; P-value: 0.117). This P-value at 11.7% and can be viewed as being statistically 
insignificant on AIS.  
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From the results above, Loan Seniority Type does decrease the All-in-Spread as the loan 
type changes from subordinate to senior loans, but the high P-values result in the Loan 
Seniority Type variable actually having no real effect on AIS in the simple linear- and 
multiple linear regression models. 
Country Risk Rank  
Country Risk Rank is ranked from 1 to 7, in order of the countries sovereign’s riskiness.  
The sample sized is relatively small for a category of seven variables, and although strictly 
a Categorical Predictor, the variable is brought into the models as continuous to reduce 
the number of model parameters. The variables consist out of 33.71% “3”, 21.35% “4”, 
16.85% “5”, 22.47% “6” and 5.62% “7” country risk rankings. 
In the simple linear regression model, as the Country Risk Rank variable is moved by one 
unit, the mean response on AIS increases by 61.453 (95% CI for effect: 29.776; 93.130; P-
value: <0.001). This P-value at <0.1% and can be viewed as being highly statistically 
significant on AIS.  
From the results above, as Country Risk Rank variable is moved by one unit it does 
increase the All-in-Spread as the countries sovereign risk increases, and the extremely 
low P-values result in the Loan Secured variable having a real effect on AIS in the simple 
linear- and multiple linear regression models. 
Loan Term 
Loan Term was calculated as the difference between the maturity and activation dates, 
and each unit presents one month, as a Continuous Predictor, and is represented in the 
frequency histogram below: 
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In the simple linear regression model, as the Loan Term variable is moved by one unit, 
the mean response on AIS decreases by 0.112 (95% CI for effect: -0.933; 0.709; P-value: 
0.789). This P-value at 78.9% is extremely high and can be viewed that Loan Term has no 
statistically significant effect on AIS. 
From the results above, Loan Term does decrease the All-in-Spread as the maturity of the 
loan increases, but the extremely high P-values result in the Loan Term variable actually 
having no real effect on AIS in both the simple linear and the multiple linear regression 
models. 
Loan Size  
Loan Size is a Continuous Predictor that has a long tail to the right, as shown in the graph 
below: 
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A log (base 10) transformation was applied to the variable, to pull in the tail, to avoid 
having some data points with ‘very different’ predictor values and possibly pulling the 
regression line.  
 
Post the log transformation, one data point has a relatively low loan size. The new log-
transformed loan size can be interpreted as a one-unit increase corresponds to a tenfold 
increase in the original untransformed loan size.  
In the simple linear regression model, as the Log of Loan Size variable is increased by one 
unit, the mean response on AIS decreases by 71.458 (95% CI for effect: -141.437; -1.47; 
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P-value: 0.048). This P-value at 4.8% and can be viewed as being statistically significant 
on AIS.  
From the results above, increasing the Loan Size does decrease the All-in-Spread the 
relatively high P-values result in the Loan Size variable actually having a real effect on AIS 
in the simple linear regression model, but not having a real effect in the multiple linear 
regression model. 
Standard deviation of Regression Models 
The estimate for standard deviation (𝜎  ) in the simple linear regression has a range from 
188 to 215, and in the multiple regression, the estimate of 𝜎  is 168.  
An ANOVA test was used to assess overall significance of the model. The low p-value 
(<0.001) leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that all parameters, except the intercept 
𝛼0, equals 0.  
Co-efficient of Determinants 
In order to assess how well the model fits the data, the co-efficient of determinants are 
used to assess the degree of variation in the response’s variables in the model outputs, 
represented by the R-square statistic, which provides the percentage of the deviance in 
the response variable for by adding the explanatory variable into the model (Hutcheson,  
2011).  
To account for distortions of R-square as more variables are added to the model 
(deviances reduce as additional variances are added), the Adjusted R-square statistics are 
calculated which take into account the number of terms entered into the model 
(Hutcheson, 2011). 
The R2 and Adjusted R2 values for the Simple Linear Regression Models: 
             Variable       R2 Adjusted R2 
Industry Risk 0.0127062560 0.001358052 
Collateralizeable Assets 0.0289223613 0.017760549 
Tranche Type 0.0489605034 0.038029015 
Tranche Amended 0.0164960051 0.005191361 
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Currency Risk 0.0029338972 -0.008526633 
Loan Secured 0.2378510954 0.229090763 
Loan Seniority Type 0.0279619185 0.016789067 
County Risk Rank 0.1424988217 0.132642486 
Loan Term (Months) 0.0008274197 -0.010657323 
Log of Loan Size (log10) 0.0440140488 0.033025705 
 
Residual Plots 
Residuals plots were used to assess model assumptions and fit, with Standardized 
Pearson Residuals plotted. The visual examination of the residuals (miss-predictions of 
the fitted data to the model) is a useful mean to observe obvious deviations from 
randomness. 
The following diagnostic residual plots were produced:  
Scatter plot of residuals (y-axis) against fitted values (x-axis), or predictor variables (x-
axis): The scatter of residuals should fall into a horizontal band, centred on 0. There 
should not be much variation in the vertical spread of points, or trends, as the fitted value 
/ predictor changes. Residuals should thin out as you move away from 0 (vertically), with 
only about 5% of values larger than 2 in magnitude.  
Histogram of residuals: This should be approximately normally distributed with a mean 
of 0 and variance of 1 (bell shaped curve centred around 0, with about 68% of residuals 
within -1 to 1, and 95% within -2 to 2). 
There is evidence of some model misfit when considering only single predictors, such as 
Country Risk Rank. The simple linear regression model consistently overestimates the 
response for the Country Risk Rank category 4 (the second highest fitted value), imposing 
a linear relationship between Country Risk Rank (continuous), resulting in the expected 
response which does not seem appropriate.  The remaining parameters in model seem 
okay. The point lying far to the right for Log of Loan Size corresponds to the very small 
loan size of 0.03.  
In the multiple linear regression model (Model B) it can be noted that the pattern of 
residuals by Country Risk Ranking has improved. The comparison of the Standardized 
    
121 | P a g e  
Determinants of the Cost of Credit for Project Finance Debt in Africa 
Pearson Residuals plotted for the simple linear- and multiple linear regression models 
are shown below: 
  
Single Linear Regression   Multiple Linear Regression 
  
It should be noted that the Country Risk Rank in the simple linear regression does not 
seem right when not accounting for other variables. A possible means of rectifying the 
discrepancy would be to allow for each of the five categories in Country Risk Rank to have 
their own mean responses. However the sample sizes are already small, and this effect 
the results in the multiple linear regression model. Since the problem disappeared in the 
multiple regression model, we decided to leave the CRR variable as is. 
The Standardized Pearson Residuals plotted for the simple linear- and multiple linear 
regression models are shown on the following pages. 
Residual Plots – Simple Linear Regressions 
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11 Appendix D: Model B Residual Plots 
 
The Standardized Pearson Residuals plotted for Model B multiple linear regression 
models are presented on the following pages: 
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